282. Wind Turbines, Warming, and the Limits of Industrial Solutions

A recent article discussing a 2018 Harvard study has reignited debate about one of the central assumptions of modern climate policy – namely, that large-scale wind energy automatically reduces environmental harm.

The study, published in the academic journal Joule, argued that if the United States were powered predominantly by wind turbines, the turbines themselves would alter local climate conditions by mixing warmer upper air with cooler surface air, especially at night. The result, according to the study, would be measurable local surface warming.

The article presents this as a profound contradiction. If the purpose of decarbonisation is to reduce warming, what happens if one of the principal technologies used to achieve it creates warming of its own?

This issue deserves careful thought, because it reveals something much bigger than a dispute about wind turbines. It highlights the growing tension between industrial-scale technological solutions and the realities of the natural world.

The Harvard study did not say that wind turbines create new heat in the way greenhouse gases trap additional heat in the atmosphere. Instead, the turbines redistribute existing heat through turbulence. Large rotating blades disturb the natural layering of air, especially at night when the atmosphere is calmer. Warmer air from above is mixed downward, slightly raising surface temperatures near large wind installations.

The effect appears to be real and measurable at local scale. However, the way the findings are interpreted politically is another matter entirely.

Supporters of wind power argue that local temperature changes from turbines are fundamentally different from long-term global greenhouse warming.

Critics argue that ordinary people experience local conditions, not global averages, and therefore immediate warming near turbine concentrations matters greatly.

What is striking is not merely the scientific disagreement, but the scale of industrial intervention now being contemplated. Replacing fossil-fuel electricity entirely with wind would require an extraordinary transformation of landscapes. Vast areas of countryside would become energy production zones, filled with turbines, access roads, substations, transmission lines, maintenance systems, and backup infrastructure.

This is where the issue moves beyond climate science into the wider question of how industrial civilisation attempts to solve problems.

Modern societies increasingly assume that every difficulty can be overcome through another layer of technology, finance, regulation, and construction. Yet each solution creates additional complications which then require further solutions. Wind turbines reduce one category of emissions while introducing other effects involving land use, mineral extraction, intermittency, visual impact, ecological disturbance, grid instability, and now possibly local climatic alteration.

The deeper problem may not be wind itself, but scale.

Industrial societies always seek gigantic centralised systems because the entire financial and political structure depends upon continuous expansion.

Energy systems are expected to power endless economic growth, mass mobility, global supply chains, artificial intelligence, data centres, and ever-increasing consumption. Under those conditions, no energy source is ever sufficient for long.

This is why the debate often becomes polarised between supporters of fossil fuels, wind, solar, or nuclear power, when the more fundamental issue concerns the size and expectations of the economy itself.

If societies continue to attempt to maintain present levels of industrial consumption indefinitely, every energy source will face serious consequences.

Fossil fuels contribute to atmospheric carbon accumulation.

Wind requires enormous land transformation and industrial infrastructure.

Solar requires vast mining operations, transmission systems, and large areas of land coverage.

Nuclear introduces long-term waste management, security requirements, and extremely centralised political control.

None of these systems truly escapes the laws of nature. They merely redistribute pressures in different ways.

From the perspective of localism, the most important lesson may be that the future cannot simply be engineered through larger and more complex national systems. Instead, societies may gradually be forced toward lower-energy, more local, and less consumption-driven ways of living.

In such a future, the objective changes completely.

Instead of asking how to sustain infinite industrial growth with alternative energy, communities should begin to ask how to live well with less energy overall.

That change alters everything.

Smaller local economies require less transport.

Local food production reduces dependence on refrigerated global supply chains.

Repair replaces disposal.

Housing adapts to climate rather than depending entirely upon mechanical heating and cooling.

Daily life becomes physically closer to people’s homes.

Under those conditions, energy systems also become smaller, more diverse, and more adapted to locality rather than dominated by gigantic national infrastructures.

This does not necessarily mean wind turbines disappear entirely. Small-scale local generation may still have a role. But the industrial dream of covering whole continents with vast energy machinery begins to look increasingly like another temporary phase of late industrial civilisation rather than a permanent solution.

The Harvard study, therefore, matters less because it proves or disproves wind power and more because it exposes the unintended consequences that emerge whenever industrial society attempts to overpower natural limits with still larger technological systems.

The central issue may not be whether wind turbines warm the air slightly.

The central issue may be whether humanity is finally approaching the point where it must stop trying to sustain unlimited industrial expansion altogether.

278. Electricity and the Transition to Localism: How the Structure of the Grid May Shape the Structure of Society

It is often assumed that if the UK electricity grid became financially difficult to maintain, the result would be a sudden national blackout. That is very unlikely. But it is equally unrealistic to assume that the system could simply be reorganised from the centre if the financial economy itself weakened severely.

The more realistic conclusion is that the future of electricity supply cannot be predicted in detail. It depends too heavily on what remains operational in the financial system, transport, communications, and engineering support.

However, although the process cannot be predicted, the direction of change can be understood. Electricity is not just another service. It is one of the main structures that shape how society organises itself. Changes in electricity supply, therefore, help us see how the country might move gradually from a fully centralised industrial system toward a more locality-based one.

Electricity networks do not just support society. They help determine its scale.


Electricity networks reflect the economy they serve

In a growth-based industrial economy the objective of the electricity network is simple:

To supply everyone, everywhere, continuously

This assumption has shaped the design of the modern grid. It depends on:

stable finance
large contractor networks
complex control systems
national coordination
continuous maintenance
reliable fuel logistics

When those conditions exist, universal supply is practical.

But when those conditions weaken, the network’s objective changes. Infrastructure always adapts to the economy that supports it.

The question then becomes not whether electricity disappears, but what electricity networks are for.


The electricity system is not just engineering

It is easy to think of the grid as wires and power stations. In reality, it depends on the organisation.

It relies every day on:

credit
insurance
spare parts supply
telecommunications
software support
transport logistics
contractor availability
specialist engineers

If these weaken, the network weakens with them.

If they weaken severely, the system cannot simply be redesigned from the centre. Large infrastructure depends on management capacity as much as engineering capacity.


A national financial shock would affect the whole country at once

If the financial system weakened seriously, the effect on electricity supply would begin everywhere at roughly the same time.

Credit would tighten nationally.

Procurement systems would weaken nationally.

Contracting arrangements would fail nationally.

Maintenance capacity would reduce nationally.

So the change would not spread slowly from one region to another. It would begin everywhere.

However, the consequences would quickly become uneven.


Electricity cannot be reduced evenly across the country

The grid cannot simply be turned down like a dimmer switch across the whole nation.

Operators would have to concentrate effort where electricity supports the largest number of people and the most essential services. In practice this means protecting:

cities
water supply systems
hospitals
communications networks
railways
food distribution centres

This is not a political choice. It is a technical necessity.

Rural distribution would normally become less reliable first.


The network would simplify rather than reorganise

Modern electricity networks require high levels of coordination. Reorganising them deliberately would require functioning management systems, contractor networks, telecommunications, fuel supply, and finance.

These are exactly the systems most affected in financial disruption.

So the grid would not be redesigned in a planned way. Instead it would simplify itself.

Typically this means:

Maintenance concentrated where crews already exist
Complex switching arrangements reduced
Weaker circuits abandoned
Repairs are taking longer
Redundancy is gradually disappearing

The result is a patchwork system rather than a new design.


Electricity generation would also change

Different forms of generation depend on different kinds of support.

Gas generation depends heavily on fuel logistics.

Offshore wind depends heavily on specialist maintenance.

Biomass depends heavily on imports.

Nuclear depends heavily on national coordination.

Solar depends least on external systems.

Because these supporting structures would be affected differently, the exact sequence of change cannot be predicted. But the direction is clearer.

Generation would gradually become more local.


The objective of the electricity network would change

This is the most important shift.

Today the objective of the network is universal supply.

In a constrained economy the objective would become:

Reliable supply that supports the most essential activity

This produces a corridor system rather than a blanket system.

Electricity begins to behave more like the railway network before widespread car ownership. Railways connected towns, industry, and transport corridors. They did not attempt to reach every front door directly. Daily life organised itself around those routes.

Electricity networks could begin to play a similar role ⚡


Electricity corridors would shape settlement patterns

If electricity reliability is concentrated along major infrastructure routes, those routes become the framework in which economic life continues most easily.

Reliable supply supports:

water pumping
communications
rail movement
medical services
food storage
repair activity

Places within these corridors remain stable more easily.

Places outside them adapt differently.

Infrastructure shapes geography.


Local electricity becomes the branch network

If the national grid begins to behave like a corridor system, local electricity will play a role similar to that of branch lines.

Local supply might include:

rooftop solar
small wind systems
battery storage
farm electrical infrastructure
community buildings acting as supply anchors
backup generators
local electricians and workshops

These systems already exist across the country. They are normally hidden beneath the national grid because universal supply works so well.

If conditions change, this hidden layer becomes visible.

Electricity does not disappear. It becomes local 🌿


Local electricity supports everyday life

Even if national supply becomes selective, local electricity can support:

lighting
communications
refrigeration
workshop tools
medical equipment
small-scale food processing

These are the foundations of locality-level resilience.

Electricity shifts from supporting consumption everywhere to supporting essential activity locally.


The national grid would still matter

Even during severe disruption the national grid would not disappear completely.

Electricity would still be required for:

water supply
sewage treatment
hospitals
railways
communications
food logistics

The government would almost certainly protect these systems as far as possible.

The national grid would remain as a backbone.

But it would no longer be the whole system.


The relationship between national and local electricity would reverse

At present:

local systems support the national grid

In a constrained economy:

The national grid supports essential infrastructure
local systems support everyday life

This is a structural change rather than a technical failure.


The transition cannot be predicted in detail

The sequence of change depends heavily on what remains working in the financial system.

Possible influences include:

fuel distribution
contractor availability
telecommunications reliability
government coordination
engineering workforce stability
spare parts supply

Because these cannot be forecast reliably, the process must be understood step by step as it unfolds.

The direction is clearer than the timetable.


The transition is already beginning quietly

Many early signs are already visible across the country.

These include:

increasing rooftop solar installation
growing domestic battery storage
greater awareness of electricity use
alternative heating systems reducing grid demand
resilience planning for essential infrastructure
local electrical capability existing beneath the national system

Each of these developments looks ordinary on its own.

Together they indicate structural adaptation.

Transitions rarely announce themselves.

They appear through practical decisions made locally.


Electricity helps determine how society reorganises

Electricity availability shapes:

where people live
how far they travel
what work is possible
how food is stored
how medical care operates
how communication continues

For this reason electricity networks do not just respond to economic change.

They help shape it.


Electricity as a guide to the transition to localism

If the financial economy weakens, the structure of electricity supply becomes one of the clearest indicators of how society is reorganising.

A strong national backbone supports national coordination.

A corridor network supports corridor economies.

Local electricity supports local economies.

The future structure of electricity supply, therefore, helps reveal the future structure of society itself.

The process cannot be predicted precisely.

But the direction of travel is easier to see:

from universal central provision

Toward a layered system in which a reduced national backbone operates alongside growing locality-level electricity supporting everyday life closer to home ⚡🌿

271. Sustainability Is Not Sustainable

Why the Replacement of Renewables Reveals the Limits of the Energy Transition

Public discussion about the future of energy assumes that replacing fossil fuels with renewable technologies will create a sustainable system. Yet when we look carefully at the material reality of renewable infrastructure, a different picture emerges. The evidence suggests that the modern technological energy system, whether fossil-based or renewable-based, is not sustainable in the long term.

This matters because policy is currently being built on the assumption that sustainability can be achieved simply by changing energy sources. In reality, the problem is deeper than that.

Solar Panels: A Replacement Industry, Not a Permanent Solution

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Solar panels are widely presented as clean, long-term energy infrastructure. However, they have productive lifetimes of around 25 to 30 years. After that period their output declines significantly and they must be replaced.

This means solar power is not a permanent installation. It is a rolling replacement programme.

International projections indicate that global solar panel waste could reach tens of millions of tonnes by mid-century. Some estimates suggest around 78 million tonnes by 2050. Annual solar e-waste alone could reach millions of tonnes each year by the 2030s.

Solar panels also contain heavy metals such as lead and cadmium. These materials can enter soil and groundwater if panels are not carefully processed. Recycling remains technically difficult and energy intensive.

What appears to be a clean energy technology is therefore also a future waste stream.

Wind Turbines: Large Machines with Large End-of-Life Problems

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8

Wind turbines face similar challenges.

Modern turbine blades can weigh up to 15 tonnes each. They are difficult to recycle because they are made from composite materials. In many cases they are currently shredded and mixed into concrete, or simply stored.

Even more significant are the reinforced concrete foundations and offshore installations. These require major energy inputs to construct and will require major energy inputs to remove.

Maintenance costs also increase as turbines age. Decommissioning costs are often underestimated in project economics.

Germany has already acknowledged the scale of this issue. Millions of tonnes of turbine blade material are expected to reach end of life without a clear recycling pathway.

Wind power therefore depends on continuous industrial replacement, not permanent infrastructure.

Heat Pumps: A Quiet Example of the Same Pattern

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7

Heat pumps are another example.

They are currently being promoted as a key technology for domestic heating. Yet they are heavy industrial devices with compressors, electronics, refrigerants and metal components. Their expected service life is typically around two decades.

Our own experience illustrates the point clearly. A heat pump installed in 1998 required replacement after about 22 years. That was entirely normal performance.

Now imagine millions of homes installing heat pumps across the country. In 20 to 25 years these systems will also need replacement.

The energy system being built today therefore commits society to a large future wave of technological renewal.

Whether that renewal will be affordable in a contracting economy remains an open question.

Replacement Requires Energy

The key issue is often overlooked.

Renewable technologies do not replace themselves.

They must be mined, manufactured, transported, installed, maintained and eventually dismantled using large quantities of energy and materials. Much of this energy currently comes from fossil fuels.

In other words, renewables depend on the legacy energy system they are supposed to replace.

This creates a structural contradiction at the centre of current policy.

The Deeper Problem: Technology Itself Is Not Sustainable

The most important conclusion is not about solar panels or wind turbines alone.

It is about technology as it is commonly understood in modern industrial society.

Modern technology operates through cycles of extraction, production, installation, maintenance and replacement. Each stage requires energy and materials. Each stage produces waste.

There is therefore no such thing as permanently sustainable industrial technology.

What exists instead is a managed replacement cycle.

The present energy transition assumes that changing energy sources will make the system sustainable. In reality, the replacement cycle continues regardless of the energy source.

A Future Constraint That Is Rarely Discussed

There is another implication.

If future energy availability declines, the ability to maintain large technological systems may also decline.

At that point the challenge will not be how to expand renewable infrastructure, but how to replace it.

This possibility is rarely included in policy planning.

Yet it may prove decisive.

The Real Conclusion

The evidence from solar panels, wind turbines and heat pumps points toward a simple but uncomfortable truth.

The present energy transition is not moving society from an unsustainable system to a sustainable one.

It is moving society from one replacement-dependent system to another replacement-dependent system.

Recognising this does not weaken the case for renewables. It strengthens the case for realism.

If sustainability is to exist at all, it will not come from changing technologies alone. It will come from reducing dependence on large-scale replacement-based systems and strengthening smaller-scale, longer-lived local arrangements.

That is where the real transition still lies. 🌿

264. I asked ChatGPT what the UK Local Energy System will look like

Here is a realistic sketch of what a typical UK locality energy mix might look like by mid-century if three things happen together:

  • fossil fuel availability declines
  • global supply chains become less reliable
  • the economy shifts from growth to maintenance and adaptation

This is not a prediction. It is a maintainability model — what is most likely to keep working rather than what is easiest to install today.


1. The biggest change: energy demand falls before supply stabilises

The first adjustment is not technological. It is structural.

Energy demand falls because:

  • fewer imports
  • less long-distance travel
  • smaller manufacturing sector
  • reduced discretionary consumption
  • more local production
  • fewer energy-intensive services

So the future system does not need to replace today’s national consumption level.

Instead, it supports:

homes
food production
local transport
essential services
repair trades
small workshops


2. A realistic locality electricity mix

A typical locality might draw electricity from a combination like this:

Rooftop solar – the backbone of local daytime supply

Already widely installed and easy to maintain.

Likely uses:

  • direct household consumption first
  • small shared storage second
  • limited export to local networks

Over time:

inverters become the limiting component rather than panels.


Small onshore wind – the winter stabiliser

Solar is weak in winter.

Small wind fills that gap.

Typical roles:

  • farms
  • workshops
  • community systems
  • edge-of-settlement installations

Winter wind becomes extremely valuable as heating electrifies gradually.


Micro-hydro – the hidden long-life contributor

Where geography allows, hydro becomes one of the most reliable sources:

  • continuous output
  • long lifespan
  • low maintenance
  • mechanically simple

Some systems could run for generations.


Legacy large wind farms – partial continuing contribution

Existing infrastructure does not disappear overnight.

Instead:

some turbines remain operating
some are refurbished
some are abandoned

Their contribution gradually declines but remains useful for decades.


3. Heat becomes more local than electricity

Heat dominates UK energy demand.

The locality mix likely includes:

Managed woodland

Supports:

  • domestic heating
  • small workshops
  • food processing
  • drying crops
  • charcoal production

Wood fuel becomes strategic rather than decorative.


Heat pumps where buildings allow them

Most effective in:

  • newer homes
  • insulated homes
  • shared systems
  • community installations

Less effective in older rural housing without insulation upgrades.


Solar thermal (often overlooked but important)

Very durable technology.

Useful for:

  • hot water
  • summer heating loads
  • reducing electricity demand

Lower complexity than PV systems.


4. Transport energy shifts from national to local scale

Future locality transport energy probably looks like:

walking
mobility scooters
electric bicycles
shared small EVs
electric buses on key routes

Private long-distance EV ownership becomes less common than today’s expectations assume.

Rail remains important where it already exists.


5. Storage becomes smaller and more distributed

Instead of large national battery systems:

expect more:

hot water tanks
thermal storage
gravity storage
small shared batteries
vehicle-to-home electricity use

Storage shifts from industrial infrastructure to household infrastructure.


6. The electricity grid becomes simpler, not larger

Today’s planning assumes grid expansion.

A contraction scenario suggests:

shorter distribution routes
stronger local balancing
less long-distance transmission
more neighbourhood-level coordination

The grid becomes more like a network of local systems joined together, rather than one fully centralised machine.


7. What a mid-century locality energy pattern might look like in practice

A typical locality might rely on something like:

summer electricity mostly solar
winter electricity mostly wind
continuous contribution from hydro where available
heat largely from wood + heat pumps
transport mostly electric but shorter range
storage mostly thermal rather than chemical

National infrastructure still exists, but local reliability matters more than national optimisation.


8. The most important shift: maintenance replaces expansion 🔧

The defining feature of the future system is not technology choice.

It is this:

energy systems are designed to last longer, be repaired locally, and replaced less often

That change alone reshapes:

skills
employment
settlement patterns
woodland management
building standards
local workshops
community cooperation

It is exactly the sort of transition your wider work on the emerging local economy has been anticipating.

260. Energy shortages in Europe could hit by next month, warns Shell CEO

By Stephanie Kelly and Marianna Parraga

March 24, 20262:25 PM GMTUpdated 19 hours ago

Energy Asia conference in Kuala Lumpur
  • Summary
  • Companies
  • Energy shortages in Europe could hit next month, warns Shell CEO
  • Middle East conflict affecting global energy supplies
  • Shell exploring gas and oil opportunities in Venezuela

HOUSTON, March 24 (Reuters) – Energy shortages could ​hit Europe by next month, Shell (SHEL.L), opens new tab CEO Wael Sawan said on Tuesday, adding that securing adequate ‌energy supply was critical to national security.

Countries cannot have national security without energy security, Sawan said, adding that Shell was trying to work with governments to help them address the energy crisis, including with storage and purchasing. The Middle East conflict, now in its fourth week, has already affected ​supplies of jet fuel, with diesel set to be next, followed by gasoline as summer driving season ​gets underway in the Northern Hemisphere, Sawan said.

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The war has damaged major energy facilities and nearly halted shipping through ⁠the Strait of Hormuz – which handles about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows.

“South Asia was first ​to get that brunt. That’s moved to Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and then more so into Europe as we get ​into April,” he said while speaking at the CERAWeek conference in Houston, Texas.

Germany’s Economy Minister Katherina Reiche also warned that energy supply scarcity could occur in late April or May if the conflict continues.

VENEZUELA

Shell is mainly looking at natural gas projects in Venezuela, Sawan said, and also ​evaluating oil opportunities.

The British major could give the green light to one or two projects in Venezuela before year-end ​if the fiscal and legal situation in the country allows, Sawan said. Venezuela’s National Assembly approved an oil reform in January, but ‌oil ⁠executives have said more needs to be done to secure foreign investment.

This month, Shell signed preliminary agreements with the Venezuelan government to develop oil and gas projects, which could give the company access to coveted areas.

Shell and U.S. company Chevron (CVX.N), opens new tab have been closing in on the first big energy production deals with Venezuela, five sources close to the negotiations told Reuters ​this month.

The deals would allow ​both companies to boost oil ⁠and gas production in the South American country, the biggest steps to date toward what U.S. President Donald Trump has said would be a $100 billion effort to rebuild Venezuela’s oil industry ​after decades of mismanagement and underinvestment under Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chavez.

“What we ​are looking at, ⁠at the moment, is where we can add value to Venezuela, the Venezuelan people,” Sawan said. “Initially, I would say it’s more geared towards gas, and in particular gas that can be monetized through LNG.”

Shell has progressed slowly in recent years to develop ⁠the Dragon ​offshore gas project in Venezuela. The company, which struggled to advance it due to ​U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s energy sectors, is now trying to move it forward so the gas can be turned into LNG in neighboring Trinidad and ​Tobago.

257. Europe is about to have worst ever fuel shortages

Yesterday’s post by Tim Watkins:

When the last of the tankers from the Gulf unloads its cargo – sometime in the next week – Europe will have just days before its worst ever fuel shortages occur. This can be cushioned to some extent – and at great cost – by competing for additional supplies from non-Gulf producers – although Asian states will likely outbid Europe – and by further releases from the strategic reserve. But this will barely mitigate what is coming.

250. Britain’s energy security – what the Iran war reveals and the lessons that should be learned

Professor Sir Dieter Helm

9 March, 2026

Dieter Helm is Professor of Economic Policy at the University of Oxford and Fellow in Economics at New College, Oxford

It takes a crisis to reveal the underlying state of Britain’s energy insecurity, and its defence. By now we should be basking in the success of “getting out of gas”. We do after all have a lot of renewables. These, we have been told, are nine times cheaper than gas. We don’t have much nuclear left, and we have got out of coal, so all our bets are in the renewables basket. We should be well on our way now to being a “clean-energy superpower”, relying on “home-grown energy” that should be bringing down energy bills by the now legendary £300.

None of this is so far realised. Britain has the highest industrial power prices in the industrial world, so no other country is looking to it to see how they could emulate it. On the contrary, everyone else wants to work out how Britain has ended up in such an unenviable position. We turn out to be utterly reliant on foreign supply chains for the renewables and the transmission and batteries needed to deal with all this intermittent generation. It turns out that we already need twice the capacity (120GW and counting), twice the grid, and all the batteries and storage, plus lots more interconnectors to service a firm-power demand peak of 45GW – which we used to meet comfortably with just 60GW of capacity.

Having got out of coal, and betting on intermittent low-density and geographically distributed renewables, it turns out that we have become more rather than less dependent on gas for our energy security. Iran’s interruption of its LNG gas shipments out of the Strait of Hormuz and the attacks on Qatar reveal how threadbare Britain’s energy security actually is. Why, given we don’t buy LNG from Qatar? Why do we seem to be worse hit than China, Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan, all of which buy a lot of gas from Qatar? And why, given we have very little dependency on Gulf oil, compared with China (40% of all its oil coming through the Strait of Hormuz), India (15%), and Japan and South Korea (12% each)?

China, India and Japan have little gas or oil. China and India have lots of coal, with China burning more than 55% of all the world’s coal (!), and building another 400GW of coal generation capacity – all firm power, as against China’s wind (at around 24% load factor) and solar (at around 20% load factor).

Britain should be in a much better position. It has oil and gas reserves in the North Sea, and Norway nearby to provide over 30% of Britain’s gas, and it has good wind flows in the North Sea too. It is not in the league of the world’s energy superpower: the US. The US is by far the world’s largest oil producer, and its shale gas has translated it from what was supposed to be a major importer of Qatar LNG to first self-sufficiency from its shale gas, and in the last ten years it has become the world’s greatest LNG exporter. Ten years ago, it did not export gas; 20 years ago, the shale revolution had not got going.

Why, then, is Britain in such an energy mess? Part of the answer is its gas policies. Put aside the simplistic slogans about getting out of gas, and recognise that Britain will be dependent on gas for at least another couple of decades and probably more. Because of the energy mix that has been chosen (no coal, a fast decline of nuclear, and lots and lots of intermittent renewables), it will need gas to guarantee firm electricity supplies.

Whatever the political rhetoric from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, this is a reality. It is even clear in the scenarios of the National Electricity System Operator (NESO). It turns out that gas is critical to the renewables policies. It is not renewables instead of gas; it is renewables and gas. Energy security depends upon it, just as it depends on all those foreign supply chains of critical minerals and especially rare earths, and on all the solar panels and wind turbines made in China and elsewhere. If the Iran war has displayed that the emperor of the clean-energy superpower has no clothes, wait to see what happens if and when China invades Taiwan.

It turns out that our energy policies have not just weakened our energy security; it is much worse, they have undermined our defence. Why? Because they have undermined our defence industries and have also exposed us to having our energy supplies adversely hit by cutting the many interconnectors we now need to keep the lights on.

On the former, high energy prices have led to a cascade of exits from energy-intensive industries, and in short order. Gone is Grangemouth, a refinery in Scotland, one in Hull, most of the steel industry, the fertiliser industry, and the fibreglass industry. Our ability to produce the petrochemicals and refined fuels is now more dependent on imports. We don’t have our own steel in the volumes and of the quality we would need for a rapid militarisation.

On the latter, it is hard to think of a way to make Britain more vulnerable to a hostile power. Let’s call it Russia. One pipeline is responsible for 30% of our gas supplies (from Norway). We have virtually no gas storage. The cables are obvious sitting ducks for cutting. The North Sea wind farms are perfect targets for swarms of drones, the new weapon of choice in aggressive attacks. And for all this we have perhaps one boat that patrols all this offshore infrastructure.

A proper defence policy would ensure that the defence supply chain has a lot of home-grown industrial support. It might even look to provide long-term energy pricing at competitive costs. It would have a navy capable of policing and defending its offshore infrastructure. Sadly, none of this is in good shape.

Back home, the central pillar of energy policy should be security. It is no good being “green” if you cannot defend your country. In the British case, a central piece should be a gas security policy, not bleating on and on about “getting out of gas”. We need gas and we will go on needing it for a long time to come. It is essential in the renewables strategy. It is not fossil fuels versus renewables. The reality is that it is both and it is going to continue to be both.

What should a gas policy look like? It has several parts: securing sufficient gas supplies; having enough storage to withstand shocks; providing an economic framework for gas generation of electricity that takes account of the impact on intermittency from wind and solar on the demand for gas-generated electricity; and a defence force capable of protecting the offshore gas infrastructure. Britain fails on all of them.

Let’s start with gas supplies. Since we are going to burn lots of gas for a long time to come, why would it be sensible to close off the development of Britain’s own North Sea gas reserves, and penalise existing production with extremely high taxes? No other country in the world is following Britain’s “leadership” on all this. Why is it sensible to instead rely as a consequence on Norway and LNG cargoes from the US instead?

The anti-North Sea oil and gas approach is best regarded as a mix of ideology and expediency. The ideology stems from the remarkable simplicity of the idea that Britain can continue as a major world economy relying overwhelmingly on wind and solar, and the hope of further nuclear in due course. Not coal like China and India, not coal and gas like the US. The aim appears to be the first country to be overwhelmingly based upon renewables and as quickly as possible. It is a piece of progressive ideology with little evidence to support it and little environmental benefit. It is one hell of a bet, and it is one that increases emissions by using at the margin the much more polluting US shale-based LNG over North Sea pipeline gas.

The expediency arises because of the desperate fiscal position Britain has got into. It needs the money, and hence it can justify higher taxes.

The consequence of these North Sea policies – higher taxes, banning new licences – is both immediate and medium-term. It is immediate because it tells the North Sea oil and gas companies they are not welcome (as, indeed, leading politicians have told them to their faces). These companies see much better prospects elsewhere. Lots of countries are boosting their oil and gas production. Why spend at the margin on maintaining existing assets when the government is so hostile to their very existence. Time for them to look elsewhere – as indeed they are already doing.

Instead of securing our gas supplies, we become dependent on the US LNG at the margin. That is what minsters mean when they talk of being exposed to world prices. Right now in the midst of the Iran war, the US is in a great bargaining position. Everyone wants cargoes of US LNG, and in the Far East they are willing to pay top dollar for them. Britain is not top of the pile, and US companies will be mindful of the rapid deterioration of the “special relationship”. Hence the price to Britain goes up.

If instead we looked to the North Sea to provide a medium-term secure supply, the opposite policies would be the better way of proceeding. Start with asking what long-term take-or-pay contracts could be struck in return for the development of newer fields, and the continuation of production from declining fields. Tie that long-term contract price to industrial energy costs, notably for critical energy-intensive industries, and especially those necessary for the defence supply chain. Companies could have fixed-price electricity supplies, and oil and gas companies could have the security of contracts to finance their investments.

Next up is storage. Britain has very little, and for a good historical reason. In the “old days” of the “bad old British Gas”, Britain insisted that British continental shelf gas production should be landed in Britain and sold under contract to British Gas. These contracts allowed British Gas to flex its gas-take, treating the gas wells as in effect storage sites to be drawn upon as needed. It therefore did not need much storage. Germany, by contrast, has built large-scale storage, with up to three months of supplies. Britain has a few days at best. Hence the criticality of those US LNG cargoes now.

In Britain, energy storage issues are very much to the fore when it comes to renewables. The government backs pumped-hydro storage, and it is active in promoting grid-supporting batteries. But on gas it is silent. Even the Rough storage facility is under pressure. In the “bad old days”, there were big seasonal swings. Hence a gas storage facility could be filled cheaply in summer, and then sold down at higher prices in winter. The economics of renewables with zero marginal costs and the rapid decline of energy-intensive industries have undermined this. Hence the commercial case for storage has collapsed. The result is that just when we need storage, we will have almost none.

The commercial impact of renewables has one further blow for gas. Conventionally a new gas station was built and initially run flat-out, recovering its capital costs, and only later moved up the merit order to become more flexible in use. This commercial case has been turned on its head. Why? Because renewables always run when they can (when the wind blows and the sun shines). They are paid a contract-for-difference (CfD) fixed price (even if the power is not needed), and hence the fact that their marginal costs are zero does not impact on their revenues – but it does on the gas power stations. When the wind blows and the sun shines enough, the wholesale price of electricity collapses and the gas power stations cannot recover even their gas supply costs. At other times, when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine, the wholesale price shoots up and the gas power stations are needed to generate.

The result is that the intermittency of wind and solar renders the gas power stations intermittent too (and this is true for nuclear too). The consequences for the economics of a gas power station are dire. It does not know how much gas it will need and when, and it cannot contract on any basis other than “on demand”. The result is that there is little or no incentive to build new ones, and an increased incentive to close existing ones earlier.

The implication for gas policies is that if the gas is needed for security of supply and to maintain firm electricity power supplies, then it will need contracts. It is not just wind and solar that need government-backed contracts. There needs to be a strategic gas reserve, and gas power stations need to be paid to be available whether or not they are used. They could have a formal regulated asset base (RAB), like Sizewell and the electricity networks, or a capacity contract tailored to their peculiar circumstance driven by the intermittency of wind and solar.

And there we have the energy security policies. North Sea gas supplies from the British sector as well as Norway, long-term contracts for new supplies, industrial electricity contracts for energy-intensive industries – notably in the defence sector – backed by gas longer-term contracts, investment in storage, and a strategic gas generation reserve, to which is added a North Sea defence capability to protect the Norwegian gas pipeline and to ensure that the electricity interconnectors are protected from attacks by Russia or others.

None of this is anti-renewables, or against addressing climate change. Indeed, it is essential to both. The climate change agenda will not survive if the lights go out, or if security is undermined. Without gas, the energy mix will be subject to great volatility and much higher costs. Net zero and high prices have already proved difficult bedfellows.

Which brings us back to Iran and the Iranian war. One aspect of energy markets which our political leaders seem incapable of understanding is that a shock is not the same as a trend. It was a mistake made when Russia invaded Ukraine. Gas prices spiked, and politicians ranted on and on about the future of high and volatile gas prices. They are not the first to make this sort of mistake. When oil prices peaked after the Iranian Revolution back in 1979, politicians convinced themselves that the price of oil would go ever upwards, and even convinced themselves of the nonsense of peak oil. They repeated the error as oil prices peaked in late 2014.

What they forget to mention (or even notice) was that what went up came down again. After the Iranian Revolution by the mid-1980s oil prices were back down to $10/barrel and stayed there for the rest of the century, with one blip – the First Gulf War, when they went up to $30/barrel and then fell quickly back to $10/barrel. By the late 1990s, The Economist ran a front page cover asking whether oil companies could survive $9/barrel oil. After Russia invaded Ukraine the gas price fell back. By early 2026, it was 90% lower than its peak, and it had fallen 40% in 2025. The current shocks in this Iranian war are not trends, whatever the hysteria in the press. Price going up is a response to supply shocks as the market way to ration the supplies. Those without other contracted options from core supplies (like China and India with Russia) or without storage are desperate and pay top dollar. They cannot deplete storage they don’t have and wait and see, or look elsewhere.

After a shock, the reaction is typically to take more precautions against future shocks. No doubt lots of gas importers will be increasing their storage and diversifying their supplies. They will want to maximise their own production if they have it. The result is more resilience and the price falls. This time, the great gamble on the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz may greatly weaken the market power of the Gulf States. Iran, too, might start to ramp up its production, as will probably Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Markets work after a lag. For all the alarmism in the short term (and it might be tough), the consequence of the shock now is probably lower oil and gas prices in the future. The Gulf is not the monopoly it once was. The US once desperately needed Gulf oil, as Jimmy Carter found out. Now the US does not need Gulf oil or gas. The world needs US oil and gas. It is the energy superpower now. Britain should take note. It has made itself more energy insecure and dependent on the US.

221. Can the Grid Carry the Power We Are Planning to Generate?

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The UK’s electricity strategy assumes a rapid expansion of offshore wind. In energy policy terms this looks logical. The resource is large, domestic, and low-carbon. Renewables already provide a substantial share of national power, and offshore wind capacity is set to grow sharply over the next decade.

But futurists increasingly ask a different question. Not how much electricity can be generated, but whether the national system can carry it, store it, and rely on it when conditions change.

Carrying Offshore Wind Power Inland

Offshore wind is mostly generated far from where electricity is used. Large volumes of power must be brought ashore and then transmitted across the country. This places enormous strain on the high-voltage transmission system operated by National Grid.

Futurists point out three structural problems.

First, grid capacity is already constrained. Many offshore wind projects are ready to generate but cannot connect because transmission upgrades are years behind. Queue backlogs now stretch well into the 2030s.

Second, the grid was never designed for this pattern of flow. It evolved around centralised power stations located close to industrial demand. Offshore wind reverses that logic, pushing large, intermittent surges of electricity into a system that must then move it long distances.

Third, public resistance is growing. New pylons, substations and overhead lines cut through countryside and settlements. Planning objections are not a side issue – they are becoming a binding constraint.

From a futurist perspective, the problem is not engineering alone. It is social and political capacity to keep expanding a national system indefinitely.


The Hard Reality of Windless and Sunless Days

A deeper concern lies in the weather itself.

The UK regularly experiences winter high-pressure systems that bring days, sometimes weeks, of cold, still air. These are precisely the moments when electricity demand rises sharply, while wind output collapses.

Solar contributes little at this time. Batteries help only briefly. Long-duration storage at national scale remains limited and costly.

Futurists therefore stress that the issue is not average annual generation, but system reliability during prolonged lulls. These conditions are not rare anomalies. They are recurring features of the British climate.

This creates a growing tension. The more the system relies on weather-dependent generation, the more complex and expensive it becomes to guarantee supply during unfavourable conditions.


Can the Grid Expansion Be Funded?

Official plans assume massive investment in new transmission lines, offshore connections, substations, and reinforcement of local distribution networks.

The question futurists increasingly ask is simple. Who pays?

Grid expansion costs run into tens of billions of pounds. These costs ultimately fall on electricity consumers through higher bills, or on the state through borrowing and subsidy. Both routes assume continued economic growth and political consent.

In a future shaped by:

  • stagnant or contracting real incomes
  • rising public debt
  • declining discretionary spending

the assumption that society can endlessly fund large, capital-intensive national infrastructure becomes fragile.

Futurists argue that there is a growing mismatch between industrial-era infrastructure ambitions and the economic reality of a society moving into long-term contraction.


Localism as a Structural Alternative

This is where localism enters the discussion, not as ideology but as system design.

Rather than forcing ever more electricity through an increasingly stressed national grid, futurists suggest a gradual shift toward local energy systems.

These include:

  • local wind and solar used close to where it is generated
  • small-scale storage tied to communities rather than the national system
  • demand adapted to local supply conditions rather than the other way round

Under localism, the grid still exists, but it becomes a supporting network, not the single point of failure on which everything depends.

Local systems are inherently more resilient. When national supply tightens, local generation and reduced demand soften the impact. When failures occur, they are smaller, slower, and easier to manage.

From a futurist viewpoint, this mirrors wider economic trends. As national systems struggle with scale, cost and complexity, informal and local arrangements expand naturally.


A Change in Expectations

The deeper shift is cultural.

For decades, the assumption has been that electricity will always be available, instantly, everywhere, regardless of weather or cost. Futurists increasingly question whether this expectation itself belongs to the era of cheap fossil energy.

In a constrained future, electricity becomes something that is:

  • more variable
  • more locally managed
  • more closely matched to essential needs

Localism does not promise unlimited power. It promises adaptation.


The Bottom Line

Futurists are not arguing that offshore wind is a mistake. They are arguing that building generation faster than the system can carry, store and socially accept it creates new vulnerabilities.

They question whether:

  • the national grid can expand at the required pace
  • the funding model is sustainable in a shrinking economy
  • reliance on weather-dependent generation can be made fully reliable at national scale

Many conclude that the long-term answer does not lie in ever-larger national systems, but in a gradual shift toward locality-based energy, reduced expectations, and resilience through simplicity.

In that sense, localism is not a retreat. It is an adaptation to physical, economic and social limits that are becoming increasingly hard to ignore.


207. Energy Surplus, and the Evolution of Power: Roman Britain, Localism and Globalism

The history of the United Kingdom can be seen as an economy which grew and shrank and grew again, and so on, driven by rising and falling energy surpluses.

After Rome: Energy Collapse and Political Fragmentation (5th–9th centuries)

When Roman rule ended in Britain in the early fifth century, the collapse was not only political.  It was energetic and economic.

Roman governance depended on surplus extracted from agriculture and trade, enforced through taxation, roads, towns, and paid officials.  When that surplus disappeared, the system could not be maintained.

Energy surplus is the extra energy left after people have met their basic needs.  It is what allows societies to build, travel, govern, trade, and create things beyond survival.

Small surpluses come from human effort, animal power, food, wood, and water.  These support local economies and simple administration.

Large surpluses come from fossil fuels.  These support cities, extended supply chains, national governments, and global trade.

When energy surplus grows, economies expand.  When it shrinks, economies simplify and become more local again.

Britain then became fragmented into small, autonomous kingdoms.  Governance shrank to the scale permitted by available energy.  Power could only operate where it could be exercised directly.  Authority depended on walking distance, personal loyalty, and local knowledge.

Economic life became intensely local.  Energy came almost entirely from human labour, animal traction, and local biomass.

Local Biomass is:
Wood used for fuel, charcoal, and construction
Crop residues such as straw
Grasses and fodder grown to feed animals
Animals themselves as a source of energy
Human food energy produced from local agriculture

In a low-energy economy, almost all usable energy comes from biomass.  People eat locally grown food.  Animals eat local fodder.  Firewood is gathered nearby.  Materials are grown or harvested close to where they are used.

Biomass is limited by land and time.  You cannot extract more wood or food than the local landscape can regenerate.  That natural limit keeps economies small, local, and seasonal.  It also prevents long-distance centralisation, because energy cannot be moved cheaply.

Long-distance transport was expensive and unreliable.  Under these conditions, central administration was impossible.  Survival depended on proximity.

This was not disorder.  It was governance resized to fit a low-energy economy.

The Emergence of Local Administration: Shires, Hundreds, and Wapentakes (9th–11th centuries)

As agricultural output slowly improved, a modest surplus returned.

This allowed more structured local administration to emerge, particularly under later Anglo-Saxon rule.

England developed shires, later known as counties, as broad administrative areas.  Within them were hundreds, or in areas of former Danelaw influence, wapentakes.  The difference in name reflected legal custom rather than function.  Both were units of local governance designed to operate within strict energy limits.

Hundreds and wapentakes were not bureaucracies.  They were assemblies.  They handled justice, land disputes, obligations, and local order.  Courts met at regular intervals.  Attendance was personal.  Decisions relied on reputation, oath, and community enforcement.

These systems existed for practical reasons.  Travel had to be possible within a day.  Administration had to be cheap.  Authority had to be visible.  Justice had to be embedded in daily life.

Later, during the era of a national monarch, royal power was thin.  Sheriffs represented the crown, but relied heavily on local cooperation.  Governance was layered rather than centralised.

  • Norman Rule: Central Authority Built on Local Foundations (11th–13th centuries)

The Norman Conquest did not abolish counties, hundreds, or wapentakes.  It took them over.

The Normans imposed a new ruling elite, but relied on existing local administrative structures.  What changed was the direction of extraction and control.  Land was redistributed.  Obligations were formalised.  Written records became more important.

In this context, extraction does not mean only the physical removal of resources such as minerals or fuel.  It refers more broadly to the organised removal of surplus from where it is produced to where it is controlled.  This includes food, labour, energy, rent, taxes, and later money and profit.  Centralised systems depend on this process.  When surplus can no longer be extracted without damaging local viability, those systems weaken, and local forms of organisation reassert themselves.

The Domesday survey illustrates the shift to written records.  It was possible only because surplus and administrative capacity had grown enough to support a nationwide audit.  Yet the information gathered remained grounded in local knowledge.

This period marks the beginning of systematic centralisation.  Local courts remained active, but royal courts expanded.  Money replaced payment in kind.  Law became more uniform.

Central authority grew because it could now be afforded.

Growth, Energy, and the Limits of Medieval Centralisation (13th–15th centuries)

As water power spread and farming intensified, surplus increased further.  Towns expanded.  Cathedrals, castles, and manor houses multiplied.  Governance became more formal and more distant.

Yet this system remained fragile.  When surplus collapsed in the fourteenth century due to famine and plague, central enforcement weakened.  Labour shortages undermined manorial control.  Large houses became unaffordable.  Obligations loosened.

Local autonomy increased again.  Informal arrangements replaced rigid rules.  Authority drifted back toward locality, not through reform, but through necessity.

This pattern is essential.  Centralisation advanced only while surplus allowed it.  When surplus fell, local systems resurfaced.

Fossil Fuels and the National Bureaucratic State (18th–19th centuries)

The Industrial Revolution transformed the scale of economic and administrative life.  Fossil fuels release vast quantities of stored energy.  Coal allowed work to be concentrated, multiplied, and transported.  Production no longer depended on land, season, or muscle.

This new energy regime generated an unprecedented surplus.  Factories expanded.  Cities grew rapidly.  Transport improved.  Administration scaled up.  Permanent salaried officials became normal.  Authority could now be exercised reliably nationwide.

Counties and local courts were not abolished, but they were absorbed into a national hierarchy.  Local discretion narrowed.  Uniform rules replaced local judgment.  Governance became more distant because energy allowed it to be.

This period also saw the consolidation of the national monarchy and state.  Taxation systems expanded.  Law became increasingly standardised.  The costs of administration could be met because the surplus was abundant.

An Interlude: Railways as a Surplus Warning Signal

The nineteenth-century railway boom and bust reveal a crucial aspect of this phase of expansion.

Railways were made possible by coal.  Without fossil energy, rails, locomotives, steel production, and large-scale earthworks would have been inconceivable.  Coal powered not only the trains, but the financial and industrial systems that built them.  This sudden abundance of usable energy created a national surplus.

That surplus sought outlets.  Railways appeared to offer certainty, profit, and permanence.  Investment surged.  Lines were promoted far beyond immediate need.  Routes duplicated one another.  Some ran through sparsely populated areas with little long-term demand.

This was not irrational behaviour.  It was what surplus looks like when it is abundant and searching for expression.  Energy abundance encouraged confidence.  Financial systems amplified it.

The collapse that followed was not a failure of the railways themselves.  It was a correction in scale.  Capital had outrun underlying economic reality.  What survived was a smaller, more viable network.  What disappeared were speculative extensions that surplus had briefly made possible.

Railways also enabled a new level of administrative centralisation.  Distance collapsed.  Officials, goods, and information could move quickly and cheaply.  National governance became practical in ways it had never been before.  Local systems were increasingly subordinated, not because they failed, but because energy allowed authority to operate at scale.

Later contraction made the limits visible again.  Branch lines closed.  Rural connections disappeared.  The network retreated toward routes that still justified their energy and maintenance costs.  This was not merely a policy choice.  It was surplus reality asserting itself.

From Managed Centralisation to Global Overreach (Late 19th–20th centuries)

After the railway corrections, centralisation continued in a more managed form.  Infrastructure was treated as essential rather than speculative.  The national state deepened its role in welfare, planning, policing, and regulation.

Oil later extended this trajectory.  Energy became more flexible and mobile.  Cars, aviation, suburban living, and global supply chains expanded.  Economic life stretched far beyond local and even national boundaries.

Globalism was not an ideological project at first.  It was an energy condition.  Cheap fuel made distance irrelevant.  Supply chains lengthened.  Local production declined.  Authority moved further away from daily life.

The national state reached its greatest scale during this period because surplus allowed it to do so.

The Present Transition: Shrinking Surplus and Administrative Strain (21st century)

That condition is now weakening.  Energy still exists, but net energy is lower.  Costs rise.  Surplus shrinks.

Central systems strain under their own weight.  Enforcement weakens.  Services falter.  Global supply chains prove fragile and expensive.

As always, discretionary systems fail first.  Long commutes, non-essential retail, and high-energy lifestyles contract.  Large homes become burdens.  Inequality changes shape as complexity becomes costly.

At the same time, local systems re-emerge.  Food growing.  Repair.  Informal care.  Shared resources.  These are often described as social trends, but they are energy adaptations.

Why Counties, Hundreds, and Wapentakes Worked, and Why Something Like Them May Return

Counties, hundreds, and wapentakes worked because they respected three constraints.

They matched travel limits.
They minimised administrative cost.
They combined functions locally.

They were not designed.  They evolved.

Modern equivalents will not look medieval.  But they are likely to share key characteristics.  They will be small enough for people to recognise one another, large enough to pool skills and resources, and able to resolve routine matters without escalation.

They will handle practical issues first.  Care.  Maintenance.  Local resources.  Disputes.  They will gain authority through usefulness rather than legislation.

Digital tools may support them, but they will remain place-based.  Trust cannot be centralised.

From National Monarchy and Globalism to Local Autonomy

Historically, political scale follows energy scale.  Fragmented kingdoms emerged when energy was local.  National monarchies grew when surplus allowed centralisation.  Globalism followed fossil energy abundance.

As surplus declines, authority drifts back toward locality.  The national monarchy and state may persist symbolically, but practical power shifts downward.

This does not require collapse.  It requires adjustment.

Local systems will not announce themselves as replacements.  They will simply become the places where things still work.

A Note on Extraction

Extraction does not mean only mining or taking physical resources out of the ground.  It means the organised removal of surplus from where it is produced to where it is controlled.

Here is a clear breakdown.

At its simplest, extraction is the process by which energy, labour, or output produced locally is taken away from local use and redirected elsewhere.  That “elsewhere” might be a lord, a king, a state, an empire, or a global system.

In Roman Britain, extraction meant taxes in grain, goods, and money.  Agricultural surplus was removed from farms to feed armies, towns, and administrators.  Labour was also extracted through conscription and obligation.  Without this extraction, Roman administration could not exist.

In the medieval period, extraction took the form of rents, tithes, labour services, and fines.  Peasants produced food locally, but a portion was claimed by landlords, the church, or the crown.  That surplus funded manor houses, castles, and officials.  The key point is that production happened locally, but control of surplus did not.

Under the manorial system, extraction was often physical and visible.  Grain stored in a lord’s barn.  Days of labour owed.  Animals taken as rent.  The system functioned only while there was enough surplus to be extracted without collapsing production.

With the rise of national states, extraction became more abstract.  Taxes were paid in money rather than goods.  Surplus was converted into revenue.  That revenue funded bureaucracies, courts, and wars.  The mechanism changed, but the principle remained the same.

In the fossil-fuel era, extraction expanded again.  It included not only taxation, but wages, profits, interest, and resource flows.  Energy extracted from coal and oil fields was converted into economic surplus, which was then extracted again through markets and finance to support distant systems, global supply chains, and large institutions.

In the present context, extraction also includes the removal of local resilience.  When food, energy, care, and production are organised at a distance, localities lose control over their own surplus.  They become dependent on systems that extract value upward or outward, often invisibly.

So extraction is a recurring pattern:

Local production
followed by
the removal of surplus
to sustain larger, more distant structures

This is why extraction and centralisation go hand in hand.  Extraction requires surplus.  Central systems exist to organise and enforce it.  When surplus shrinks, extraction becomes harder.  Central authority weakens.  Localism re-emerges because less can be taken away without breaking the system.

Conclusion: Administration is an Energy System

Administration consumes energy.  Governance requires surplus.  When surplus expands, power centralises.  When surplus contracts, power localises.

The history of counties, hundreds, and wapentakes shows that local governance is not primitive.  It is efficient under constraints.

What lies ahead will not be a return to the past.  But it may rhyme with it.

203. Government Advice: Power cuts

A torch that has been switched on.

Power cuts (or electricity outages) can have a number of causes including severe weather, which can lead to damaged infrastructure, or system faults. 

The UK has a resilient electricity system. Most power cuts are short-lived and occur locally, but more widespread and longer outages can happen. These could potentially last several days with regional or, although unlikely, national impacts. 

Gas boilers and hobs, heat pumps and your home internet won’t work without power. Your mobile phone might stop working if your local mast is in the affected area. Mains water supply to your home could also be disrupted. Find out what to do in a phone and broadband outage, or a water outage.


Actions to take to prepare for a power cut

  • Keep a battery or wind-up torch (and spare batteries) at home. You probably won’t want to use the torch on your mobile phone as this will drain its batteries more quickly. It is not advised to use candles or any other naked flames to provide light, as these could pose a fire hazard.
  • Consider keeping some bottled water and non-perishable food that doesn’t need cooking such as ready-to-eat tinned meat, fruit or vegetables and a tin opener. You should also include ready-made baby formula and pet food if needed. 
  • Find out your power/load block letter. In the unlikely event of a national energy shortage, emergency power cuts could be scheduled on a rotating area-by-area basis. Each area in GB is assigned a ‘load block letter’ and would be scheduled to disconnect from the electricity grid for around three hours at a time. You can find which load block letter you are in by entering your postcode at powercut105.com, or some energy suppliers include it on electricity bills.
  • If you’re eligible, sign up to your energy supplier’s Priority Service Register to let them know that you need additional support during a power cut.

You would lose internet connection and possibly mobile signal during a power cut. To prepare for this:

  • Write down the phone number to report a power cut – this is 105 in England, Scotland and Wales and 03457 643643 in Northern Ireland. You can also save the number in your mobile phone.
  • Keep a battery or wind-up radio (and spare batteries) at home. There might be updates communicated by radio during a power cut. A car radio can be used, however in severe weather it might be safer to stay inside. Write down on paper the frequencies of any local or national radio stations you use for news updates. You could add these to your household emergency plan
  • It can be helpful to keep these notes with other items you might have, such as a torch or radio, and in a place that’s easy to find in the dark. 
  • If your only way of making emergency calls is through a landline phone, or if you have a telecare kit connected to your landline, contact your landline provider to understand whether your phone will work during a power cut. If your landline will not work during a power cut, your landline provider might offer you a free solution (such as a back-up battery unit), for a minimum of one hour, that would enable you to call the emergency services during a power cut if you needed to.
  • If you have a personal alarm or diabetes sensor (also known as telecare devices) or other connected equipment monitoring your health (such as diabetes sensors), speak to your device provider/manufacturer to understand how they will function during a power cut. 
  • Download or print out offline versions of maps in case you do not have access to live map-based mobile applications. To provide location services, your mobile smart phone uses a GPS signal. This means your mobile may still be able to provide your location when not connected to the network. However, map-based mobile applications rely on internet connectivity to download the maps.

Actions to take during a power cut

  • Visit your local network operator’s website to report a power cut and track updates when there’s a problem. If you’re unable to report the power cut online, call 105 for free in England, Wales and Scotland and 03457 643643 in Northern Ireland. 
  • Keep away from hazards such as power lines. Electricity at high voltages can jump gaps with no warning. 
  • Turn off items such as irons, ovens, electric fires and fryers. Unplug your TV and PC as they can be damaged if there is a surge when power goes back on. 
  • Keep warm by using blankets and layered clothing. Keep doors of unused rooms closed and close curtains to keep the heat in. Older adults, babies and young children, and people with long-term health problems are most likely to become ill if they get too cold. 
  • Check in on vulnerable neighbours and, if you are able, offer to share blankets, clothing or other supplies such as food. You can also pass on any important information you might have received about the power cut, such as when the power is expected to go back on. If you have a corded landline phone, this might still be working in a power cut. 
  • In a power cut your TV or internet might not be working. To get news updates use a battery or wind-up radio to search for stations that are still broadcasting. Try FM and digital modes. You can use the radio in your car, however in severe weather it might be safer to stay inside. 
  • If you have a power cut and you don’t have back-up power to your landline phone (or have a corded landline) and have a life-threatening emergency, you should attempt to call 999 or 112 using a mobile. You might receive overlapping signal from a nearby area that is unaffected – emergency calls automatically ‘roam’ onto all available networks.
  • Keep fridges and freezer doors closed, as this will ensure they stay cold for several hours. The Food Standards Agency provides advice on food safety in a power cut
  • To prepare baby formula safely, you will need to be able to boil water and follow the normal safety procedures.  If you are not able to boil water, please try to use ready-to-use baby formula. The NHS provides advice on making up baby formula.

194. The Decline of Surplus Energy:  What it Means

Now and then, I have to remind myself where I have got to in my thinking.

For two centuries, the UK economy grew because we had cheap energy with a large surplus.  We put a little energy into getting a lot back.  That surplus powered everything beyond basic survival, including, for a while, the consumer-based economy, much of which is discretionary.

Discretionary businesses and markets depend on people having spare money created by surplus energy in the broader economy.  When surplus energy is high and energy costs are low, households can afford extras such as leisure, travel, and luxury goods. 

Essential businesses rely on steady demand for food, heat, and basic services, and their markets shrink or grow only slightly as energy conditions change. 

As surplus energy falls and energy costs rise, households cut back on discretionary spending first, which causes those markets to contract while essential markets remain the backbone of daily life.

Now the surplus is decreasing, and we have become focused on affording the essentials.  Less is left over for comfort, variety, and growth.

What this means for prosperity

Prosperity depends on what is left after the basics are paid for.

When energy costs increase, households have less money for eating out, leisure activities, holiday travel, new clothes, and gadgets.  Firms have less to invest in staff and new kit.  The State collects less tax from slowing activity, while costs for health care, care, and infrastructure continue to rise.  

The result is a slow squeeze on the domestic and wider economies.  

Discretionary markets are now shrinking.  Second-hand replaces brand new.  Some replacements cannot be afforded.  It feels like a reduction in choice, pace, and reach.

What if the present UK system remains unchanged?

Assume the government tries to run the current model with blinkers on, as if nothing basic has changed.

Debt will try to bridge the gap of the declining surplus.  Households will juggle higher bills and lower real incomes.  Local shops will thin out.  Out-of-town retailing will struggle with energy and transport costs.  Public services will, in effect, be rationed through increased waiting times.  Councils will delay maintenance.  National supply chains will trim their range and carry less stock.

Daily life is already stepping back toward past habits.  People travel less and nearer to home.  More meals are cooked from basic ingredients (something now being rediscovered).  Gardens and allotments will become part of domestic economies, not just hobbies.  Homes will fill with repaired items.  Sharing will become normal, from tools to car lifts.

Much of the formal framework will be retained, as an informal layer emerges beneath it.  

The system quietly reverts to an older pattern, albeit boosted by modern technology.

Will this be an evolution or a revolution in the economic system?

Both are possible.  

Evolution occurs when institutions acknowledge the energy constraint and redesign their use of money, services, and daily behaviour to accommodate a world that is no longer expanding.  

Revolution occurs when the formal system fails to adapt despite rising pressure.  The outcome includes a decline in honesty and trust.  Although it may not be acknowledged, unconscious lying is a response to the ensuing muddle.  Because people become unable to cope.  From top to bottom in society, this may already be happening.

How change actually happens

Change is an evolutionary process.  The government may want us to think it rules the roost, but in reality, the natural evolution of the economy determines what happens.

As the return on energy declines, discretionary sectors become memories of good times, and the rising costs of essentials creep into everything. 

For example, heating all the rooms in our homes, an essential we grew up with, is becoming unaffordable and discretionary.  Those of us who lived through the 1940s and 50s, when the economy was much smaller than it is now, will remember how we clustered round the only open fire and were kept warm, filling the coal scuttle.

Tax receipts will decline, and the state will have to trim benefits.  Local authorities will defer projects.  Households will move decision by decision toward thrift.  Informal exchange will grow, from neighbourly help to small cash jobs.  

In response to the shrinking economy, pay rates charged by electricians, plumbers, and builders for household work will decrease.  Their purchase and maintenance of electrical tools will become unaffordable, and they will have to revert to using hand tools.  DIY and self-built housing will increase, with some opting for off-grid living in response to rising utility prices.

The number of small businesses may increase because the margins of large-scale operations are too thin.  

A parallel economy will form, close to home.  Black markets in rationed food will develop.

If policy stays fixed, stress builds.  Debt becomes harder to service.  Banks and lenders pull back.  Shocks, such as a winter price spike or a supply interruption, will expose the lack of slack.  Trust in promises, both public and private, will weaken.  People and firms seek reliability over growth.  They value a steady supply over a low sticker price.  They accept less variety if it is nearer and more certain.  

The formal rules either bend to reality or break.  Goods and services become less trustworthy.  Home deliveries fail and are stolen.

What a managed evolution could look like

If the Government and councils recognise that the era of economic growth and surpluses is over, there will be an opportunity to shift to an entirely new way of thinking. 

The first step will be for the government to recognise that a radical shift in thinking is needed.  There can be no further economic growth.  This will take time to be generally accepted and become the norm.

In the meantime, the UK will slip into an Anomie system.  It may already be there.

In anomic systems, there is a growing absence of social rules, norms, and expectations that once guided people’s behaviour.

  • Society’s norms become unclear or weakened.
  • People feel disconnected, uncertain, or without guidance.
  • Traditional structures no longer provide stability.

In short, anomie is the feeling or condition of normlessness.  Everything will seem to be muddled.

The outcome of this rethink must be recognition that the hierarchical systems of governance that enabled the industrial/consumer economy to develop are over.

The focus must shift from maximising throughput and economic growth, led from the top down, to enabling people in local communities to secure their essentials.  Hierarchies enable growth; once growth ceases, they have to be de-layered and dismantled.

Planning and licensing will need to facilitate small-scale production, repair, and food production.  Procurement must favour nearer suppliers to cut energy costs.  Community buses, driven by volunteers, will replace conventional services.  A transition which is already underway in country areas.

A kind of management is needed which enables this to happen.  Not top-down, but enabling bottom-up grassroots activities to be born and develop.  Not guided, which would be counterproductive because this is new territory not visited before.  People won’t be bothered to think for themselves if local councils act as if they know best and limit funding to services they deem necessary.

As the economy shrinks, the localist economy is likely to be increasingly self-generating.

In time, there will be no need for top-down intervention in local community doings.  Local health services will develop, and general hospitals will provide services sought locally.  The localist economy will be established.  At first, we can’t imagine what it will look like, except that it will be driven from the grassroots.

What a rupture could look like

If denial of the end of growth persists, cuts will deepen, backlogs grow, and services erode.  

A sharp energy shock triggers business closures and job losses in the thinning discretionary sector.  Households default.  The tax base shrinks.  The central government centralises more decision-making to hold the line, slowing local problem-solving.  Black markets and petty thefts grow.  

A settlement then arrives fast, not by design, but through breakdown.  Price controls, rationing, emergency procurement, and strict priorities appear.  After the shock, rules are hastily written to match the new reality.  In effect, it would be creeping centralisation, leading to totalitarianism.

Not unlike what happened after the last big shock, when the Second World War broke out and then ended, leaving the government to deal with the dreadful state of the indebted economy.

Life in the United Kingdom during and after the war was shaped by disruption, hardship, and a strong sense of collective effort.  Daily routines were transformed by rationing and power outages.  Food was limited, so people learned to stretch every ingredient, grow vegetables, and share what they had.  Cars became rare on the roads because petrol was tightly rationed, and most private motoring came to a halt.  People walked or cycled.  Essential vehicles were reserved for the military, ambulances, farming, and other vital work.  

A return to the past would only be partial.

We will not rewind to the 1940s and 50s.  We will keep today’s knowledge and experiences, basic digital tools, and some modern infrastructure.  But for those of us who experienced the post-war era, the pattern feels familiar.  Shorter supply lines.  Less travel.  National systems still exist, but local practice carries a greater share of the load.

Choosing the path

The energy fact will not change.  The choice will be how we will change our systems with it.  

Evolution is calmer than revolution.  It will require clear communication about limits, early support for essential services, and legal space for small-scale activities.  It will reward households that adapt and communities that organise.  

Revolution is the risk if we delay, deny, or defend old models.  Delay will result in the change arriving suddenly and on harder terms.

Politically

Revolution will involve a regular party-political choice, reacting to events.  Parliamentary procedures may not be necessary.

A decision to enable fully fledged localism to evolve will require extensive parliamentary processes.  Once enacted, each locality will decide how to govern itself. 

A willing local authority may be able to implement some aspects of localism that do not require new legislation.

What to watch

There will be shrinking ranges on supermarket shelves.  Longer waiting times.  Rising repair trades.  Growth of allotments and local food.  More second-hand.  New mutual aid groups.  Small makers and services that thrive by being near.  These are signals of the shift.  They are also the seeds of the next economy. 

Conclusion

Falling surplus energy leads to falling prosperity.  

If we keep the current systems unchanged, life will narrow and move closer to home, much like it was 75 years ago.  The issue is whether it will be a top-down revolution or grassroots localism.

With top-down systems maintained, there would be increasing government and local government regulation of daily life.  Social inequality might increase due to rising social unrest.

Moving closer to home can be a managed evolution to localism.  It may be self-managed at each locality.

The difference lies in whether economic shrinkage is acknowledged and accepted, and the UK positively redesigns around it, with localism playing a significant part.  Or we can pretend that shrinkage isn’t happening and have to put up with the unexpected consequences of attempts to fabricate “growth”.

183. Britain’s Growing Dependence on Foreign Electricity – Why Localism Is the Answer


The Telegraph: “Britain more reliant than ever on foreign electricity imports” (20 October 2025)

The Telegraph reports that Britain is now importing around 16 percent of its electricity in the first nine months of this year, up from 15.6 percent the year before. The cause lies in the decline of the nation’s generating capacity, high domestic prices compared with France and Norway, and the economics of undersea interconnectors that automatically draw in cheaper foreign power.

This growing dependence exposes a fundamental weakness in the centralised energy system. When national supply contracts, and foreign imports fill the gap, Britain becomes more vulnerable to international price shifts, market volatility, and cross-border politics. The remedy is not simply to build more giant projects but to change the structure of the system itself.


Localism: The Practical Alternative

1. Resilient, locally controlled supply
Local energy generation – solar panels on roofs, community wind farms, small-scale hydro, or biomass systems – can supply local needs directly. This reduces exposure to the fluctuating international market and gives communities a degree of energy independence that the national grid cannot.

2. Matching production with local demand
A localised system aligns supply with the pattern of local consumption. Energy generated nearby is used nearby, cutting transmission losses and easing strain on national infrastructure.

3. Faster delivery through community engagement
Large projects often stall in the planning system. Local schemes, supported by residents and councils, can be built quickly. Local ownership generates pride and participation, creating a virtuous circle of trust and investment.

4. Keeping value within the community
When electricity is produced locally, so is its economic benefit. Revenue from generation stays in the locality, creating jobs and funding further investment in storage, maintenance, and energy efficiency.


What This Looks Like

Localities could develop networks of community energy cooperatives, each managing their own mix of solar, wind, and battery storage. Councils could coordinate neighbourhood micro-grids, ensuring power stability and fair distribution. Local demand-management schemes could smooth peaks in usage, reducing the need for imported electricity at critical times.

These developments do not replace national systems – they strengthen them from the ground up. The national grid becomes a backup, not the lifeline it is today.


A Necessary Evolution

The UK’s generating capacity fell to 71.7 gigawatts last year, down 3 percent. That trend will not reverse quickly. Centralised, capital-intensive projects take years to complete. Local energy projects can be conceived, financed, and operating within months.

Localism therefore represents the natural evolution of the British energy system – smaller, faster, more flexible, and more secure.


Conclusion

Britain’s growing reliance on foreign electricity is a symptom of over-centralisation and under-investment in local capacity. The answer lies not in larger reactors or longer cables, but in empowering local communities to generate and manage their own energy. Localism restores control, strengthens resilience, and keeps wealth circulating where it is produced.

The power Britain needs for the future may not come from across the Channel, but from its own localities – rooftop by rooftop, turbine by turbine.

156. A Grim Encore: Europe’s Descent into Coal

Civilisation rests on pillars—food, water, steel, cement, and above all, energy. Without them, everything crumbles. That foundational truth, articulated in “A Return to Coal” by Consciousness of Sheep on September 8, 2025, rings louder now than ever consciousnessofsheep.co.uk.

Once the world’s industrial heart, Europe now teeters on the verge of a second Dark Age—for reasons that read like tragicomic irony.

The Mirage of “Cheap” Russian Gas

For decades, European rhetoric cast Russian gas as cheap and plentiful. But that was a myth. In reality, while Russian pipeline gas benefited from transport infrastructure and long-term contracts, pricing steadily converged with—or even exceeded—European spot and LNG levels Reuters. The notion that Russia ever offered a perpetual gas discount was less energy economics and more wishful politics.

Renewables That Aren’t So Renewable

Europe pinned its hopes on non-renewable renewable energy-harvesting technologies (NRREHTs)—wind and solar. But these technologies lack the physical inertia of traditional plants like coal, gas, or nuclear. That’s a serious grid integrity issue. When something disrupts the system—say, a lightning strike at a wind farm or sudden loss of production—there’s no spinning turbine mass to smooth the shock. The result? Cascading blackouts and grid instability.

Even sustainably-minded myths crumble under scrutiny: renewables can’t provide the fast ramp-up, inertia, or black-start capabilities essential to modern grids.

Lignite: Europe’s Dirty Refuge

So where does Europe turn? The article points—with mordant humor—to Europe’s vast coal reserves, especially lignite (brown coal) in places like Northern Ireland—and critically, Germany. Ironically, the nations most bullish about decarbonisation—Britain, France, Germany—may be the first to revert to coal when cheaper Russian gas flows eastward.

It’s especially telling that nuclear shutdowns and intermittent renewables are leaving Europe exposed—only to fall back on one of the dirtiest and least sustainable fuels.

The Irony of a Green Collapse

Here’s the tragic core: efforts to phase out fossil fuels—often at the cost of nuclear decommissioning—have made Europe more fragile, not greener. Germany’s premature nuclear exit, green policy fetish, and reliance on renewables without proper backup capacity led to industrial decline and imports of coal-based wind turbine components from China  In the UK, expensive LNG imports have hamstrung heavy industry; steel production falters, business bankruptcies skyrocke.

All the while, the “green transition” depends heavily on subsidies and mandates—renewables get priority dispatch, despite lacking inertia, and profits for renewable operators are barely viable without these supports.


Conclusion: Coal’s Comeback – Wry, Grim, Inevitable?

Europe may well be hurtling back toward coal—not because of innovation, but under the weight of failed energy policy, shaky grids, and geopolitical isolation.

  • Russian gas wasn’t really cheap, and its myth masked deeper vulnerabilities.
  • Renewables without robust backup are fragile illusions, not anchors of sustainability.
  • Coal—lignite in particular—lurks as a last-resort fallback, especially for nations that once led energy reforms.

This is not a “green transition” but a reversal, propelled by miscalculation, rigid ideology, and the brutal physics of energy systems. The irony is bitter, the direction unmistakable, and the cost – economic, environmental, and societal – immeasurable.

155. The Decline of Surplus Energy and What it means for Prosperity: Part Four

From Top-Down Control to Grassroots Evolution

In Part One, we saw that the decline of surplus energy will steadily shrink prosperity and reduce the capacity of our current economic system to deliver the lifestyle we have come to expect. In Part Two, we explored why localism — shorter supply chains, stronger community economies, and decisions made closer to home — is the only sustainable response. Part Three described how localism could take shape in practical terms: in food, housing, energy, work, and governance.

Part Four brings these threads together with one critical insight: real change will not start at the top. It will begin in the streets, the villages, the households, and the informal networks where people live their daily lives. The evolution to localism will be led from the bottom up.


1. Why Change Starts with People

Centralised systems, built on abundant cheap energy, are already struggling to respond to today’s challenges. As prosperity contracts, national institutions will find it harder to maintain the breadth of services, infrastructure, and supply chains we once relied on.

People and communities will adapt first because they have to. When supermarket ranges shrink, people will grow food. When heating bills rise, they will share resources. When public services become unreliable, they will build informal networks of care and exchange.

This is not rebellion — it is necessity. Localism will grow because it works when larger systems falter.


2. The Role of Grassroots Action

We are already seeing the early signs of this shift:

  • Community gardens, allotments, and shared kitchens emerging in towns and villages.
  • Repair workshops replacing throwaway consumption.
  • Informal service exchanges — neighbour helping neighbour, often outside the formal economy.
  • Local food networks and direct farm-to-household schemes bypassing centralised distribution.
  • Small-scale renewable energy projects designed and owned by communities.

These are not waiting for government permission. They happen because people see gaps and fill them. Each small step strengthens resilience. Each success inspires others. Localism spreads not by decree, but by demonstration.


3. A New Role for Top-Down Institutions

As grassroots initiatives grow, the role of central and local authorities changes fundamentally:

  • From control to support.
  • From planning first to responding first.
  • From enforcing uniformity to enabling diversity.

Communities will develop solutions suited to their own resources, geography, and needs. The task of councils, planners, and national government is not to dictate those solutions but to remove barriers, offer practical help, and connect good ideas so they can spread.

This is the revolution: a shift from top-down control to grassroots evolution.


4. Why Ownership Matters

People are far more likely to support and sustain changes that they believe are theirs. Top-down plans, however well intentioned, often fail because they feel imposed. Bottom-up action succeeds because:

  • It grows from lived experience and local knowledge.
  • It builds trust within communities.
  • It encourages creativity and flexibility.
  • It develops informal systems that complement, not compete with, formal systems.

Localism works because it places control where people already live, work, and care — close to home.


5. A Grassroots Evolution, Not a Crisis Response

The danger, as outlined in Part One, is that we delay until breakdown forces sudden, chaotic change. But there is another path: early, steady grassroots evolution.

If communities take the lead now:

  • Food systems can localise before supermarket shortages make it urgent.
  • Shared energy schemes can be in place before blackouts become common.
  • Repair and reuse networks can grow before replacement costs become unbearable.
  • Skills can be built while there is still time to prepare the next generation.

This is about being ahead of the curve, not behind it.


6. The Shape of the Future

If we succeed, the UK of the future will feel smaller, slower, and closer to home. But it will also feel more secure, more connected, and more meaningful:

  • More food grown and processed locally.
  • More energy generated and managed by communities.
  • More informal economies where people trade time, skills, and care.
  • Less dependency on fragile global systems.
  • Stronger local identity and greater trust between neighbours.

Top-down systems will still exist, but they will become servants rather than masters — responding to, supporting, and amplifying the innovations of grassroots communities.


Conclusion

Parts One to Three showed why localism is inevitable: declining surplus energy, shrinking prosperity, and the need for shorter supply chains and stronger communities.

Part Four shows how it will happen:

  • Change begins with people, not planners.
  • Localism spreads by action, not instruction.
  • Authorities succeed when they enable rather than control.

This is not a managed transition imposed from above. It is an evolution driven by households, neighbourhoods, and communities taking ownership of their future — step by step, choice by choice.

The question is not whether this happens, but how smoothly. If we encourage grassroots action and allow people to lead, we can make the shift to localism steadily, creatively, and together.


154. The Decline of Surplus Energy and What it means for Prosperity: Part Three


How Localism Could Unfold in the UK

In Part One, we saw how the decline of surplus energy will steadily reduce prosperity and strain the UK’s current economic model. In Part Two, we explored why localism — shorter supply chains, more self-reliant communities, and decentralised decision-making — is the only realistic way forward.

Part Three sets out a practical vision of how localism could emerge. This is not a prediction of government policy but a reasoned projection of how the UK might adapt under pressure. It combines what is likely to happen naturally with what could happen deliberately if we prepare for the change.


1. Food: Relocalising Supply and Production

Food is the foundation of localism. As surplus energy declines, the cost of transporting food over long distances rises sharply. Supermarkets, designed for large centralised distribution, will struggle to maintain the range and volume we are used to.

How localism changes food systems:

  • More local farms and gardens – Small-scale, labour-intensive farms, allotments, and community gardens re-emerge as key suppliers. These farms prioritise resilience and reliability over maximising yield.
  • Village and Suburban-based processing – Local bakeries, dairies, butchers, and breweries return, reducing dependence on distant factories.
  • Reduced imports – With energy prices rising and global supply chains under strain, the UK will need to replace imported food with local production wherever possible.
  • Shared community storage – Small-scale cold stores, grain banks, and co-operative food hubs appear to smooth seasonal supply.

Instead of a supermarket economy dominated by 10,000-mile supply chains, food returns closer to home. This doesn’t mean empty shelves — it means fewer choices, simpler diets, and a stronger local food economy.


2. Housing: A Shift Toward Informal Development

In Part One, we saw how falling prosperity will make conventional housing models increasingly unsustainable. The formal planning system, built on continuous expansion, becomes unworkable in an energy-constrained economy.

Localism reshapes housing in three ways:

  • Using existing space better – Empty shops, unused offices, and older housing stock are repurposed into affordable dwellings.
  • Loosening planning restrictions – Over time, centralised planning loses control as people create informal housing solutions: small extensions, garden dwellings, caravans, and converted sheds.
  • Integration with nature – Trees and shade become part of new housing layouts, responding to rising temperatures caused by climate change.

Local communities will have more say in land use, encouraging small-scale, low-energy development rather than vast centralised estates. This marks a break from the rigid, top-down planning model of the past.


3. Energy: From Centralised Supply to Local Control

In Part One, we saw that the core challenge is not the disappearance of energy but the loss of cheap surplus energy. Centralised national grids, designed for abundant fossil fuels, will increasingly struggle to cope with volatility and cost.

Local energy strategies emerge:

  • Community renewables – Villages, towns, and city districts invest in their own solar, wind, and micro-hydro schemes.
  • Energy co-operatives – Ownership shifts from national corporations to local partnerships, giving residents a stake in generation and pricing.
  • Lower energy lifestyles – Localism naturally leads to less demand: fewer car journeys, more efficient homes, and smaller-scale workspaces reduce energy needs.

Energy security becomes less about maximising supply and more about minimising vulnerability. Local control brings stability where centralised systems falter.


4. Work and Employment: Rebuilding Local Economies

In Part One, we noted that discretionary sectors — retail, entertainment, and tourism — will contract as households prioritise essentials. This opens the door for a new structure of employment rooted in local production and services.

Work under localism focuses on:

  • Food and farming – A significant increase in agricultural and food-processing jobs, similar to the 1930s but supported by modern tools.
  • Repair and reuse – From clothing and furniture to electronics, repair trades grow rapidly as replacing goods becomes less affordable.
  • Care and services – With ageing populations and weaker central funding, communities build local care networks supported by volunteers and informal economies.
  • Small manufacturing – Digital tools, 3D printing, and small-scale workshops enable local production of everyday items.

Employment shifts from servicing mass consumption to maintaining essential needs. The informal economy — cash jobs, skill swaps, co-ops — becomes a core part of daily life.


5. Governance: Power Moving Closer to People

Localism is not just about production — it is about decision-making. As central government struggles to fund services, more authority inevitably moves downward.

Key governance changes:

  • Decentralised decision-making – Councils, parishes, and community assemblies gain real powers over land use, energy, and food systems.
  • Community resource management – Shared assets like local woodlands, allotments, energy grids, and water supplies are managed collectively.
  • Integrated informal systems – Authorities increasingly work alongside informal networks — community kitchens, co-ops, and micro-enterprises — recognising them as essential contributors.

Instead of control being concentrated in Whitehall, governance gradually becomes more distributed and adaptive.


6. The Pace of Change

Localism will not arrive overnight. It will unfold unevenly:

  • By necessity – In many places, it will begin when central systems fail to deliver, forcing communities to improvise.
  • By opportunity – In other areas, forward-looking councils and groups will plan ahead, redesigning services and supply chains in anticipation of energy constraints.
  • By crisis – Shocks — a spike in energy prices, food shortages, or a financial downturn — will accelerate transitions already underway.

Some communities will adapt early and thrive. Others will struggle until breakdown forces change.


The Transition Ahead

Localism is not about turning back the clock, nor is it about rejecting technology or progress. It is about aligning society with the realities of declining surplus energy. A smaller-scale, less energy-intensive economy can be fairer, more resilient, and closer to the needs of its people.

The alternative — clinging to the old model described in Part One — leads to deeper shocks, harsher inequalities, and greater instability. By embracing the principles outlined in Part Two, localism becomes a pathway to adapt deliberately rather than react desperately.

The future will be smaller, slower, and closer to home. Whether that future feels secure and liveable depends on how soon we begin shaping it.


153, The Decline of Surplus Energy and What it means for Prosperity: Part Two

Here’s Part Two, written as a natural continuation of Part One. It refers back to the energy constraints and declining prosperity explained earlier and sets out a clear, reasoned argument that localism is the only realistic path forward:


Part Two

Why Localism is the Only Feasible Way Forward

In Part One, we saw that the decline of surplus energy is reshaping the foundations of our economy and society. As energy becomes harder to obtain, more expensive, and less abundant, the prosperity that we once took for granted inevitably contracts. If the UK continues with its present economic system, the result will be a gradual narrowing of daily life, with communities forced to adapt to lower levels of choice, mobility, and material consumption.

The key lesson from this is clear: the old model of a highly centralised, high-energy, growth-driven economy cannot survive in a world where cheap surplus energy no longer exists. The question is not whether we return to the systems of the past, but how we design the systems of the future.

This is where localism emerges, not as an option, but as a necessity.


The Logic of Localism

Localism means shifting more of our essential production, exchange, and decision-making closer to where people live. In a shrinking economy, this is not ideological — it is practical. Transporting food, goods, and energy over long distances becomes less viable when energy is expensive and supplies are fragile. Maintaining giant national systems built for perpetual expansion drains resources that are increasingly scarce.

Localism addresses this by shortening supply chains, reducing dependence on vulnerable global markets, and allowing communities to organise around what really matters: food, shelter, energy, care, and skills.


The Three Pressures Driving Localism

1. Rising Costs of Distance
In Part One, we saw how falling surplus energy makes everything costlier. This pressure will steadily undermine the business models built on moving vast quantities of goods across the country and the world. Local production — whether in food, repair, energy, or services — becomes competitive again when transport costs rise and reliability falters.

2. Fragile National Systems
Highly centralised systems depend on scale and efficiency to function. When energy and tax revenues fall, these systems weaken. Hospitals, supply chains, and even utilities will struggle to meet demand under the current model. Local networks, by contrast, can act faster, make decisions that reflect local realities, and build resilience where it matters most.

3. The Growth of the Informal Economy
As discretionary spending shrinks, more people will turn to informal exchange — trading skills, time, and produce outside the formal money system. This trend is already visible in second-hand markets, community gardens, repair workshops, and local service exchanges. Localism strengthens and legitimises these patterns rather than resisting them.


Localism as a Managed Transition

If policymakers accept the reality set out in Part One, they can prepare for a managed shift to a localised economy rather than allowing a chaotic breakdown. This means:

  • Planning for shorter supply chains – Giving priority to local producers and small businesses in procurement, licensing, and tax policy.
  • Supporting food security – Expanding local farming, market gardening, allotments, and small-scale food processing, reducing dependency on fragile imports.
  • Redesigning energy systems – Developing small, distributed renewable energy schemes owned and managed locally.
  • Restoring practical skills – Prioritising training in trades, repair, growing, and low-energy technologies to prepare people for a less centralised economy.
  • Shifting decision-making power – Giving communities greater authority over land use, resource allocation, and infrastructure priorities, ensuring they can respond directly to local conditions.

This is not a nostalgic retreat into the past but a deliberate redesign for a future where resilience matters more than scale.


The Alternative: Denial and Disorder

If we ignore these realities and cling to the old model, the pressures outlined in Part One will not disappear. Instead, they will break the system from below. Food and energy insecurity will increase, central services will fail under strain, and informal economies will grow anyway — but without structure, support, or fairness. Inequality will deepen as some adapt while others fall behind. Social cohesion will erode as trust in national institutions collapses.

This is the difference between shaping the transition and having it forced upon us.


The Inevitable Direction of Change

The end of cheap surplus energy means the UK must rethink the scale at which it operates. Communities will need to rely more on themselves, and solutions will have to fit local resources and conditions. Localism is not a political choice but a response to physics, geography, and affordability.

In time, the shape of the economy will reflect the constraints of energy. The longer we delay, the harder the adjustment becomes. But if we start now — using the logic set out in Part One — we can build a society that is smaller in scale, slower in pace, and closer to home, but also fairer, more resilient, and better able to meet the needs of its people.


Conclusion

Part One showed us the unavoidable challenge: falling surplus energy drives falling surplus prosperity. Part Two shows us the solution: localism is the only sustainable response. We either embrace it deliberately, with planning and foresight, or we stumble into it through breakdown and necessity.

The energy reality is fixed. The choice lies in how we respond.


151. The Decline of Surplus Energy and What it means for Prosperity: Part One

For two centuries we grew because we had cheap energy with a large surplus. We used a little energy to get a lot back. That surplus powered everything beyond basic survival. As the surplus falls, more effort must go into simply running the essentials. Less is left over for comfort, variety, and growth.

What this means for prosperity

Prosperity depends on what is left after the basics are paid for. When energy takes a bigger bite, households have less money for eating out, leisure, travel, new clothes, and gadgets. Firms have less to invest in staff and new kit. The state collects less tax from slowing activity while costs for health, care, and infrastructure keep rising. The result is a slow squeeze on the domestic economy. Discretionary markets shrink first. Repairs replace replacements. Second hand replaces brand new. People trade time and skills, not only money. It feels like a reduction in choice, pace, and reach.

If the present UK economic system remains unchanged

Assume we try to run the current model as if nothing basic has altered. Prices will signal scarcity, but investment will still chase short term returns. Debt will try to bridge the gap. Households will juggle higher bills and lower real incomes. Local shops will thin out. Out of town retail will struggle with energy and transport costs. Public services will ration informally through waiting time. Councils will delay maintenance. National supply chains will trim range and carry less stock.

Daily life steps back toward the habits of the past. People travel less and nearer to home. More meals are cooked from basic ingredients. Gardens and allotments become practical, not hobby. Homes fill with repaired items. Multi purpose community spaces return. Sharing becomes normal, from tools to car lifts. Not by romance, but by necessity. We keep much of the formal frame, yet an informal layer spreads underneath it. That is how the system reverts, quietly, to an older pattern.

Will this be simple evolution, or a revolution in the economic system?

Both are possible. Evolution happens when institutions accept the energy constraint, and then redesign money, services, and rules to fit a world that is no longer expanding. Revolution happens when the formal system refuses to adapt while the pressure keeps rising. The outcome depends on pace, honesty, and trust.

How change actually happens

First, the energy return declines, then costs creep through everything. Discretionary sectors contract. Tax receipts soften. The state trims or targets benefits. Local authorities defer projects. Households move decision by decision toward thrift. Informal exchange grows, from neighbour help to small cash jobs to co ops. Small producers emerge because large scale margins are too thin. A parallel economy forms, close to home.

If policy stays fixed, stress builds. Debt becomes harder to service. Banks and lenders pull back. A few shocks, such as a winter price spike or a supply interruption, expose the lack of slack. Trust in promises, public and private, weakens. People and firms seek reliability over growth. They value steady supply over low sticker price. They accept less variety if it is nearer and sure. At that point the formal rules either bend to reality, or they break.

What a managed evolution could look like

Government and councils recognise that the era of surplus is over. They shift focus from maximising throughput to securing essentials. Planning and licensing make space for small scale production, repair, and food. Procurement favours nearer suppliers to cut energy risk. Money and credit support maintenance, not just new build. Pricing protects basic needs, perhaps with lifeline tariffs. Transport policy backs walking, cycling, and small electric fleets for short trips. Education and training move toward practical skills. The aim is resilience first, efficiency second.

What a rupture could look like

If denial holds, cuts deepen, backlogs grow, and services hollow out. A sharp energy shock triggers business closures and job losses in the already thin discretionary sector. Households default. The tax base shrinks. Central government centralises more decisions to hold the line, which slows local problem solving. Black markets grow. A new settlement then arrives fast, not by design, but through breakdown. Price controls, rationing, emergency procurement, and strict priorities appear. After the shock, rules are rewritten in haste to match the new reality.

Why a return to the past is only partial

We will not rewind to the 1930s. We keep knowledge, basic digital tools, and some modern infrastructure. But the pattern feels familiar. More human work. Shorter supply lines. Modest output with high care for durability. Less travel. Smaller, multi use spaces. Community institutions matter more. National systems still exist, yet local practice carries more of the load.

Choosing the path

The energy fact will not change. The choice is whether we change our systems with it. Evolution is calmer. It needs plain talk about limits, early support for essentials, and legal space for small scale activity. It rewards households that adapt and communities that organise. Revolution is the risk if we delay, deny, or defend sunk models too long. Then change arrives suddenly and on harder terms.

What to watch

Shrinking ranges on supermarket shelves. Longer waiting times. Rising repair trades. Growth of allotments and local food. More second hand. New mutual aid groups. Small makers and services that thrive by being near. These are signals of the shift. They are also the seeds of the next economy.

Conclusion

Falling surplus energy leads to falling surplus prosperity. If we keep the current system unchanged, life will narrow and move closer to home, much like the past. That can be a managed evolution or a rough revolution. The difference lies in whether we accept the limit and redesign around it, or pretend it is not there and let the limit redesign us.

131. Has Growth Ended? – A Review

Read the full article here: https://surplusenergyeconomics.wordpress.com/2025/05/29/304-has-growth-ended/

Dr. Tim Morgan’s article asks a big question: Has economic growth come to an end? He thinks it might have—and not just because of politics, bad decisions, or short-term problems, but because of something much deeper: the limits of energy and nature itself.

What’s the article about?

Morgan believes the global economy may have hit a turning point in 2023. Up until now, we’ve kept pushing for more growth—more money, more production, more consumption. But he argues that the real economy (what we physically do and make) is no longer keeping up with the financial economy (what we imagine through loans, debts, and stock markets).

He says the gap between what we think we have and what we actually do have is getting wider, and that spells trouble.

What’s causing the slowdown?

The main issue, according to Morgan, is energy. Everything we do—building houses, growing food, running hospitals—relies on energy, especially oil, gas, and coal. However, it now requires increasingly more energy just to extract that energy from the ground. This is referred to as the Energy Cost of Energy (ECoE).

The higher the ECoE, the less energy is left over for the rest of the economy to grow. Morgan says we’ve reached the point where the energy “surplus” is shrinking. That’s why prosperity—the ability of ordinary people to live comfortably—is already falling in many countries.

What does the future look like?

If Morgan’s right, we’ll see:

  • A steady decline in real wealth over the next 25 years.
  • Fewer things people can afford beyond basic needs (what he calls a collapse in “discretionary” spending).
  • Financial systems are under strain because they’re based on the idea that growth will continue forever.
Is there anything we can do?

Morgan doesn’t give a lot of solutions in this piece, but he does hint that we’ll need to:

  • Be more realistic about what the future holds.
  • Stop pretending we can grow forever.
  • Find ways to live well with less.
Final word

Dr. Morgan’s message is profound: the era of endless economic growth is over. We now need new ways to think about prosperity—ones based on what really matters, not just money and markets. This article is a great starting point for that conversation.