418. The Coming Crisis of Uninsurable Homes

Climate Change, Property Values and the Shrinking Economy

For generations, home ownership has been regarded as one of the safest forms of personal wealth. A house provides shelter, security and an asset which can be sold, inherited or used as security for borrowing. Much of Britain’s financial system has been built around the assumption that residential property will retain its value.

That assumption is now coming under threat.

An article by Harry Brennan in The Daily Telegraph on 14 October 2026 reports warnings from senior figures in the insurance industry that climate change could make increasing numbers of British homes difficult, or even impossible, to insure.

The implications extend far beyond the insurance industry. They could undermine the mortgage market, reduce property values, damage household wealth and add another source of instability to an economy already struggling with the consequences of declining growth.

The Insurance Problem

There is also an important connection with Localism.

Insurance works by spreading risk across large numbers of policyholders. Most properties suffer no serious damage in any particular year, allowing the premiums collected from many households to pay the claims of relatively few.

But what happens when the risks increase substantially?

Flooding, subsidence, coastal erosion and wildfires are becoming increasingly important considerations for insurers. Where damage becomes more frequent, insurance premiums must rise. Where the probability of serious damage becomes too great, insurers may withdraw cover altogether.

This is not simply a theoretical possibility.

Tenbury Wells in Worcestershire has already attracted attention as an example of a town where repeated flooding has created serious difficulties in obtaining affordable flood insurance.

The Environment Agency estimates that around 6.3 million properties in England are currently at risk of flooding, with the number potentially increasing substantially by the middle of the century. Subsidence presents another growing problem, particularly where prolonged dry periods affect clay soils.

There is an important distinction between a property being at risk and becoming uninsurable. Nevertheless, increasing physical risks inevitably raise questions about the long-term availability and affordability of insurance.

The Threat to the Mortgage Market

The financial implications are potentially enormous.

Mortgage lenders normally require buildings insurance because the property provides security for the loan. If that security cannot be insured, the lender faces an additional risk.

An uninsured property may therefore become difficult to mortgage.

That immediately reduces the number of potential purchasers. Fewer purchasers mean lower property values. In the worst cases, a house may become practically unsellable, even though it remains habitable.

Consider a household whose property has been valued at £300,000. If insurers withdraw cover because of repeated flooding, prospective buyers may be unable to obtain mortgages. The property could lose a substantial part of its market value.

The owners may still have an outstanding mortgage, but the value of the asset securing it has fallen.

If this happens to sufficient numbers of properties, the consequences could extend throughout the banking system.

The insurance industry whistleblowers quoted by The Telegraph have drawn comparisons with the financial crisis of 2008, when weaknesses in mortgage lending helped destabilise the international financial system.

The circumstances are different, and a comparable crisis is not inevitable. Nevertheless, the underlying warning deserves attention. An apparently secure financial asset can become much less secure when the assumptions supporting its value prove unreliable.

The Problem of Maintaining Protection

Governments can respond by constructing flood defences, improving drainage, strengthening buildings and restricting development in vulnerable locations.

But these measures require money, materials, energy and continuing maintenance.

Flood barriers must be inspected and repaired. Drainage systems must be maintained. Coastal defences must be strengthened as conditions change.

And protection is never absolute.

Britain already faces enormous demands for expenditure on roads, bridges, railways, water supplies, electricity networks, hospitals and other essential infrastructure.

Climate adaptation adds another expensive obligation.

In an expanding economy, governments might reasonably expect rising tax revenues to finance much of this expenditure.

But what happens in a shrinking economy?

If the economy is contracting because the cost of obtaining and delivering energy is rising, the resources available for maintaining existing infrastructure will become increasingly constrained.

The country may face a growing requirement for protective expenditure at precisely the time when its ability to finance that expenditure is weakening.

This is a central problem of the post-growth economy.

The Wider Property Problem

The threat of uninsurable homes is only one aspect of a much larger issue.

Britain’s housing market depends upon a complicated combination of mortgage lending, insurance, employment, household incomes, infrastructure and confidence in future property values.

All these are vulnerable to economic contraction.

If real household incomes decline, fewer people can afford existing house prices.

If unemployment rises, mortgage repayments become more difficult.

If energy costs increase, heating and maintaining properties become more expensive.

If public authorities cannot afford to maintain roads, drainage and other infrastructure, some locations may become less attractive.

Climate-related insurance problems add another pressure.

These pressures could reinforce one another. Falling property values might reduce household confidence and spending. Mortgage lenders might become more cautious. Construction activity could decline, reducing employment and demand for materials.

A property market that has benefited for decades from economic expansion could therefore become a source of instability during economic contraction.

This would be particularly serious in Britain, where so much personal wealth is tied up in residential property.

Can Government Insurance Solve the Problem?

Britain already has a scheme known as Flood Re, designed to help make flood insurance available and affordable for eligible households at higher risk.

The scheme spreads some of the costs across the wider insurance market. It is currently intended to end in 2039, although its future is under discussion.

Such arrangements can provide valuable protection.

But they cannot eliminate the underlying physical risks.

If flooding becomes more frequent and damaging, somebody must ultimately bear the cost. That might be the homeowner, the insurance customer, the taxpayer or some combination of all three.

Government support can redistribute financial losses. It cannot make those losses disappear.

In a shrinking economy, this distinction becomes increasingly important.

There will be limits to how much expenditure can be transferred from one group of households to another, particularly when many households are already struggling to afford essentials.

What This Means for Localism

Localism offers a different way of thinking about the relationship between settlement, property and economic security.

The present system treats houses primarily as financial assets. Their market values depend heavily upon the availability of credit, the expectations of purchasers and the assumption of future economic growth.

In a localist economy, the primary purpose of housing would increasingly return to providing secure and affordable shelter.

This does not mean that houses would cease to have monetary value or that private ownership would disappear. It means that their usefulness as places to live would become more important than their potential for capital appreciation.

Local knowledge would also become increasingly valuable.

People living within a locality often understand which fields flood, which roads become impassable, where drainage is inadequate and which buildings have survived difficult conditions over many generations.

Such knowledge could influence decisions about where to build, where to improve drainage and where further investment would be unwise.

Smaller-scale building and maintenance activities could increasingly draw upon local materials, local labour and established construction methods.

Traditional buildings sometimes offer useful lessons in ventilation, moisture management, repairability and the use of materials suited to local conditions. These lessons would need to be combined with modern knowledge of flood resilience and structural safety.

Localism would not prevent climate change or remove the need for national insurance arrangements and major flood defences.

Indeed, some problems, particularly coastal protection and the management of major river catchments, cannot be solved by individual localities acting alone.

There would still be an essential role for national government.

But local decision-making could help communities adapt their settlements to the resources and environmental conditions actually available to them.

The Question of Where People Live

There is another consequence which deserves consideration.

Britain has spent generations concentrating economic activity, employment and population in particular urban centres and development corridors.

This concentration has required increasingly elaborate infrastructure, including transport systems, drainage networks, electricity supplies and flood protection.

Some of this development has taken place on land which would previously have been considered unsuitable for housing.

As the costs of maintaining and protecting settlements rise, it may become necessary to reconsider where future development should occur.

A shrinking economy cannot indefinitely support every existing pattern of land use, particularly where protection requires increasing expenditure.

This does not mean abandoning established communities.

It does suggest that future settlement decisions should give much greater weight to long-term physical security, access to essential resources and the costs of maintaining infrastructure.

Localism would encourage settlements to develop in closer relationship with their surrounding land, water supplies, food production and available energy.

The objective would not be to maximise property prices, but to create communities capable of sustaining themselves with fewer external resources.

A Warning of Something Much Bigger

The insurance industry’s warnings reveal a weakness in the modern economy which is easily overlooked.

Much of our apparent wealth depends upon promises about the future.

A house is valuable partly because we assume that somebody will be able to purchase it. A mortgage is secure partly because we assume that the house will retain sufficient value. Insurance is affordable partly because we assume that future losses will remain manageable.

These assumptions depend upon physical conditions as well as financial arrangements.

When those conditions change, financial promises can become increasingly difficult to honour.

Climate change is one source of pressure. Rising energy costs, declining economic growth and the growing expense of maintaining infrastructure are others.

Together they raise a fundamental question.

Can an economy built around continually rising asset values remain stable when the physical costs of maintaining those assets are increasing and the resources available to meet those costs are becoming more constrained?

This is not merely an insurance problem.

It is another indication that the institutions developed during the age of economic expansion may be increasingly difficult to sustain in an age of contraction.

Localism will not provide an immediate solution to the insurance crisis. Nor will it protect every vulnerable property.

But it offers a different foundation for the future: one in which homes are valued primarily as places to live, communities make greater use of local knowledge and resources, and economic arrangements are shaped by what can realistically be maintained.

The growing threat of uninsurable homes may prove to be another warning that Britain needs to prepare for an economy in which maintaining what already exists becomes more important than pursuing further growth.

And that is precisely the economy for which Localism is intended.


Source: Harry Brennan, The Daily Telegraph, 14 October 2026, reporting warnings from senior insurance industry figures concerning climate risk, property insurability and financial stability.

417. The Industrial Era Is Over

Britain’s political leaders are promising a new age of industrialisation. Yet the factories described in the Telegraph’s report are closing, reducing production or struggling to survive. The promises point towards an expanding industrial future. The physical evidence points in the opposite direction.

The demolition at Llanwern is a powerful image of this contradiction. Buildings that once represented industrial strength are being dismantled while politicians promise to restore that strength.

But the deeper question is whether the conditions that supported the industrial era can be restored at all.

The argument that the industrial era is over does not mean that every factory will close. It means that industrial expansion can no longer be assumed to provide the organising principle of our economy and society.

The Conditions Have Changed

Industrialisation depended on abundant energy becoming available at a cost that allowed production to expand. Coal, followed by oil and gas, enabled machinery to replace human and animal effort on an extraordinary scale.

Factories produced more. Transport carried goods further. Larger markets supported larger businesses. Rising incomes allowed households to buy what those businesses produced.

This became a reinforcing process. More energy supported more production, more consumption and further investment.

Politicians still expect that process to resume. Their proposals assume that investment, technology and government encouragement can set it moving again.

But investment is a financial commitment. Production is a physical activity. Money cannot remove the need for affordable energy, materials, functioning infrastructure and customers who can pay.

The Telegraph’s account repeatedly returns to these constraints. Energy costs undermine production. Overseas competition squeezes margins. Factories operate below capacity. Government support runs up against strained public finances.

These pressures are evidence of Britain’s industrial difficulties. They do not, by themselves, prove that industrial expansion has ended everywhere. Nevertheless, they expose the weakness of promising a return to industrial prosperity without explaining how its physical foundations will be secured.

Moving Production Does Not Remove Dependence

For decades, Britain could lose factories while continuing to consume manufactured goods. Production moved elsewhere. Imports filled the shops.

This made deindustrialisation appear manageable.

But an economy dependent on imported goods still depends on industry. It also depends on international transport, reliable suppliers and sufficient income to pay for those imports.

Calling Britain a service economy does not release it from these requirements.

Financial services, consultancy, administration and digital businesses all operate within a material world. They need electricity, buildings, equipment, food and transport. Their customers must have money to spend.

As households devote more of their income to essentials, some discretionary services face the same affordability pressures as manufacturers.

Changing the description of the economy does not change its foundations.

Technology Cannot Promise the Old Prosperity

Advanced manufacturing will remain valuable. Britain needs medicines, electrical equipment, machinery and other essential products. Research can improve their production.

But successful specialist factories cannot automatically recreate the employment once provided by mass industry. Automation may increase output while requiring fewer workers.

Nor does electrification abolish the energy question. Electric furnaces and automated production still require dependable power. New generating capacity, networks and equipment must themselves be built and maintained.

Technology can change what is possible. It cannot guarantee that everything technically possible will also be affordable.

Preserve What We Need

The end of the industrial era calls for a different purpose for industrial policy.

The priority should be to preserve the capabilities needed to sustain everyday life. These include food processing, medicines, water equipment, essential transport, repair and the production of durable tools.

Some require substantial national organisation. Others can operate closer to the people they serve.

Public support should therefore be judged by the essential capacity it protects. A subsidy may be justified where losing a factory would create a serious vulnerability. That does not make every struggling business the foundation of a new growth era.

We must distinguish maintaining necessary production from attempting to recreate an economy built around continually increasing consumption.

The Opening for Localism

As distant systems become more expensive or less dependable, meeting needs within a locality becomes more valuable.

Repair, food growing, building maintenance, care and small workshops can provide useful work. They can also reduce some transport requirements and extend the life of existing possessions.

This will require skills, premises, access to land and customers with sufficient purchasing power. People leaving discretionary employment will not become successful local businesses merely because work elsewhere disappears.

But these practical foundations deserve more attention than another promise to restore the industrial past.

The industrial era is over in the sense that its central expectation, continuing expansion supported by cheap energy and rising consumption, can no longer safely guide our future.

Industry will remain. Its purpose must change.

The task is to organise production around what people need, preserve the capabilities we cannot afford to lose, and allow local economies to develop around the work of sustaining life.

Written in response to “Burnham wants to revive British industry. This is why he’ll fail”, by Matt Oliver, Emma Taggart and Szu Ping Chan, published in the Telegraph on 4 October 2026.

416. How a Renaissance Erupts and Changes Everything

The rebirth of what is essential to a productive culture may appear political in a superficial review, but the real driver of change is cultural.

Charles Hugh Smith

This is essay #16 in the series The Revolution No One Sees Coming.

The word Renaissance–“rebirth”–is associated with the European Renaissance of the 14th to 17th centuries.

But when viewed as a rediscovery of core values, principles and intellectual / spiritual heritages that have been lost to decay and corruption, then we can extend this idea of the “rebirth of what is essential to a productive culture” to movements that are typically described as regime change: rebellions, revolutions and the rise of new dynasties that draw inspiration from the core values, principles and intellectual / spiritual heritages of past eras of stable, widespread “good times” (for example, the Tang Dynasty, the Southern Song dynasty, the early Ming dynasty, the Roman Republic, etc.).

The rebirth of what is essential to a productive culture may appear political in a superficial review, but the real driver of change is cultural–the social, intellectual and spiritual/ethical values and principles that guide public conduct and Consent of the Governed not by the force of laws or state repression but by shared values and beliefs.

Renaissances by their very nature are rediscoveries or revivals of ideas and ideals lost to the decay and corruption of self-interest and sclerosis, as the status quo descends into going though the motions rather than actually being diligent, avoiding sacrifices for the common good, maintaining a fake facade of devotion to honored principles while pursuing corruption and self-enrichment with a pathologically single-minded avariciousness.

This decay and corruption typifies regimes that have reached their limits and have succeeded for so long that those feeding at the trough reckon there is no limit on what they can siphon off for their personal fortunes, while the ideas that enabled the long success no longer activate nimble problem-solving; rather, they now encourage “doing more of what’s failed.”

The European Renaissance began with the rediscovery by the intellectual-commercial class of Greek and Roman texts preserved in the Christian monasteries by monks whose tasks included laboriously copying decaying manuscripts into new handwritten texts, a task so tedious that many manuscripts included margin-notes by monks praying to be relieved of the excruciating work.

Handwritten copies of these works began circulating among the intelligentsia, and with the advent of the printing press in Europe (China had long had the same basic technology, but had never developed it into a mass media), by the early 1500s these classics became more widely available.

This process of rediscovery and rebirth does not require the unearthing of long-buried texts; it works equally well with ideas and ideals that remain in plain sight but have been abandoned in a culture corrupted by the supremacy of self-interest by any means available, including artifice, fraud and the Big Con–claiming fealty to ideals as the cover story for relentless self-enrichment.

The key to this rediscovery erupting into a force of mass cultural change is the ideas and ideals inspire new adaptations that sweep away the sclerosis of the stagnant, going through the motions status quo, as opposed to the pursuit of a dream of res-establishing or restoring a previous Glorious Realm. A Renaissance is not the exhumation of a bygone regime; it’s the inspirational rebirth of ideals that generate the adaptive, nimble, willing-to-sacrifice for the common good principles that are the foundations of Glorious Realms.

All of which brings us to the present state of the United States: its leadership so corrupted that it no longer even recognizes its corruption (corruption is now “the way the world works”), a leadership of True Believers in the secular religion of the pathologically single-minded pursuit of self-enrichment and power, a belief structure that is once again unrecognized for what it truly is, a leadership–intellectual, political, cultural–that has reached its limits and is only going through the motions of mimicking “innovation,” “democracy” and “progress” to mask the sclerosis of the status quo (doing more of what’s failed) and their ceaseless self-aggrandizement.

I call this complex structure of artifice masking sclerosis and corruption–the collapse of the Moral Universe that underpins all productive cultures–The Big Con, as the essential task in uninterrupted self-enrichment is to con the public into believing that the status quo benefits them even as it stripmines them and makes a mockery of “innovation,” “democracy” and “progress.”

The descent into sclerosis and corruption is not a new progression. What fueled Martin Luther’s outrage was the Church’s blatant corruption, as bribes were openly accepted as the path for the wealthy to gain easy access to Heaven.

We find ourselves in a similar cesspool today. a cesspool with a diving board to lend an absurdly transparent and laughable air of normalcy to the stench of decay and corruption and the putrid morass of sclerosis–doing more of what’s failed and calling it “innovation” and “progress” as The Big Con.

I know this sounds like the ravings of a white-robed lunatic on the street corner, but as this series has attempted to illuminate, The Big Con has reached its limits and the fury of the conned will burn hot as the pendulum swings to the other extreme. At some point, we will seek inspiration and adaptive nimbleness in ideals such as thrift, social cohesion, authenticity rather than artifice, and the elevation of leaders based not on their ability to con us but on their willingness to forego private self-enrichment to serve the shared interests of everyone, not just themselves and their cronies.

We can find such inspiration in Marcus Aurelius, of course, but we can also find it in American sources such as Emerson and more recently, Christopher Lasch. The treasures of inspirational ideas and ideals await our rediscovery and rebirth…

 

415. Growing Better Food Close to Home

A report discussed in The Telegraph on 7 October 2026 raises a question about our food supply. Are we producing more food while paying too little attention to what it contains?

The article reports declines of 20 to 50 per cent in certain nutrients in some crops. It links these changes to deteriorating soil quality and breeding that favours rapid growth and high yields.

The headline needs care. It does not establish that every vegetable is now half as nutritious as its equivalent in the 1960s. Different crops and nutrients behave differently. Nor does it establish that we should replace five-a-day advice with ten-a-day. The NHS continues to recommend at least five portions of varied fruit and vegetables each day.

Nevertheless, the report strengthens the case for paying attention to how food is grown. For localism, this means recognising the value of gardens, allotments, smallholdings and local market gardens.

Begin with the soil

A vegetable patch is more than a space into which seeds are placed. It is living ground which needs care.

Home growers can return composted plant material to the soil, protect its surface with mulch and avoid repeatedly walking over growing beds. They can observe which areas dry out, become waterlogged or produce disappointing crops.

Crop rotation can help limit the build-up of particular pests and diseases. Cover crops can maintain living roots in ground that would otherwise stand bare over winter. The Royal Horticultural Society identifies both approaches as useful parts of managing a vegetable garden.

These practices do not guarantee vegetables with higher mineral content. Soil conditions, crop variety and other factors still matter. But growing close to home gives people a direct opportunity to improve and understand the ground that feeds them.

The soil becomes something to maintain for the future.

From the garden to the kitchen

Home growing also shortens the time between harvesting and eating.

Leaves can be picked shortly before a meal. Beans can be gathered when tender. Soft fruit can ripen on the plant rather than being selected primarily for its ability to survive handling and transport.

This can improve flavour and reduce waste. It may also help preserve nutrients sensitive to storage, although freshly harvested food is not automatically superior in every respect. Research comparing fresh, frozen and canned produce shows that nutrient retention varies with the food, processing and storage conditions.

The practical advantage is choice. A household can harvest what it needs and eat it promptly.

Growing for the table

A commercial crop must satisfy several demands. It needs to yield reliably, withstand handling and reach customers in saleable condition.

A home grower can give more weight to flavour, suitability for the site and the preferences of those who will eat it. A local market gardener selling directly to customers has some of the same freedom.

There is room for a wider range of vegetables and varieties. Crops need not all mature together. Small successive sowings can provide food over several weeks.

Older varieties are not necessarily more nutritious. Their value lies partly in widening the choices available and helping growers discover what performs well in their own conditions.

Less dependence on purchased food

A garden will rarely feed a household completely. Even a modest contribution, however, can be useful.

Salad leaves, herbs, beans, courgettes and soft fruit can supplement bought food. Where space permits, potatoes, onions, roots and winter greens can make a more substantial contribution.

Savings depend on the cost of equipment, water, seeds and compost, as well as successful harvests. An expensive greenhouse is not essential to begin. A small productive bed may be more useful than an ambitious plot that becomes difficult to manage.

Seasonal outdoor growing can also reduce the need for packaging, refrigeration and transport. Those gains are greatest when cultivation uses modest inputs and the produce is eaten or preserved rather than wasted.

A place for everyone

Not everyone has land, strength or time to grow vegetables.

Local food production should therefore extend beyond individual gardens. Shared plots, accessible raised beds, neighbourhood growing groups and small commercial gardens can involve more people.

One person may raise seedlings. Another may tend beds, organise deliveries or preserve surplus produce. People who cannot undertake heavy work can still contribute knowledge and other useful skills.

Local growers also need customers. Buying from a nearby producer can support local food production just as growing at home can.

Food within a localist economy

As households face pressure on their spending, food remains essential. Local growing offers one way to direct land, skills and work towards that need.

It creates opportunities for small businesses supplying vegetables, seedlings, compost, tools and garden services. It also supports activity outside the money economy: shared harvests, exchanged seeds and help between neighbours.

National supplies will remain necessary. But a locality with productive gardens and nearby growers has an additional source of food and practical knowledge.

The nutritional concern raised by this report points towards a broader responsibility. We need to consider the condition of the soil, the quality of the harvest and whether people can obtain a varied diet.

Growing locally and at home brings those questions within reach. It connects the care of the ground with the food on the table.

Source: Vegetables half as nutritious as they were in the 1960s, The Telegraph, 7 October 2026.

414, Cob Cottages: Local Materials and Modern Building Standards

Cob cottages were built mainly from earth, straw and water. Their walls needed no brick kiln. Much of the material could come from close to the building site.

For localism, this makes cob worth reconsidering. It offers an example of housing shaped by local resources, practical knowledge and human labour. Modern Building Regulations allow this approach in England, but a new cob cottage must demonstrate that it is safe, durable and sufficiently energy-efficient.

What were cob cottages made of?

Traditional cob used subsoil containing clay, mixed with sand, small stones or other suitable aggregate, straw and water. The clay bound the mixture together. The aggregate helped control shrinkage, while the straw reinforced it.

The proportions depended on the earth available. There was no single recipe suitable for every locality. Builders used mineral subsoil rather than fertile topsoil containing roots and other organic matter.

Animal dung sometimes appeared in historical mixtures. It was not essential. Its presence may sometimes have resulted from cattle treading the material during mixing.

Cob is particularly associated with Devon and the South-West. Related earth-building traditions include clom in west Wales, clay dabbins in Cumbria and wychert in Buckinghamshire. Their differences reflected local materials and experience.

How were they built?

Builders thoroughly mixed the earth, water and straw. People or animals could tread the mixture to combine it.

In mass cob construction, the material was placed directly onto the wall in successive layers, often called lifts. Each lift needed time to firm up before more weight was added. The wall faces were trimmed to shape.

Clay-lump construction used a different method. Earth was moulded into blocks, dried and then laid as walling. Neither method required firing in a kiln.

A complete cottage still needed other materials. Masonry formed the protective base. Timber supplied roof members, floors, doors and window frames. Roof coverings could include thatch, slate or tiles.

Keeping the walls dry

Earth walls need protection from excessive water.

Traditional cottages commonly had raised masonry bases and generous roof overhangs. The base reduced contact with ground moisture and rain splash. The roof sheltered the wall faces. Good drainage and sound roof coverings were essential.

Lime or earth finishes could protect the walls while allowing them to dry. Inappropriate cement render and waterproof coatings can trap moisture and cause deterioration. Properly maintained earth buildings can survive for centuries.

Their survival shows that earth can be durable. It also shows the importance of suitable design and maintenance.

Do current Building Regulations allow cob?

Yes. In England, Building Regulations do not require every house to be made from brick, concrete block or another standard manufactured product.

Approved Document 7 explains that the solutions described in the government’s guidance are not exclusive. Other materials can be suitable. What matters is whether the materials and workmanship perform adequately in the circumstances in which they are used.

This provides a route for cob construction. It does not mean that any mixture of earth and straw will be acceptable. The suitability of the material and the design must be demonstrated.

A new cob cottage must meet the relevant requirements for the whole dwelling. These include structural stability, fire safety, resistance to moisture, ventilation, energy efficiency, drainage and access. Cob walls are only one part of that assessment.

The practical approach is to involve building control early, supported by a designer and structural engineer with experience of earth construction. Evidence may include soil and material tests, structural calculations, moisture details and energy calculations.

Planning permission is a separate matter. An acceptable construction method does not establish a right to build a house on a particular piece of land.

The energy-efficiency challenge

The earlier claim that thick cob walls make a comfortable house needs qualification.

Earth walls can store heat and release it slowly. This can moderate temperature changes. However, heat storage and insulation are different properties. A traditional cob wall cannot simply be assumed to meet the standards required of a new dwelling.

The design may need additional insulation or an earth construction system developed to provide better thermal performance. Any insulation must also be compatible with the wall’s moisture behaviour.

Roof insulation, windows, airtightness, ventilation and heating all contribute to the result. A local material can therefore be combined with modern design to produce a comfortable home.

The rules also continue to develop. England has published new energy and ventilation guidance for the Future Homes and Buildings Standards. The associated regulations generally come into force on 24 March 2027, subject to transitional arrangements. A proposed project must establish which requirements apply to it.

Why cob matters to localism

Brickmaking requires fuel for firing. Cob avoids that stage. Where suitable earth is available nearby, it can also reduce the movement of heavy walling materials.

The localism argument follows from these practical differences. As energy and transport become more expensive, methods using nearby resources may become more attractive.

Cob could support connected local occupations. These include earth building, carpentry, lime plastering, roof maintenance and the supply of straw and timber. Skills would remain within the locality, alongside the ability to repair what had been built.

This would replace some dependence on industrial production with greater dependence on skilled labour. It could provide useful employment for people moving from discretionary work into the provision of essentials.

Could cob become affordable housing?

Possibly, but cheap earth does not automatically produce a cheap house.

Cob construction requires labour, drying time and suitable weather. Testing, design, foundations, roofing, services and regulatory compliance still cost money. Additional insulation may also be necessary.

Affordability would depend on the site, the design, access to skilled workers and how the work was organised. Local training and repeated use of well-developed designs could help.

A sensible beginning would be to repair existing earth buildings, train builders and construct demonstration projects. Experience could then support new homes.

Cob is a practical possibility within modern building rules. Its contribution to localism would come from combining nearby materials and skilled hands with homes that are safe, dry, comfortable and economical to run.

413. LOCAL BRICKWORKS AND THE FUTURE OF LOCALISM

A locality needs the means to maintain its buildings. Houses, workshops, food stores and agricultural buildings all require repair. Some new buildings will also be needed, even in a shrinking economy.

Local brickmaking could provide part of that essential capacity. It brings together a natural resource, skilled labour and a durable product. Where suitable clay and an affordable source of heat are available, a brickworks could serve several neighbouring localities.

The starting point should be the preservation of existing works and their knowledge. Establishing a new brickworks becomes much harder if the people who understand clay preparation, drying and firing have disappeared.

Examples which survive

Northcot Brick at Blockley in Gloucestershire uses clay from its own quarry. It retains handmade brickmaking alongside machine production. The works was established in 1925 partly to provide housing and employment for local people. That original purpose has a clear connection with localism.

H.G. Matthews, near Chesham in Buckinghamshire, produces handmade wood-fired bricks. It also uses woodchip to provide heat for drying. Its experience offers a practical connection between brickmaking and a wood economy.

Bulmer Brick & Tile, near Sudbury, is a small family business using clay from its own seams. Its specialised bricks support the repair of existing buildings. York Handmade Brick at Alne in North Yorkshire provides another example of an independent manufacturer with a brickworks and quarry site.

These businesses demonstrate that the skills survive. They do not establish that every locality could produce cheap bricks. Their methods, fuel requirements and costs would need careful examination.

Repair before expansion

In a shrinking economy, the purpose of a local brickworks would increasingly be to maintain useful buildings.

Repairing a wall or extending a workshop may require relatively few bricks. Matching older brick sizes and shapes can be especially valuable. A small works could develop its business around these needs.

Reclamation could form a complementary activity. Suitable bricks recovered from demolition could be sorted, assessed and offered for reuse. New bricks would fill the gaps which reclaimed supplies cannot meet.

Reclaimed bricks still need assessment for their intended use. Their previous survival does not establish that every brick is suitable for an exposed external wall.

How to establish a small brickworks

The first task is to investigate demand. Local builders, property owners and conservation specialists could identify the sizes, quantities and types of brick they need. This would help determine whether a works could support itself.

A local enterprise needs enough regular orders to cover wages, fuel, maintenance and the occasional unsuccessful batch.

The second task is to investigate the clay. A deposit which looks suitable may crack during drying or distort during firing. Samples should be examined by a ceramics laboratory and used to make trial bricks. Tests establish how the material behaves and whether blending is necessary.

Trial batches should, where possible, be fired in an existing suitable kiln. This allows the clay and proposed product to be assessed before money is committed to a permanent works.

Choosing and arranging the site

A suitable site would bring together clay supply, water, fuel storage, access and enough space to keep production moving.

A proposed small works would need:

  • A clay storage and preparation area.
  • A covered moulding workshop.
  • Drying sheds or a controlled drying chamber.
  • A kiln area with safe access.
  • Covered fuel storage.
  • Space for cooling, inspection and finished stock.
  • Access for deliveries and collection.

The layout should minimise repeated handling. Clay would move through preparation, moulding, drying and firing, followed by inspection and storage.

Before acquiring or developing a site, the organisers should establish the planning and environmental requirements with the relevant authorities. Clay extraction and brick manufacture raise separate questions. The requirements depend on the location, scale and process, including kiln emissions. The UK nations have different regulatory arrangements.

Making the bricks

Clay preparation involves breaking down and mixing the material to obtain a consistent body. A small works might use a clay mixer or pugmill, with hand moulding for suitable products.

Moulds must allow for the shrinkage established through trials. Newly moulded bricks then need controlled drying before firing. Drying too quickly or unevenly can damage them.

The kiln heats the dried bricks according to a firing programme suited to their clay. Cooling also needs control. The finished bricks are inspected and sorted. This sequence requires practical experience as well as equipment.

Handmaking can provide skilled employment. Sensible machinery can reduce exhausting preparation and handling work. A localist enterprise should choose equipment which it can maintain and afford.

Building the kiln

The kiln is likely to be the most demanding part of the project.

For modest, intermittent production, a batch kiln would be worth investigating with an experienced kiln designer. Its capacity should match both demand and the drying facilities.

Construction requires suitable refractory materials, insulation, foundations, combustion equipment, flues and temperature monitoring. The detailed design must follow from the chosen clay, fuel and production rate. A general sketch is insufficient for building a reliable commercial kiln.

An oversized kiln could leave the business waiting for enough orders to fill it. An undersized one could consume too much labour and fuel for the output obtained.

Fuel and the wood economy

Wood firing deserves investigation where a dependable woodland supply exists. H.G. Matthews shows that it can be used commercially. Its wood-fired kilns hold about 60,000 bricks and are stoked day and night for up to five days. This illustrates the commitment involved.

A proposed works would need a fuel budget based on trial firings. Available woodland growth would have to be considered alongside competing needs for household heat and other uses.

Wood fuel also needs preparation, drying and storage. Local availability does not make its cost or environmental effects disappear.

Recovering kiln heat for drying could improve the process where the design permits it. The appropriate arrangement would need specialist assessment.

Quality and viability

Bricks intended for buildings need evidence of performance. Relevant tests include strength, water absorption and resistance to freezing and thawing. Their suitability depends on the intended application and exposure.

The works would also need records linking each batch to its clay mixture, drying conditions and firing programme. These would help identify faults and maintain consistency.

Before full production, the organisers should calculate the cost per saleable brick. The calculation must include rejected bricks, labour, fuel, testing, equipment upkeep and delivery.

The most credible route is gradual: establish demand, test the clay, obtain trial firings, confirm the site requirements and only then commission the permanent facilities.

A local brickworks could become an enduring part of a locality’s essential economy. Its value would come from reliable materials, skilled work and the ability to maintain buildings close to home.

417. THE ECONOMY CANNOT ESCAPE ITS ENERGY REQUIREMENTS

Governments continue to promise economic growth through investment, innovation and higher productivity. Each new technology is presented as another opportunity to restore the expansion on which public finances and commercial expectations depend.

But there is a physical question beneath these promises. What energy and resources will be required to make them work?

In “The problem restated”, published on 4 October 2026, Tim Watkins draws attention to the energy foundations of economic activity. Machines and computers perform useful tasks because they receive energy. Technology determines how effectively that energy is used. It does not remove the requirement.

He also argues that improvements become harder and more expensive as technologies mature. Further gains may remain technically possible while becoming commercially unaffordable.

His discussion of artificial intelligence illustrates the issue. Something which appears almost weightless on a computer screen depends on substantial physical infrastructure elsewhere. Watkins questions whether the anticipated revenues can justify the costs of building and operating it.

His prediction of financial failure remains a judgement. The underlying question, however, deserves attention. Does a proposed development provide enough useful benefit to justify the resources it consumes?

That question applies far beyond computing.

The cost of maintaining complexity

An economy must maintain what it already possesses before it can enjoy the benefits of adding more.

Roads need resurfacing. Water pipes need replacing. Electricity networks require maintenance. Buildings deteriorate. Machinery wears out. Even digital services depend on equipment which must be powered, cooled and periodically renewed.

Expansion therefore leaves behind continuing obligations.

A new development may generate income today while adding maintenance costs for decades. Where future growth is assumed, those costs can appear manageable. Where households, businesses and governments already struggle to maintain existing provision, adding more can deepen the difficulty.

Borrowing postpones payment. It does not supply the future labour, materials and energy needed to keep everything working.

From a localist perspective, this is one reason to question the assumption that greater scale and complexity necessarily represent progress.

Efficiency and the work we choose to do

Improving the efficiency of a machine is useful. But another approach is to reduce the amount of work demanded from it.

A more efficient vehicle may use less fuel on a journey. Bringing an essential service closer to its users may shorten that journey or remove it altogether.

Better packaging may reduce damage during distribution. Producing some food closer to where it is eaten may reduce the need for packaging, storage and repeated handling.

An improved administrative system may process information faster. Giving people clear responsibility and the authority to settle a matter may reduce how much processing is needed.

These are changes in the organisation of daily life. Their value lies in meeting a need with fewer demands on the supporting system.

Local provision is not automatically more efficient. A well-used train or a specialist hospital can justify operating across considerable distances. The practical task is to establish which activities benefit from concentration and which become unnecessarily costly when separated from the people they serve.

Localism as economic adaptation

If energy and other essential inputs absorb a growing share of available income, less remains for discretionary purchases. Businesses depending on those purchases face weaker demand while meeting their own rising costs.

People losing work in such businesses will still need livelihoods. Their neighbours will still need food, repairs, care, warmth and help maintaining their homes.

This creates a possible direction for economic adaptation. More work may become concerned with meeting nearby essential needs. Small businesses, household production and cooperative arrangements may develop where larger systems become too expensive or unreliable.

That development will require practical opportunities. People need access to land, premises, tools, skills and modest finance. Wanting to become self-employed is insufficient if the means of doing useful work remain beyond reach.

Localism should therefore be understood as a change in how livelihoods and essential provision are organised. Its growth would arise from many decisions made in response to changing circumstances.

A different purpose for investment

Investment would still matter in a smaller economy. Its purpose would increasingly be to secure essential provision and reduce continuing costs.

Insulating a home can lower its future heating requirement. Repairing a water supply protects an existing necessity. Providing a workshop can help local tradespeople maintain equipment which would otherwise be discarded.

Such investments should be assessed by their lasting usefulness, affordability and maintenance requirements.

A national core would remain necessary for activities which localities cannot reasonably provide for themselves. Local economies would depend on that core, just as the national system would depend on food production, care and practical work within localities.

The challenge is to make both supportable.

The lesson for localism is that economic promises must be tested against physical requirements. Where maintaining and expanding the existing system becomes increasingly burdensome, organising daily life around fewer journeys, durable equipment and accessible essential services becomes a practical response.

Human progress can continue through greater security, useful work and stronger relationships. Those achievements deserve attention even when they produce little financial growth.

411. POWER THAT CANNOT REACH THE PEOPLE WHO NEED IT

Britain’s electricity difficulties are often discussed as a shortage of generation. The account of Harker substation in The Telegraph reveals another problem. Electricity can be available where it is generated, yet unavailable where it is needed.

Scottish wind farms can produce more electricity than the connections south can safely carry. When that happens, some generators must reduce their output. Other generators, including gas-fired stations nearer the demand, are paid to increase theirs.

Consumers meet the cost of managing this mismatch. Government figures show that payments to gas generators to replace curtailed generation reached £910 million in 2024/25. Those payments represented about two-thirds of total constraint costs that year. The expense therefore extends well beyond compensation paid to wind farms.

The result is an uncomfortable contradiction. Britain has invested in equipment to capture renewable energy, but cannot always use the electricity it could produce. Meanwhile, households and businesses pay for replacement power.

The Cost of the Whole System

Wind is free. Delivering reliable electricity from it requires turbines, foundations, cables, substations, maintenance and arrangements for matching supply with demand.

The useful economic measure is therefore the cost of dependable electricity reaching the consumer. The generating cost alone cannot tell us whether the complete system is affordable.

The Harker story illustrates the consequences of expanding one part of a system faster than the supporting parts. A new wind farm adds generating capacity. It does not automatically add the transmission capacity needed to carry its output.

The article identifies the “Connect and Manage” policy as an important cause of this imbalance. Its underlying assumption was that generation could connect before wider reinforcement was complete, with the network catching up afterwards. Where that reinforcement lagged, the cost of managing congestion continued.

However, it would be misleading to suggest that nothing has been done. National Grid reports that an overhead line upgrade between Harker and the Scottish border has been completed. The wider difficulty is ensuring that improvements across the network keep pace with the generation they must serve.

Affordability in a Shrinking Economy

For localism, the significance reaches beyond a particular substation.

A national electricity system depends upon substantial investment, skilled labour, materials and continuing maintenance. These are real commitments of resources. Borrowing can bring expenditure forward, but it cannot remove those commitments.

If economic growth weakens or gives way to sustained shrinkage, the burden becomes harder to carry. Households have less spare income. Businesses face tighter margins. Public services must meet higher operating costs from constrained budgets.

Some grid reinforcement will remain essential. It can also save money by reducing congestion and the need for replacement generation. The question is which investments deliver the greatest improvement in reliable supply for the resources available.

Counting turbines or announcing investment totals is insufficient. What matters is whether people can obtain the electricity they need at a price they can afford.

The Case for Using More Energy Locally

One response is to bring some electricity use closer to its source.

Where suitable local demand exists, electricity that would otherwise be constrained could serve useful work nearby. Flexible activities might include heating water, charging batteries or operating equipment at times of plentiful supply.

The Government’s own plans recognise this principle. A proposed service would encourage flexible electricity demand to locate in constrained areas and increase consumption when requested, making better use of renewable generation.

From a localist perspective, this raises a practical question. Could more of that useful demand support local food production, workshops, repair businesses and other essential activities?

Such opportunities require careful assessment. A business cannot depend upon cheap surplus electricity unless its equipment, working hours and finances suit an irregular supply. Nor should electricity be consumed merely to avoid switching a turbine off. The activity must meet a worthwhile need.

Local generation also needs supporting infrastructure. Solar panels, batteries and small wind installations have costs and limitations. Producing electricity nearby does not, by itself, guarantee supply through a still winter evening.

Localism therefore supports a combination: a dependable national network for shared needs, alongside local generation, sensible storage and flexible use where these are practical.

Reducing the Burden

There is another response which receives less attention: reducing the energy required to provide a decent life.

Insulation, durable goods, repair and shorter journeys can reduce demand while preserving useful services. Local production can sometimes reduce the transport and infrastructure needed to supply essentials.

This does not mean asking people to endure cold homes or inadequate care. It means judging energy use by the human benefit it provides.

Harker offers a warning about planning through targets for separate parts of an economy. Generating capacity, transmission capacity and consumer demand must work together. Otherwise, apparent progress in one place creates additional costs elsewhere.

For localism, the lesson is clear. The future electricity system must be judged by the dependable service it provides, the resources it requires and its affordability. More equipment is useful only when it forms part of a system that works.

410. THE INCREASING MUDDLE OF THE UK ECONOMY

An economy can become more difficult to live and work in without coming to a sudden halt. Businesses continue trading. Government continues collecting taxes. People continue working. Yet more effort goes into understanding rules, chasing answers and overcoming failures in the systems which are supposed to help everything function.

There is evidence that this is happening in Britain.

The strongest evidence concerns the machinery surrounding economic activity. Tax administration, public services and government information systems show signs of increasing complexity and poor coordination.

In its 2025 report on the cost of the tax system, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee stated that the system was becoming more complex. It recorded 240 tax policy changes announced between 2022 and 2024. These were expected to impose additional costs over the following years of about £875 million on HMRC and £913 million on businesses. The committee also noted that complexity increases opportunities for avoidance and evasion, and the risk of error.

Each change may have its own justification. Taken together, however, changes require businesses to keep learning, adjusting software, seeking advice and checking that they have understood their obligations.

The National Audit Office reported in February 2025 that businesses faced an estimated annual tax compliance cost of £15.4 billion. It considered this likely to be an understatement. There was no equivalent estimate of the total cost borne by individual taxpayers.

This is part of the cost of keeping the economy functioning. It uses time and skills which could otherwise contribute to providing goods and services.

Difficulty increases when a complicated system is accompanied by inadequate help.

The National Audit Office’s May 2024 investigation found that HMRC had cut services too aggressively while introducing digital alternatives. Those alternatives had not reduced demand for assistance as much as expected. Poor service created further pressure, while attempts to close telephone lines had to be reversed following opposition.

The resulting muddle is familiar. An unresolved problem produces another enquiry. A delayed answer produces a reminder. A mistake requires a correction. Work is generated by the failure to complete earlier work.

An apparent saving within an organisation can therefore transfer costs to everyone dealing with it. The business owner loses working time. The householder loses an afternoon. An accountant must intervene. The saving looks less convincing when these wider costs are included.

Government has acknowledged similar problems across its digital services. Its January 2025 blueprint identified fragmented institutions, data held in separate systems, ageing technology, inconsistent leadership, shortages of skills and outdated funding arrangements. These are weaknesses in how organisations work together, as well as in their computers.

Even understanding the economy presents difficulties. In September 2026, the Office for National Statistics explained that recent movements in its Labour Force Survey reflected both economic developments and improvements to the survey itself. It advised caution over short-term changes and said payroll records currently provided the most reliable measure of employees. This does not make all economic statistics unreliable. It does make confident interpretation more demanding.

There is also evidence of improvement. In July 2026, the ONS reported recovering survey responses and fewer lower-impact errors. The picture is therefore uneven. Some systems improve while others remain difficult or fragmented.

For localism, the significance lies in the relationship between complexity and available resources.

Within a shrinking economy, an elaborate administrative structure can become increasingly difficult to support. If resources are squeezed while obligations remain complicated, delays and mistakes can multiply. This is an interpretation of the evidence, rather than a conclusion established by these reports.

Localism offers scope to shorten some of the relationships involved in meeting everyday needs. A local repairer can discuss a fault directly with a customer. A food producer can learn what nearby households need. A care provider can organise work around people they know.

These arrangements still need standards, fair taxation and accountability. Small businesses can also struggle with paperwork, and local organisations can be badly managed. Simply making an organisation smaller does not guarantee competence.

The practical aim should be to reduce unnecessary steps and make responsibility clear. Essential national systems must function reliably. Local enterprise needs rules it can understand, help it can reach and decisions made within a reasonable time.

An economy becomes muddled when too much effort is spent navigating its arrangements and correcting their failures. The evidence suggests that Britain has a substantial problem of this kind.

As resources become harder to find, simplicity becomes an economic necessity. More of our available effort needs to reach the work that feeds, houses, warms and cares for people.

409. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AT A DISTANCE

Nearly a quarter of Herefordshire Council’s staff are reported to work remotely from outside the county. According to the Hereford Times, the council identified 391 such employees, against a total workforce of 1,598. That is approximately 24.5 per cent.

The council also said it did not hold information on how many employees worked partly or wholly from home. The figures therefore leave questions about working arrangements unanswered. They do not establish how frequently these staff visit Herefordshire, how far away they live or what duties they perform.

Nevertheless, they raise an important question for localism. How closely should local government be connected to the people and places it serves?

Knowledge of a place

A council administers more than a collection of services. It serves a living locality, with its own landscape, settlements, businesses and relationships.

Herefordshire’s scattered population, narrow roads and distances between services shape everyday life. So do the circumstances of older residents, small farms and households with limited transport. These things can be described in reports, but understanding them also comes from being present.

Living outside the county does not make an employee incapable of understanding it. Some may live just across the boundary and know Herefordshire well. Equally, a local address does not guarantee good judgement. What matters is whether staff have sustained contact with the communities affected by their work.

The danger arises when that contact becomes occasional, while decisions are increasingly made through screens, standard procedures and centrally collected information. A service can meet its administrative targets while failing to understand the practical difficulties faced by its users.

Where the wages go

Council employment also supports the local economy.

Employees who live locally spend part of their earnings in local shops, employ local tradespeople and support services used by their neighbours. When employees live elsewhere, a greater share of that household spending is likely to take place outside Herefordshire.

The figures do not tell us how much spending leaves the county. Some outside residents will still shop and use services here. But the underlying issue is significant. Public expenditure can provide a service to one locality while supporting household consumption in another.

Under economic shrinkage, this becomes more important. As discretionary businesses lose customers, reliable employment connected with essential services helps sustain local livelihoods. Where that employment is based influences which localities retain the spending.

The value and limits of remote work

Remote working has real advantages. It can reduce unnecessary journeys, help employees with disabilities or caring responsibilities and give a council access to specialist skills that are difficult to recruit locally.

Localism need not reject these benefits. A specialist adviser may serve several localities effectively without living in each one. Some administrative work can be performed from home just as well as from an office.

But remote working is not the same as localism. A digitally connected workforce may be geographically dispersed while authority remains concentrated in a distant administrative centre.

Localism concerns where responsibility rests, how decisions are made and whether people can influence the services on which they depend. Moving an employee’s desk into a house elsewhere does not, by itself, bring government closer to residents.

Government in a shrinking economy

If economic shrinkage progressively limits public spending, councils will face pressure to reduce costs. Shared services, remote staffing and greater automation may appear attractive.

Some savings will be useful. Others may remove the local knowledge and personal contact that make services effective. An apparent saving can become a cost elsewhere if residents cannot obtain help, maintenance needs go unnoticed or unsuitable decisions have to be corrected.

The localist response would be to retain specialist support where necessary while placing more practical responsibility close to the people concerned.

Care, minor maintenance, community facilities and other everyday services depend heavily on people who know the locality. Small local teams and businesses could undertake appropriate work, provided they have the funding, skills and accountability to do it. Local responsibility must come with resources. It cannot simply mean transferring an unfunded burden to residents.

A council rooted in its locality

Herefordshire does not need an arbitrary rule requiring every council employee to live within its boundary. It does need a clear understanding of which jobs require regular local presence, how staff acquire local knowledge and whether residents can reach someone who understands their circumstances.

The reported figures should prompt examination of these matters, rather than judgement of individual employees.

As the economy becomes smaller, the connection between public services and local livelihoods will matter more. A council’s purpose will increasingly be to help sustain the essentials of everyday life within the resources available.

For localism, the central question is therefore not simply where council staff live. It is whether local government remains rooted in the lives of the people it serves.

408. Slower Population Growth and the Evolution of Localism

Britain’s population is still growing, but much more slowly. The Telegraph reports that the population reached an estimated 69.5 million in mid-2025. The annual increase was approximately 228,000 people, or 0.33 per cent. Excluding the pandemic year, this was the slowest growth since 1998.

Falling net migration accounted for most of the slowdown. Births only slightly exceeded deaths. These figures challenge the assumption that Britain must continually accommodate a rapidly expanding population.

They also raise a more fundamental question. Does a successful society require its population and economy to keep growing?

More People and Greater Prosperity

A larger population can increase the total size of an economy. More people buy food, pay rent, use transport and need services. More workers can produce more goods and generate additional tax revenue.

But an increase in total economic activity does not necessarily mean that each person becomes better off.

The outcome depends on the work available, the productivity of that work and the provision of housing and infrastructure. Additional people contribute skills and labour. They also need homes, water, energy, healthcare and transport. Whether living standards improve depends upon how these contributions and requirements fit together.

Population growth cannot, by itself, resolve an underlying deterioration in economic affordability.

From the energy-based perspective discussed on this blog, the central problem is the rising cost of obtaining the energy upon which production depends. If a greater share of available resources must be devoted to securing energy, less remains for other purposes. Increasing the number of consumers does not remove that constraint.

A Slower Increase in Demand

Slower population growth could ease some additional pressure on housing, water supplies, sewage treatment, roads and electricity networks.

It would not make existing shortages disappear. Nor would it necessarily reduce housing demand at the same rate. The number and size of households matter, as does where people choose or need to live.

Nevertheless, planning for slower growth offers an opportunity to reconsider priorities.

Maintaining existing homes may become more useful than pursuing expansion wherever developers find it profitable. Repairing water systems may deserve precedence over extending them. Keeping essential services accessible may matter more than constructing facilities based on expectations of continually rising demand.

In a shrinking economy, maintenance becomes central to protecting everyday life.

The Difficulty of an Ageing Population

Slower population growth brings difficulties as well as opportunities.

An ageing population needs care, suitable housing and accessible healthcare. If fewer people are available for paid work, supporting these services can become harder.

Migration can help meet particular shortages. Migrant workers already contribute to the care and support upon which many households depend. However, a lasting settlement also requires training, adequate pay, decent working conditions and affordable homes.

Localism would have to address these needs directly.

Neighbourly support and family care can improve daily life, but they cannot replace professional nursing or specialist medical treatment. A workable future requires cooperation between local provision and a national core of essential services.

Older people also remain contributors. Their knowledge, practical skills and experience can support younger generations. Communities benefit when people can continue participating within their abilities.

Different Futures for Different Localities

A national population figure conceals many different local experiences.

Some localities may continue attracting people because they offer useful work, affordable housing or reliable access to essentials. Others may lose younger residents and struggle to sustain shops, transport and care services.

These differences could become more pronounced as economic conditions tighten.

A locality with productive land, practical skills, dependable water and strong social relationships may possess advantages that conventional measures of economic success overlook.

Localism therefore involves more than reducing the scale of administration. It concerns the capacity of people in a locality to provide more of what they need and to support one another.

That capacity must be developed deliberately. It will not emerge simply because population growth slows.

Planning for Sufficiency

The demographic slowdown does not prove that economic shrinkage is inevitable. Neither does it guarantee the emergence of localism. It does, however, weaken the assumption that the future will always involve more people, more consumption and more construction.

A society organised around perpetual expansion finds slower growth alarming. A society concerned with sufficiency asks different questions.

Can people obtain nutritious food? Can they live in secure, warm homes? Is care available when it is needed? Can useful work be found close enough to home? Can existing infrastructure be maintained within the resources available?

These questions remain important whether the population grows, stabilises or eventually declines.

The purpose of the economy is to support human life. Slower population growth gives Britain an opportunity to reconsider how it does so, with greater attention to the quality of life and the sufficiency of essentials in every locality.

407. When Borrowing Can No Longer Conceal Shrinkage

Britain’s 30-year government bond yield has passed 6 per cent, reaching its highest level since 1998. The rise forms part of a wider sell-off in government debt, driven by concerns about inflation, energy prices and public finances.

This is more than a financial market story. It raises a question which governments have avoided for years. How much longer can borrowing sustain commitments which the underlying economy struggles to support?

There is an important distinction. A 6 per cent yield on 30-year gilts does not mean that Britain suddenly pays 6 per cent on its entire national debt. Much existing debt carries rates agreed when it was issued. But higher market yields make new borrowing more expensive. They also increase the cost of replacing debt as it matures.

The pressure therefore builds over time. More public money goes towards interest, leaving less available for services, maintenance and investment unless taxes or borrowing rise further.

Energy Behind the Financial Pressure

The immediate concern is another energy price shock associated with the Iran war. More expensive energy raises the cost of transport, farming, manufacturing and heating. These costs spread through the economy.

Yet higher prices do not necessarily mean that people are buying more. Households can spend more money while receiving fewer goods and services.

This distinction matters. Inflation can accompany declining living standards.

Higher interest rates may restrain spending and help prevent inflation from becoming entrenched. But they cannot produce additional oil or gas. They cannot remove the physical costs of extracting energy, maintaining infrastructure or transporting food.

When inflation begins with an energy shortage or disruption, raising interest rates imposes another burden upon an economy already under pressure.

The Limits of Borrowing

Borrowing brings spending forward. Its justification usually rests upon the expectation that future income will make repayment manageable.

That expectation becomes harder to fulfil when the economy’s capacity to generate prosperity weakens.

From the perspective of energy-driven shrinkage, the present difficulty is not simply that governments have chosen the wrong financial policy. It is that maintaining economic activity requires energy and materials, while an increasing share of available resources may be absorbed by the cost of obtaining them.

Less remains for everything else.

A sudden wartime price shock is different from this longer structural process. Nevertheless, it exposes the vulnerability of an economy dependent upon affordable energy, extensive supply chains and continuing access to credit.

The latest movement in bond yields does not, by itself, prove that permanent shrinkage has arrived. It does show how quickly the financial arrangements supporting everyday life can become more expensive.

The Squeeze Reaches Households

Government borrowing costs are only one part of the problem.

Mortgage pricing is influenced by expectations for interest rates and conditions in financial markets. Businesses also face higher financing costs. A shop, workshop or food producer may struggle even when there is demand for its products.

Households then face several pressures together. Food and energy absorb more of their income. Mortgage payments may rise when existing deals expire. Employers become more cautious about recruitment and spending.

Discretionary purchases are postponed. Businesses dependent upon them lose customers. Some reduce their workforce or close.

The consequences reach essential activities too. Food production, care, repairs and transport all require customers who can afford to pay.

An economy can therefore become less affordable without everything physically disappearing. Goods remain available, but fewer people can buy them. Services are needed, but neither households nor public authorities have sufficient money to support them.

Localism Under Financial Constraint

These pressures strengthen the case for localism, but they do not make its development automatic or easy.

People losing formal employment will not all be able to establish successful businesses. They may lack premises, tools, skills or working capital. Their potential customers may also be short of money.

Localism must therefore involve more than encouraging everyone to become an entrepreneur.

It includes repairing possessions, sharing equipment, growing suitable food, organising care and passing practical knowledge between generations. Some activities will support small businesses. Others will take place within households or through mutual help.

Their value lies in meeting needs with fewer purchased inputs and smaller financial commitments.

Local production is not always cheaper or more energy-efficient. The useful question is whether a particular arrangement reduces total dependence upon expensive transport, borrowing and external supplies.

A locality that can maintain tools, repair buildings, support care and produce some of its food has practical resources which cannot be measured solely by the amount of money changing hands.

A Government Within Its Means

National government will remain necessary. Defence, specialist healthcare, major transport networks and other shared systems cannot simply be transferred to individual localities.

But rising borrowing costs make the choice of commitments more difficult.

Government needs to distinguish between maintaining essential provision and financing expansion on the assumption that growth will eventually pay for it. Maintenance protects what already serves a useful purpose. Expansion creates additional obligations which must be supported for years.

The same distinction applies locally and within households.

The deeper lesson of rising borrowing costs is that financial promises must remain connected to physical capacity. Money can organise claims upon resources. It cannot guarantee that those resources will be affordable.

If economic shrinkage continues, the task will be to protect essentials, reduce avoidable dependence and enable useful local activity. Success will increasingly mean preserving quality of life through sufficiency, rather than borrowing against a future of ever-growing consumption.

Source: The Telegraph, “UK borrowing costs hit highest level since 1998”, 1 October 2026

Diesel, Affordability and the Evolution of Localism

The diesel problem reaches far beyond the filling station. It concerns the cost of producing food, moving goods and maintaining the physical foundations of everyday life.

In her article, “Can the diesel and jet fuel shortage be solved?”, published on 30 September 2026, Gail Tverberg argues that the difficulties are deeper than the immediate disruption of international supplies. Her central concern is whether producers can supply these fuels at prices that consumers can afford.

This is an important distinction. Oil remaining underground is not the same as affordable fuel available for use.

The affordability problem

Tverberg identifies a conflict between the needs of producers and consumers. Producers need prices high enough to justify extraction, processing and investment. Consumers need prices low enough to leave money for everything else.

More expensive production can therefore create a problem that neither side can easily resolve. A price that makes additional production worthwhile may also make the resulting fuel unaffordable for many of its users.

For Britain, the implications extend throughout the economy. Diesel powers agricultural machinery, delivery vehicles and much construction equipment. Its cost enters the price of food, building work and countless goods transported by road.

Businesses may initially absorb an increase. Eventually, they must raise prices, reduce their margins, cut activity or close. Households then have less money available after paying for essentials. Discretionary spending comes under further pressure.

From a localism perspective, this is one of the mechanisms through which economic shrinkage can develop. The economy becomes more expensive to operate, while people become less able to afford its output.

More oil does not necessarily restore growth

Tverberg discusses the possibility of obtaining more fuel from heavy oil and bitumen. She also recognises that expanding production would take time and that the resulting fuels could remain expensive.

Her argument invites a question. If maintaining fuel supplies requires higher prices, how much of the existing economy can continue to function at those prices?

Additional supply could ease particular shortages without restoring the conditions that supported earlier growth. More effort and expenditure may be required simply to maintain essential activities.

There are uncertainties in the analysis. Different crude oils yield different products, and refinery equipment also matters. Falling fuel consumption per person does not, by itself, establish a shortage. Efficiency, changing travel patterns and changes in industrial activity can also affect consumption.

Nevertheless, the distinction between physical availability and economic affordability remains valuable. An economy needs energy that it can afford to use.

Localism reduces the work demanded of fuel

One response is to seek more supply. Another is to reduce the amount of transport and machinery needed to provide a satisfactory life.

This is where localism becomes relevant.

Food grown nearer its consumers may require less transport. Repairing useful goods can reduce the need for replacements. Shared deliveries can avoid duplicated journeys. Local workplaces, shops and services can bring daily activities closer together.

These arrangements would not remove dependence on diesel. A local grower may still need machinery, tools and materials from elsewhere. A small workshop may depend on national electricity supplies and manufactured components.

Nor is local production automatically more efficient. A poorly loaded van making numerous journeys can use more fuel per item than an efficient bulk delivery. The practical aim is to reduce unnecessary movement, waste and dependence wherever circumstances allow.

Localism develops through such practical choices. People respond to what they can afford and what their locality can provide.

Essentials take precedence

As household budgets tighten, spending increasingly concentrates on food, warmth, housing and care. Work serving these needs may become more important within local economies.

Some opportunities could emerge in growing food, repairing equipment, maintaining homes, preparing meals and providing personal services. These activities need skills, suitable premises and customers able to pay. Their development would require practical support and cooperation.

A national core would remain necessary. Localities cannot independently provide every medicine, specialist hospital service, communications network or major transport connection.

The relationship could gradually change, however. More everyday provision could develop locally, while national systems concentrate resources on functions that genuinely require their scale.

An economy adapted to its means

Tverberg suggests that economies may reorganise themselves around more expensive fuel and lower consumption. Seen through the lens of localism, this could mean shorter supply chains, greater attention to maintenance and a stronger emphasis on essentials.

The process would not be painless or uniform. Some localities would have advantages in land, skills, buildings and cooperation. Others would face considerable difficulties.

But trying indefinitely to preserve every feature of an economy built around cheap transport may become increasingly costly.

The more useful question is how to provide a good life with less movement, less waste and fewer demands on expensive energy. That places quality and sufficiency at the centre of economic life.

Source: Gail Tverberg, “Can the diesel and jet fuel shortage be solved?”, Our Finite World, 30 September 2026.

406. Are those out of work bound for localism?

A household that borrows to pay for food, heating or electricity has little room to absorb another setback. Research by Christians Against Poverty (CAP) shows how falling behind on essential bills can push people below the Minimum Income Standard, a measure of what households need for an acceptable living standard. Its Pushed under, pushed out report was published in March 2024, although the account quoted here was posted in September 2026.

That distinction matters because the problem has not arisen overnight. CAP found that 82% of people in the group it identified as having fallen behind on household bills were at risk of being below the Minimum Income Standard. It also found that, once debt reaches about a fifth of income, the risk of falling below that standard rises sharply. Job loss and ill health add to the danger.

What happens to people caught in this position? Governments usually speak of getting them back into work. But a job is useful only if its pay, hours and security allow someone to meet the cost of living. CAP’s more recent work argues for looking at the quality and sustainability of employment, as well as whether a person is recorded as employed.

Some people who cannot find secure employment may indeed become self-employed or start small businesses. A locality needs repairs, food production, cooking, care, maintenance and many other practical services. Someone with a skill and a few local customers may be able to earn a living from work that a large employer would never organise. As national growth weakens, such activity could become increasingly valuable.

But unemployment does not automatically create an entrepreneur. A person struggling with arrears may have no savings for tools, premises or a vehicle. They may be unable to risk an uncertain week’s takings. Their potential customers may be struggling too. Calling self-employment the answer without facing those obstacles would place yet another burden on people who already have too little.

Localism offers a more realistic possibility when it grows through practical support. Shared workshops and equipment can lower the cost of starting. Experienced tradespeople can pass on skills. Small firms can work together and refer customers to one another. Local buyers, including established businesses and public services, can give new enterprises a steadier flow of work. Debt advice and adequate income remain essential while people find their feet.

So, are those out of work bound for localism? Some may find a place in new local businesses, but they are not bound for self-employment simply because other work has disappeared. The measure of success is whether a locality can turn useful work into a dependable livelihood. If it cannot, a growing number of small businesses may merely disguise a growing number of people who still cannot afford the essentials.

405. When familiar foods become less affordable

An article published in The Conversation warns that five familiar foods could cost more this winter: chocolate, potatoes, leafy greens, bread and olive oil. They seem an odd assortment. Together, however, they show how weather, energy and long supply chains affect what we can afford to eat.

Chocolate and olive oil depend largely on harvests abroad. Potatoes, greens and wheat can be grown much closer to home, yet they too depend on suitable weather, fuel, machinery and reliable water supplies. A poor harvest is only one part of the cost. Food must also be stored, processed, transported and sold.

The UK wheat harvest illustrates the problem. The Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board reported in August that wheat yields were around 12% below the five-year average after prolonged dry weather. Yet the price of a loaf cannot be explained by the wheat harvest alone. Milling, baking and distribution all require energy.

For households, the distinction matters little when the weekly bill rises. Potatoes and bread are ordinary, filling foods. If they become dearer, families cannot simply stop buying food. Some will change what they eat; others will cut back elsewhere. The pressure is greatest on people who already have little spare money.

What might localism offer? It cannot make cocoa grow in Herefordshire or protect every crop from drought. Nor can a locality produce everything it needs. But it can strengthen the parts of food supply over which people have some practical influence: local growers, suitable crops, food storage, small mills and bakeries, and direct links between producers and customers.

That means paying attention to water and soil as well as to prices. A locality that loses its growers, growing land and food skills cannot quickly recover them when distant supplies become expensive. Keeping those capacities alive may appear costly in an ordinary year, but their value becomes clearer when harvests fail or transport costs rise.

The five foods in The Conversation are a reminder that cheap food has depended on favourable conditions at many points along the way. We should expect those conditions to vary. Localism offers a way to become more capable where we live, while continuing to trade for what cannot sensibly be produced here. The aim is a dependable supply of good food at a price people can afford

404. Biocyclic Humus Soil and Localism

Industrial agriculture depends upon long and complicated supply chains. Fertilisers, pesticides, machinery, fuel and animal feeds may travel hundreds or thousands of miles before food reaches the consumer. This system has produced abundant food, but it depends upon cheap energy, reliable transport and farmers being able to afford increasingly costly inputs.

Biocyclic Humus Soil offers a very different approach. It seeks to build fertility from local plant material and to keep nutrients circulating within the locality.

More than ordinary compost

Biocyclic Humus Soil begins as plant-based compost. It can be made from leaves, grass, vegetable waste, prunings, crop residues, fruit pulp and other plant material. Unlike ordinary garden compost, however, it is allowed to mature for a much longer period.

In one documented example, olive leaves, olive pulp and grape pulp were composted aerobically for five or six months. The material was then left to mature for a further three years. It gradually acquired a stable, soil-like structure which could be placed in direct contact with plant roots. A study by the Agricultural University of Athens describes the process.

This long maturation is important. Fresh compost continues to decompose rapidly and releases soluble nutrients. Mature humus holds nutrients within a more stable biological structure. Water, air and nutrients are retained around the roots, while soil organisms help make those nutrients available to plants.

It is therefore better understood as a lasting soil-building material rather than merely another fertiliser.

Farming without imported fertility

Biocyclic vegan farming excludes livestock manure, slurry, blood, bone and other animal-derived fertilisers. It relies instead upon plant residues, green manures, crop rotations, legumes and mature plant-based humus. The international standard describes it as a wholly plant-based form of organic farming. Biocyclic Vegan International explains its principles here.

The method need not be adopted solely for vegan reasons. Its wider importance is that it asks a fundamental question: can a locality maintain its soil fertility largely from its own biological resources?

In many places, enormous quantities of organic material are treated as waste. Leaves are collected and transported away. Hedge cuttings are burnt or shredded. Vegetable waste enters the refuse system. Food processors produce skins, pulp and stalks. Gardens generate grass cuttings, weeds and prunings.

A local humus system would treat these materials as a valuable resource.

The locality’s fertility bank

A locality could establish several humus-making sites serving farms, market gardens, allotments and households. Plant material would be collected over a short distance, composted carefully and then placed in maturing heaps.

These heaps would be a form of fertility bank. Instead of holding financial claims, they would hold carbon, minerals, water-retaining capacity and the means of producing future food.

This would create useful local work. People would be needed to collect and sort suitable material, manage compost temperatures and moisture, turn the heaps, test the finished humus and distribute it to growers. The work would require knowledge and care, but it would not depend upon enormous factories or distant corporate management.

The humus would take years to mature, so localities would have to plan ahead. That is not a weakness. It would encourage a longer view of food security. A community which begins making humus today is preparing its soil for the conditions it may face several years from now.

Possible benefits

Mature humus may improve soil structure, biological activity and water retention. This could become especially valuable as Britain experiences longer dry periods followed by intense rainfall. Soil rich in stable organic matter can absorb more water when rain falls and retain more of it for plants.

An experimental tomato trial reported a yield of 116.8 tonnes per hectare using Biocyclic Humus Soil, compared with 80.6 tonnes using inorganic nitrogen fertiliser and 63 tonnes in the untreated plots. The researchers suggested that improved root conditions and water retention contributed to the result. However, this was one trial involving one crop and a relatively small number of plots. The authors themselves said that much more research was required.

We should therefore avoid claiming that Biocyclic Humus Soil can immediately replace every fertiliser on every kind of farm. Arable crops remove considerable quantities of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. Nutrients exported from a locality in food must eventually be replaced or recovered. Plant residues may also have competing uses as animal bedding, mulch, fuel or wildlife habitat.

The system must be tested honestly under British conditions, including heavy clay, thin upland soils, wet winters and different crops. Transport, labour, storage space, contamination and the long maturation period must all be considered.

A place within localism

Localism does not mean pretending that every locality can become completely self-sufficient. It means meeting more essential needs nearby, using local resources before importing distant ones and reducing dependence upon systems which may become unaffordable.

Biocyclic Humus Soil fits this principle remarkably well. It converts neglected plant material into productive capital. It strengthens the connection between households, gardens, food businesses and farms. It replaces part of a linear system of extraction, purchase and disposal with a local biological cycle.

In a shrinking economy, synthetic fertiliser may become increasingly expensive because its production, particularly that of nitrogen fertiliser, requires large amounts of energy. Long-distance transport will also become harder to afford. Soil fertility will then be too important to leave entirely dependent upon imported products and volatile world markets.

A sensible beginning would be small. A locality could create a trial site, use clean plant material and produce several grades of compost and mature humus. Local growers could compare treated and untreated plots over a number of years. Results could be recorded and knowledge shared.

Biocyclic Humus Soil is not a miraculous substance, and it cannot remove all the difficulties facing agriculture. Its greater significance lies in the principle behind it. The fallen leaf, the hedge cutting and the discarded vegetable are not useless waste. They are part of the locality’s future fertility.

Industrial society has tried to sustain the soil by purchasing inputs from elsewhere. Localism must learn once again how to create and conserve fertility close to home.

403. Pushing a Car Uphill

The Government is trying to push a heavily laden car uphill. Ministers strain against the back of it. They announce new plans, targets, subsidies and reforms. They urge everyone to push harder.

But the car is becoming heavier, the hill is becoming steeper, and the people pushing it are becoming exhausted.

This is a useful picture of Britain’s economic predicament. The Government still assumes that economic growth can be restored if it finds the right policies. It tries tax incentives, planning reform, public investment, borrowing and regulation. When these fail to produce growth, it concludes that even more intervention is required.

The possibility that sustained growth is no longer affordable is rarely considered.

What makes the car so heavy?

Britain must support an enormous structure of government, public services, debt, regulation, infrastructure and administration. It must also maintain an ageing population, an ageing energy system and an ageing stock of roads, railways, water pipes, hospitals and public buildings.

Much of this structure was created during a period of abundant and relatively cheap energy. That energy supported industrial production, international trade, mass transport, expanding public services and rising household consumption.

Energy is still available, but obtaining and using it has become more expensive. More money, materials and effort must be devoted to maintaining the systems upon which the economy depends. Less remains for genuine expansion.

Debt has temporarily concealed the problem. Borrowing allows the country to continue consuming more than it can presently afford. It does not remove the weight from the car. It adds another load which must eventually be carried.

The symptoms

The first symptom is persistently weak economic growth. Governments announce recoveries, but improvements are small and often disappear after allowing for population growth and inflation. Many people become poorer even when the official economy is said to be growing.

A second symptom is rising taxation without visibly improving public services. The Government collects more money, yet people wait longer for medical treatment, roads deteriorate, councils reduce services and police become less visible. More revenue is required merely to prevent further decline.

A third symptom is the growth of public debt. Borrowing is increasingly used to meet ordinary expenditure rather than to create productive assets. A growing share of taxation is then required to pay interest on earlier borrowing.

Another symptom is the repeated failure of large projects. Costs rise, completion dates retreat and plans are reduced or abandoned. Britain can still design impressive projects, but increasingly struggles to afford the materials, energy and skilled labour needed to complete them.

Businesses experience the same pressure. Energy, wages, rents, interest, insurance and regulation all become more expensive. Customers have less money to spend. Profits narrow and investment is postponed. Shops, pubs, farms and small manufacturers close, while surviving businesses reduce staff.

Housing provides another symptom. Governments promise large numbers of new homes, but builders cannot construct them at prices ordinary households can afford. The difficulty is described as a shortage of planning permissions or land. The deeper problem is the widening gap between construction costs and household purchasing power.

Employment becomes less secure. Vacancies decline, young people struggle to enter settled work, and self-employment becomes more precarious. At the same time, the State creates additional administrative work in an attempt to manage the consequences.

Infrastructure begins to fail more frequently. Water leaks, power shortages, transport disruption and communications failures become harder and more expensive to prevent. Each system depends upon many other complex systems. A failure in one place can rapidly spread elsewhere.

People also notice a decline in quality. Goods become less durable. Services become harder to contact. Telephone menus, websites and automated systems replace people, but do not always solve problems. Citizens spend more of their own time doing work once performed by banks, utilities, councils and government departments.

These are not separate accidents. They are symptoms of a society trying to maintain an industrial system which has become too heavy for the economic energy available to support it.

Pushing harder will not solve the problem

The usual political answer is to demand greater productivity. Workers must work harder, businesses must invest more and government departments must become more efficient.

Some improvements are certainly possible. Waste should be reduced and useful technology should be adopted. But efficiency alone cannot overcome the physical and financial limits facing the whole economy.

Indeed, greater complexity can make matters worse. New computer systems, reporting requirements, regulators, consultants and managerial layers are introduced to improve performance. Each requires money, energy and skilled labour. The machinery intended to lighten the load can add still more weight.

Nor can the Government solve the problem simply by borrowing more. Borrowing may help the car move a few yards, but the additional debt makes the next part of the climb harder.

Lightening the car

If the car is too heavy to push uphill, there are only three realistic choices. The load must be reduced, the journey must be shortened, or a less demanding destination must be chosen.

This means accepting that the purpose of the economy cannot be the endless expansion of consumption. The priority must become the dependable provision of essentials: food, water, shelter, heat, care, basic health services, useful work and social order.

Many activities will have to move closer to the people who need them. Food can be grown and processed nearer to its market. Repair can replace frequent replacement. Care, small-scale energy, practical education and essential manufacturing can be organised within localities.

National government will still be needed for defence, taxation, telecommunications, specialist medicine, the railway network and other functions which cannot sensibly be provided locally. But it must stop trying to control every detail of economic and social life from the centre.

Localism is therefore not an attempt to overthrow the State. It is a practical response to the State becoming overloaded. It transfers manageable responsibilities to a scale at which people, resources and consequences can be connected.

The Government is presently trying to push the old industrial economy uphill. Every Budget asks the public to push harder. Every new crisis adds another suitcase to the boot.

The sensible response is not to blame the exhausted people behind the car. It is to recognise that the load has become too great, remove what is no longer essential, and begin building an economy based upon locality, resilience, quality and sufficiency.

402. Diesel: The Fuel That Reveals Our Fragility

The developing diesel crisis is not simply another rise in the cost of motoring. Diesel is the fuel that keeps the industrial economy moving. It powers lorries, buses, tractors, construction machinery, ships and emergency generators. When its price rises sharply, the cost is carried into almost everything we buy.

The Daily Telegraph reports that international diesel supplies have been severely disrupted. Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline and Russia’s restrictions on diesel exports have removed an estimated fifth of global diesel shipments.

European wholesale diesel prices have consequently more than doubled. UK inflation is forecast to rise from 3.1 per cent to 4.3 per cent by February, with diesel alone responsible for about 0.6 percentage points.

These figures reveal something much more important than a temporary fuel shortage. They expose the extraordinary dependence of the modern economy upon plentiful and affordable diesel.

The industrial workhorse

Petrol is principally a fuel for private cars. Diesel performs a much wider economic function.

A farmer needs diesel to cultivate land and harvest crops. A builder needs it to excavate foundations and carry materials. A haulier needs it to deliver food to supermarkets. Local authorities need it to collect refuse and maintain roads. Buses, ambulances and many railway services also depend upon it.

Even goods made without diesel usually travel through several diesel-powered stages before reaching the customer. Raw materials are transported to factories. Finished products are taken to warehouses. They are then carried to shops, businesses and homes.

Diesel is therefore not merely another commodity. It is one of the foundations supporting the complexity of industrial civilisation.

The multiplication of costs

The effect of an increase in diesel prices is cumulative.

A manufacturer may pay more for raw materials because the supplier faces higher transport costs. The manufacturer then pays more to send the finished product to a distributor. The distributor pays more to supply the retailer, and the retailer must pay more for deliveries.

Each business tries to pass on the additional cost. The final customer pays for diesel several times over, hidden within the price of the product.

Businesses with small profit margins cannot necessarily survive this process. Hauliers are particularly exposed because fuel is such a large part of their operating cost. If customers cannot afford higher charges, firms fail. If charges are increased, the prices of food and other essentials rise.

This is how an energy shock spreads through the economy.

Affordability, not simply availability

There does not have to be a complete physical shortage for serious disruption to occur. Diesel may remain available, but at a price that businesses and households cannot afford.

A lorry can still be filled with fuel. The difficulty is that the journey may no longer be financially worthwhile. A distant supplier may still be able to deliver, but its goods may become too expensive for customers.

The first effect will be upon discretionary activity. Holidays, leisure travel, home improvements, restaurant meals and non-essential purchases will be reduced. Businesses serving these markets will lose customers while simultaneously facing higher operating costs.

Essential sectors will not escape. Food, care, public transport and construction must also compete for fuel. Government may try to protect buses and emergency services, but priority arrangements cannot create additional diesel or make it affordable.

Britain has surrendered resilience

Britain is unusually vulnerable because its refining capacity has been allowed to decline.

According to the Telegraph, the number of UK refineries has fallen from nine in 2000 to four today. Imports supplied only 14 per cent of British diesel consumption in 2003. Last year they supplied 54 per cent.

This is another example of apparent efficiency being purchased at the expense of resilience. Importing fuel may have seemed cheaper while international markets were stable. It has left Britain dangerously exposed when shipping routes, wars and foreign governments interrupt supplies.

Globalisation encouraged countries to abandon spare capacity, local production and substantial stocks. Businesses were told to minimise inventories and rely upon just-in-time delivery. That system works only while energy remains affordable and international supply chains operate smoothly.

Efficiency and resilience are not the same thing.

Electric vehicles cannot provide a rapid escape

Some will argue that the crisis proves the need to replace diesel machinery with electric alternatives. Electrification has a useful role, particularly on railways and for vehicles travelling predictable local routes.

It cannot, however, provide an immediate replacement for the immense diesel-powered infrastructure already in use. Millions of lorries, vans, tractors and machines cannot be replaced quickly. Electric alternatives require batteries, minerals, manufacturing capacity, charging equipment and major additions to the electricity network.

These changes also require large amounts of capital at precisely the time when rising energy costs are weakening businesses and public finances.

The claim that one complex industrial system can rapidly be replaced by another may underestimate the scale of the physical task.

A warning of economic shrinkage

The diesel crisis illustrates how economic contraction arrives through repeated losses of affordability.

Transport becomes more expensive. Marginal businesses close. Supply chains shorten because distant trade no longer pays. Some products become scarce, while others remain available but are beyond the means of ordinary households.

Governments may describe each episode as a temporary crisis. Yet every interruption reveals the same underlying weakness: the industrial economy requires enormous quantities of affordable energy merely to maintain its existing complexity.

When the energy cost of sustaining that complexity rises, economic growth becomes progressively harder. More money must be spent on fuel, transport and maintenance. Less remains for investment, public services and discretionary consumption.

The localist response

Localism cannot make every locality self-sufficient, nor can it remove the need for diesel overnight. It can reduce unnecessary dependence upon long and fragile supply chains.

Food produced nearer to its market travels fewer miles. Local workshops can repair products instead of replacing them with imports. Essential goods can be stored locally rather than arriving through continuous just-in-time deliveries. Electrified rail can carry long-distance freight, with shorter local journeys at either end.

Local bus services should receive priority if fuel has to be allocated. One bus can maintain mobility for many people while using far less fuel than the equivalent number of private cars.

Local agriculture will still require machinery, but scarce diesel should be directed towards producing food rather than supporting unnecessary movement. Smaller farms may also rediscover methods that use fewer heavy machines, more repairable equipment and, where practical, human and animal power.

None of this would be effortless. Local production can sometimes cost more in financial terms. But dependence upon distant supplies also carries a cost, which becomes visible only when the system is disrupted.

A glimpse of the future

The world is “freaking out” about diesel because there is no quick substitute for it. Modern economies have been constructed around the assumption that this industrial workhorse will always be available in sufficient quantities and at an affordable price.

That assumption can no longer be taken for granted.

The immediate crisis may eventually ease. New supplies may be found, diplomatic agreements may reopen trade routes, or demand may fall as prices rise. But the vulnerability will remain.

The important question is therefore not simply how Britain can obtain enough diesel to preserve every present activity. It is how the country can ensure that scarce and expensive energy is used for what matters most.

That means protecting food production, essential transport, public services and necessary industry. It also means shortening supply chains, restoring domestic capacity and rebuilding the practical strength of localities.

The diesel crisis is not an isolated inconvenience. It is a warning from the energy foundations of the industrial economy. A society organised around distant production and constant movement becomes dangerously fragile when the fuel that connects everything is no longer cheap.

401. The War on Gardens

A recent article in the Daily Telegraph discusses proposals for households with larger gardens to pay higher water charges. The argument is that larger gardens may use more water, especially in dry periods, and that “heavy users” should therefore contribute more. Similar proposals have already been discussed by the water industry and reported elsewhere.

At first glance this may appear logical within the existing industrial-consumer economy. Water companies are under pressure, reservoirs are strained, infrastructure is ageing, and governments are desperate for investment money. But the proposal reveals something much deeper – the continuing inability of the present system to understand the future that is emerging.

In a shrinking economy, gardens are not luxuries. They are survival infrastructure.

The industrial era encouraged people to separate themselves from food production. Food came from supermarkets, transported long distances by diesel-powered logistics systems, heavily dependent upon fertilisers, chemicals, refrigeration, global finance and cheap energy. The average garden became decorative because food production had been outsourced to the industrial system.

But that system is becoming increasingly fragile. Energy costs are rising, fertiliser production is under pressure, transport costs are increasing, and food insecurity is becoming more common. At precisely the moment when people may need gardens again for vegetables, fruit, chickens, composting, rainwater collection and local resilience, the system is moving toward penalising larger plots of land.

This is a fundamental contradiction.

Localism depends heavily upon access to small areas of productive land close to where people live. A future localist society will not function through giant monocultural farms feeding distant cities entirely through supermarket chains. It will evolve through thousands of local food systems, household gardens, smallholdings, orchards and community growing spaces.

In that future, a garden is not merely an aesthetic accessory to a house. It becomes part of the productive economy.

The irony is that gardens themselves often help water management. Soil, trees and vegetation absorb rainfall, reduce runoff, recharge groundwater and moderate temperatures. Concrete, tarmac and overdevelopment do the opposite. Penalising gardens while continuing large-scale hard-surface urban development risks worsening the very environmental problems the authorities claim to be solving.

There is also an important social issue. Modern housing developments increasingly provide tiny gardens or none at all. Many younger families already have little opportunity to grow food. Discussions online increasingly show concern about shrinking outdoor space and the loss of productive land around homes.

The industrial economy treated land mainly as a financial asset. The localist future will increasingly treat land as a practical necessity.

Water itself will also need rethinking locally. Rainwater harvesting, ponds, greywater recycling, composting systems, mulching, drought-resistant planting and locality-scale water storage may all become normal parts of everyday life. The answer is not simply higher bills and more centralised charging systems. The answer is adaptation to a lower-energy society.

What is emerging is a clash between two eras.

The old industrial model sees large gardens as inefficient consumption.

The emerging localist model sees them as essential productive space.

As economic contraction continues, society may eventually discover that the households with gardens, fruit trees, water butts and vegetable plots were not the problem at all. They were preparing, perhaps unknowingly, for the future.

400. Could Britain Be the First Post-Growth Economy?

There is a respectable historical argument that Britain became the first industrial nation because it possessed an unusually productive agricultural economy.

Fewer people were needed to produce food. Farming used horses and bullocks, improved ploughs, crop rotation and carefully bred livestock. British land was predominantly devoted to useful food, fodder and wool rather than luxury crops such as grapes, olives and silk. Agricultural productivity released labour for mining, manufacturing and the growing towns.

That explanation is not complete, however. Britain also possessed accessible coal, navigable rivers, good ports, accumulated commercial capital and an overseas trading system. Robert Allen’s influential explanation emphasises the particularly British combination of high wages and cheap energy. It made the invention of labour-saving, coal-powered machinery commercially worthwhile. Cambridge University Press

The interesting question is whether some of these advantages have now been reversed. Might the first industrial nation also be among the first to enter the post-growth era?

The evidence that it might

1. Britain’s original energy advantage has disappeared

The Industrial Revolution was built upon plentiful domestic coal. During the twentieth century, North Sea oil and gas provided another period of relatively abundant home-produced energy.

Both advantages have largely gone. In 2025, Britain depended upon net imports for 43.3 per cent of its energy. More than 90 per cent of energy imports consisted of oil and gas. UK energy statistics

Renewables produce increasing quantities of electricity, but electricity is only part of total energy consumption. Transport, heating, agriculture, construction and industry remain heavily dependent upon fossil fuels. Britain has therefore moved from extraordinarily cheap domestic energy to expensive, increasingly imported energy.

This is almost an exact reversal of the circumstances which helped industrialism to begin here.

2. Industrial energy is exceptionally expensive

British manufacturers now face some of the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world. Energy-intensive industries, including steel, chemicals, glass, paper, cement and ceramics, have consequently contracted.

This matters because these are the industries which supply the physical foundations of the economy. Financial services and computer programs cannot replace steel, fertiliser, bricks, machinery or electricity.

Britain may therefore be encountering post-growth conditions sooner because it has lost much of the productive base needed to maintain a complex industrial economy.

3. Economic growth has become weak despite enormous effort

British governments continue to pursue growth through borrowing, housebuilding, immigration, financial expansion, infrastructure projects and technological innovation. Nevertheless, growth per person remains very small.

GDP grew by 1.1 per cent in 2024 and 1.3 per cent in 2025. Real GDP per head did not grow in 2024, although it recovered by 1 per cent in 2025. Office for National Statistics

These figures do not prove that growth has ended. They do show that increasingly elaborate efforts are producing diminishing results. The economy can still become larger through population growth and rising expenditure while the average person experiences little improvement.

That is one possible early sign of post-growth: nominal activity continues to increase, but material prosperity per person ceases to advance appreciably.

4. Investment is insufficient to renew the industrial system

British business investment remains weak by comparison with most other large developed economies. In 2026, IPPR estimated business investment at only 11.1 per cent of GDP, the second-lowest rate in the G7. It also estimated that British manufacturing workers had access to substantially less machinery and equipment than workers in comparable economies. IPPR

This suggests that Britain is not merely failing to expand its productive system. In some sectors, it may be struggling to replace what already exists.

In a shrinking economy, maintenance becomes more important than investment in additional capacity. Britain appears to be approaching that position without yet acknowledging it.

5. Britain depends heavily upon imports

Britain imports much of its energy, manufactured goods and food. In 2024, it produced about 65 per cent of all the food it consumed. Self-sufficiency was only 53 per cent for fresh vegetables and 15 per cent for fresh fruit. UK Government food strategy

Imports allowed Britain to specialise in services while reducing domestic production. That arrangement worked while energy, shipping, credit and internationally traded goods remained affordable.

It becomes much less secure when the cost of energy rises, international trade fragments and Britain must export more services merely to pay for physical necessities.

6. Debt has concealed the underlying loss of momentum

Public and private borrowing have allowed Britain to maintain consumption, property prices and government services despite weak improvements in productive capacity.

But borrowing cannot permanently replace surplus energy or physical production. The Office for Budget Responsibility has warned that, under unchanged policies, public debt could rise from under 100 per cent of GDP to more than 270 per cent over fifty years. Office for Budget Responsibility

Such a projection will never be allowed to materialise exactly as shown. Long before then, taxes, public expenditure, pensions or services would have to change. The importance of the projection is that the present system assumes economic growth to meet promises which a low-growth economy may be unable to afford.

7. Britain is an exceptionally mature industrial society

Britain industrialised first. It therefore accumulated some of the world’s oldest railways, sewers, water systems, housing, electricity networks and public institutions.

A mature system must devote an increasing proportion of its resources to maintenance. Bridges must be repaired, water mains replaced, hospitals rebuilt and the electricity grid reinforced. These activities may be essential, but they do not necessarily provide the large additional returns once obtained by building the systems for the first time.

Britain could therefore be the first country to encounter the full cost of maintaining an ageing industrial civilisation.

Important qualifications

Britain is unlikely to be the first country in which conventional economic growth becomes persistently weak. Japan has experienced several decades of low growth, while Italy’s productivity and living standards have stagnated for a long period. Some countries have already undergone severe economic contraction.

Nor has Britain consciously adopted post-growth. Every major political party still promises economic growth. Government finances, pensions, mortgages and business expectations remain organised around it.

The more defensible proposition is therefore:

Britain may be among the first large industrial countries to experience the practical conditions of post-growth while its institutions continue to assume that growth will return.

That distinction is important. Post-growth does not necessarily begin with an announcement from the Treasury. It begins when additional borrowing, technology, infrastructure and complexity can no longer produce sustained improvements in material prosperity.

Why Britain might also adapt first

Britain retains some advantages which could make adaptation possible:

  • a mild climate capable of producing a useful range of food;
  • plentiful rainfall, despite considerable failures in collecting and distributing it;
  • compact towns and relatively short distances;
  • an extensive railway system;
  • strong traditions of local government, voluntary organisation and mutual assistance;
  • surviving agricultural knowledge and productive countryside;
  • thousands of identifiable localities in which food, care, repair and small production could be reorganised.

These are not advantages for maintaining unlimited industrial expansion. They favour a less energy-intensive, more local economy.

Conclusion

There is no conclusive evidence that Britain will be the first country to enter the post-growth era. Post-growth does not have an agreed statistical starting point, and Britain still records occasional growth in GDP and GDP per person.

Nevertheless, the convergence is striking. Britain was the first industrial nation because it combined productive agriculture, cheap domestic energy, capital, trade and technological ingenuity. It now combines depleted domestic energy, expensive industrial power, weak investment, import dependence, ageing infrastructure, heavy debt and negligible long-term improvement in prosperity per person.

Britain may not be the first nation to formally choose post-growth. It could, however, be one of the first to discover that post-growth has already arrived.