I first used email in 1982 – when BT lauched Telecom Gold – a public dial-up email service.
In 1986–1988 – Novell MHS appeared, for LAN email and peer-to-peer systems.
IThen in the 1990s internet-based SMPT email t emerged and was developed into the worldwide system of today.
I experienced all of these development phases, all occurring as the economy grew. I can now see how email will develop in the UK shrinking economy.
4
During the 1980s and early 1990s, many people used electronic messaging systems that worked without large central providers. Messages travelled from computer to computer using store-and-forward routing. Systems such as FidoNet linked thousands of locally operated machines into cooperative communication networks.
Today most communication depends on large remote data centres. Email appears to be universal, but it depends heavily on continuous internet connectivity and corporate infrastructure.
As the economy changes and becomes less centralised, it is sensible to reconsider whether communication can again become more local.
Local email networks offer a practical answer.
A village-scale communication system
A locality can operate its own electronic messaging network using small computers placed in:
houses
farms
workshops
schools
village halls
community centres
These machines pass messages between one another automatically. Messages do not need a permanent connection to the wider internet. They simply move step by step across the locality until they reach their destination.
This approach worked reliably forty years ago. It works even more easily now.
How the system operates
Each participating building hosts a small communication node. These nodes connect by:
short-range Wi-Fi links
cable connections between nearby buildings
longer wireless links across rural gaps
If one link stops working, messages travel by another route.
The system therefore remains usable even when parts of the network fail.
This makes it very suitable for a future in which infrastructure may become less dependable.
What the network can carry
A locality communication system does more than transmit email.
It can support:
local notices
tool-sharing requests
repair coordination
local trading messages
health support information
weather warnings
food availability updates
transport sharing arrangements
In effect, it becomes a shared communication space for the locality 📡
Why local networks matter in a shrinking economy
Large communication systems depend on:
continuous electricity
expensive infrastructure
specialist maintenance
remote corporate control
Local systems depend mainly on cooperation between neighbours.
They are:
inexpensive
repairable locally
adaptable
resilient
Most importantly, they continue working even if national systems become unreliable.
A practical example
Imagine a rural locality of about two thousand people.
The network might include:
fifteen rooftop relay points
several larger hub computers
one optional internet gateway
Messages travel from building to building until they arrive.
If the gateway stops working, communication inside the locality continues normally.
This creates independence without isolation.
The wider importance for localism
Local communication systems support the development of:
local food networks
shared transport arrangements
neighbourhood repair services
informal health support
local decision making
They help restore communication as something rooted in place rather than controlled from afar.
In a contracting economy, this matters.
Reliable communication inside the locality becomes more valuable than high-speed communication across the world.
Local email networks are therefore not a backward step. They are a practical foundation for the next stage of economic organisation 📮
I have deliberately tried not to write too much about AI, because the signal gets swamped by the noise. But I think the picture is becoming clearer now. This week on The Next Wave, I’m going to re-publish versions of posts originally on my newsletter, Just Two: one from last summer, and one that goes live this week.—-
Just by way of a thought experiment: what if the current surge in the bunch of technologies that goes under the label of ‘AI’ isn’t the beginning of a whole new technology surge, but is actually the final stage of the digital surge that started in the 1970s and accelerated at the turn of the century?
I’ve been wondering this for a while in a vague kind of a way because I haven’t been able to see the business model that supports the huge investment in AI in the USA. (I’ve written about this before on here.)
This is a long way in to couple of pieces by Nicolas Colin, the strategy and innovation blogger, who has been wondering the same thing, but a lot more coherently. He calls this ‘late cycle investment theory’.
Like me, he is a fan of the work of the academic Carlota Perez, who built on the work of Christopher Freeman to develop a model of how technology and finance interacted to create new long surges of investment, starting with canals and cotton, that run for 50-60 years. (She calls them ‘surges’ because unlike ‘waves’ each technology embeds itself in the society and its infrastructure.)
The two most recent surges are a cars/oil surge, which started in 1908, and the Information and Communications Technology, which started in 1971.
(Source: Carlota Perez)
I’m not going into all of the theory of the Perez model here—it’s online if you want to do that, and I have written about it elsewhere—but the relevant point for the present discussion is that it follows an S-curve, and the first half is slow going, as new infrastructure is ‘installed’, and some of it is below the radar. The internet was a closed academic network for most of the first part of its S-curve.
From infrastructure to ‘deployment’
Halfway through, after a lot of infrastructure has been built out, and usually following a financial crash in which some of the investors in that infrastructure lose their shirts, ‘deployment’ companies take over, with actual customers and business models, and have an accelerated period of growth, before they hit market limits and turn into ordinary businesses. And the investors who have made large returns from that period of growth start looking elsewhere—for the technologies that will make the next surge.
The reason I like Perez’s version is that her model has had a lot of explanatory power over the last 25 years as I have watched the evolution of the tech sector.
Seen through a late-cycle lens, today’s markets show signs that we’ve entered the maturity phase of the computing and networks revolution. The theory, therefore, leads to specific, testable predictions about where capital should go and which strategies will outperform.
Three indicators
He points to three indicators from the tech sector that support this observation that we’re in the ‘late cycle’:
The startup funding collapse of 2022 wasn’t just a correction—it may be structural. As investor Jerry Neumann argued in his landmark Productive Uncertainty, startups rely on uncertainty as a competitive edge. When good ideas become obvious to everyone—including well-funded incumbents—the startup model faces real strain.
Then came AI, revealing new dynamics. ChatGPT’s breakthrough didn’t come from a garage startup but from OpenAI, backed by Microsoft’s vast computing power. Google, Meta, and Amazon responded with billions. This pattern—big tech deploying huge capital against well-understood problems—fits the late-cycle theory exactly.
Most tellingly, platform saturation now looks almost complete. Digital transformation has reached most sectors where computing and networks can plausibly work. What remains—healthcare delivery,education,construction, government services—may reflect the paradigm’s natural limits, not untapped markets. [His emphasis]
Optimising the existing system
In the second article —some behind a paywall—he looks specifically at the way AI is being deployed, and I’m going to quote/paraphrase quickly the visible bits of this here.
Colin’s done a lot of analysis here, and he’s assembled quite a lot of evidence which he shares. I’m not going to spend a lot of time on this, because I’m more interested in the bigger strategic questions that get raised if he is right.
What a new technology surge looks like
But it’s worth summarising some of the observations. First, that at the start of a new technology surge, you don’t know it’s happening. You understand the decisive moment afterwards, the moment at which an innovation transformed the cost structure (the Spinning Jenny, Watt’s condensing engine, the Ford production line, the microprocessor). But with AI, the moment was very visible, to the point of being choreographed.
Second, the amount of capital investment is off the scale. At the early stage of a surge, investment tends to be patchy and not fully understood—the sector exists but it is not completely legible yet.
And third, Colin suggests that AI allows computing to reach sectors that have in some ways resisted it:
Like lean production, which extended mass production’s dominance for decades through efficiency gains, AI doesn’t mark computing’s end but its maturation. The technology spreads to previously untouchable sectors, creating the illusion of radical novelty whilst actually representing computing and networks’ final conquest of the physical economy.
Late deployment
It’s worth pausing here. Although Perez dates the end of each of her surges from the date of the innovation that makes the next surge, possible, there’s a kind of ‘late deployment’ stage in the old surge while the new one is still in its early stages of development.
Late deployment: So although the ICT surge dates from 1971, much of the final innovation in the cars/oil surge also dates from then. In the UK at that time, there’s still a huge roadbuilding programme of motorways and ring-roads, and these then made possible the emergence of long-distance logistics, big-box out of town retailing, and edge of town business parks. Colin’s arguing that AI is the equivalent of bigger roads and big box retail—different, but more about embedding the technology more deeply than the kind of transformational change that eventually causes a new and distinctive form of abundance.
There’s also social pushback—in the UK the campaigns against big ringroad schemes started in the late 1960s and early 1970s. And perhaps we’re seeing some of that about AI. The U.S. map of local pushback against data centres from Data Center Watch covers the whole of the country, in red states and blue. People seem to hate Google’s inserting of AI tools into its search results, and hate even more that it is all but impossible to turn it off. This doesn’t speak to an exciting technology that is being embraced by its users. A note by Ted Gioia on his music blog says that:
Most people won’t pay for AI voluntarily—just 8% according to a recent survey. So [tech companies] need to bundle it with some other essential product.
This matters for a couple of reasons. In the first place, late stage post-deployment technologies do produce returns on investment, but they’re normal returns, not increasing returns.
But in the second place it sheds a different light on what amounts to a ‘business model war’ going on between China and the United States at the moment through their different approaches to AI.
I think we know plenty about the American model. It is fuelled by a transhumanist ideology that is just this side of The Rapture, as Sam Altman of OpenAI reminds people every week of the year.
In Washington, the AI policy discourse is sometimes framed as a ‘race to AGI.’ In contrast, in Beijing, the AI discourse is less abstract and focuses on economic and industrial applications that can support Beijing’s overall economic objectives.
Azeem Azhar of EV added some gloss:
Chinese teams… publish leaner open-source architectures and partner with specialists in areas such as healthcare analytics (Yidu Tech) and adaptive learning (Squirrel AI).
This is partly driven by constraints: China has far less computing power than the US, and needs to build lean. This also means that its model is far more exportable. But the important point here is that if AI is a late-stage technology and not the next large surge of innovation, the Chinese model matches the moment. Perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised: unlike most countries, a third of the full members of China’s Central Committee are technocrats.
As large-scale systems lose the ability to describe reality, the future belongs to small systems that preserve feedback.
As the formal economy that shaped the last two centuries begins to contract, many Canadians are quietly shifting toward local solutions. This isn’t driven by nostalgia or a rejection of modernity. It’s a pragmatic recognition: small-scale systems often perform better when large ones start to falter.
The core advantage of localism lies in preserving feedback. It keeps decisions close to their consequences and anchors activity in observable reality. In a contracting world, small scale isn’t optional—it’s structurally superior for resilience, accountability, and honest adaptation.
A quick chat tip to Chatting About Localism. Their clear explorations of scale and place have sharpened how I think about these dynamics.
How Scale Actually Works In localism, scale isn’t just a buzzword; it’s the physical and social size at which decisions are made. It answers a basic question: How big is the system doing the deciding?
Localism doesn’t insist that “small is always better.” Rather, it makes a precise claim: many activities have been pushed far beyond their appropriate scale. This shift has replaced practical judgment with bureaucracy and systemic resilience with narrow efficiency.
Small Scale (The Localist Edge)
Proximity: Decisions are made where their effects are felt.
Knowledge: Producers and users often know one another personally
Speed: Feedback arrives quickly; mistakes are visible and corrected before they compound.
Examples: Food grown and sold within a region; housing shaped by local materials; care networks built on neighborhood trust.
Large Scale (The Institutional Trap)
Distance: Decisions are made far from consequences.
Rules: Systems depend on formal procedures, centralized targets, and metrics.
Cascades: Failures aren’t contained—they ripple across the entire system.
Examples: National planning regulations that ignore regional climate; centralized food supply chains vulnerable to distant disruptions.
Why Small Systems Stay Honest
This structural difference becomes critical as formal systems weaken. Large organizations don’t merely become less efficient—they become structurally prone to losing touch with reality.
The reason isn’t individual dishonesty; it’s the effect of scale on feedback.
The “Ostrom” Factor
The late Elinor Ostrom’s research on common-pool resources (fisheries, irrigation, grazing lands) proved this. In thousands of cases, small, self-governing groups consistently outperformed centralized management. They didn’t function because the people were unusually virtuous—they functioned because dishonesty was visible, costly, and immediately damaging.
The Structural Precondition for Adaptation
As discretionary spending contracts and formal institutions struggle to respond, large systems grow more fragile. They require ever-greater simplification to function, and simplification slides into distortion. Targets supplant reality; “invented facts” become the lubricant to keep the machine running.
Local systems, by contrast, don’t “scale up”—and that’s precisely their strength. Their limited size keeps them tethered to observation and personal responsibility.
Localism isn’t a nostalgic retreat. In an era of strained housing, volatile energy prices, and brittle supply chains, it is the structural precondition for accurate description and effective adaptation. It is how we stay connected to reality when the “official” version of reality no longer makes sense.
Where in your own life or community do you see small-scale arrangements already outperforming distant ones? What practical steps could help shift more of our everyday needs toward an appropriate, local scale?
I have just spent two days trying to get a new mobile phone working. In the end I had to order an adapter.
Each time I tried to complete the purchase, a security code was sent. Often the code arrived after it had expired. So I requested another. And waited again.
Nothing was technically “wrong”. The system was functioning exactly as designed. Yet the process absorbed hours.
This is not an unusual experience. It is normal life in a large, centralised, digitised economy. But it raises a serious question.
How much productivity is being lost in friction?
Friction in the Formal System
In the formal economy, simple transactions pass through layers:
Remote suppliers
Automated call centres
Security platforms
Banks
Delivery chains
Warehouses
National distribution systems
Each layer protects itself. Each layer has procedures. Each layer introduces delay.
The individual carries the cost in time.
When codes expire, when parcels are delayed, when call centres cannot decide, when websites reject passwords, the clock is running. The economy counts the transaction as efficient. The lived experience is different.
Multiply this by millions of people and millions of transactions.
The hidden loss of productivity is enormous.
How It Would Work Locally
If I lived in a strongly localist locality, none of this would apply.
I would walk to a local electrical shop. I would take the phone with me. The shopkeeper would look at it. He would hand me the correct adapter. I would pay and leave.
Total time: ten minutes.
No expired codes. No delivery tracking. No outsourced helplines. No national logistics network.
The transaction would be resolved at human scale.
The Cost of Hierarchy
Large systems require hierarchy.
Decisions move upward. Authorisation moves downward. Queries are escalated. Responsibility is divided.
Even when digitised, hierarchy remains embedded in procedure.
In contrast, a localist economy operates with minimal hierarchy.
The person who serves you can decide. The supplier can adjust. The builder can agree. The shopkeeper can solve the problem.
Decision-making is immediate because authority is local.
Speed increases because there is no need to refer upward.
Real Productivity
Productivity is usually measured in output per hour.
But this misses something essential.
What about the hours lost navigating systems? What about the time spent correcting digital errors? What about the administrative overhead of compliance, security, and centralised control?
In a localist area:
Fewer intermediaries exist
Fewer verification layers are needed
Trust reduces transaction costs
Problems are solved face to face
The time saved is real. The reduction in stress is real. The efficiency is human, not statistical.
Trust as Infrastructure
Large systems replace trust with procedure.
Local systems rely more heavily on reputation.
In a locality, the electrician knows the builder. The shopkeeper knows the customer. The customer knows where to return if something fails.
Trust becomes infrastructure. And trust reduces friction.
Reduced friction increases productivity.
The Wider Implication
As the UK moves into a period of economic contraction, hidden inefficiencies will become more visible.
We will not be able to afford vast administrative overheads. We will not be able to tolerate wasted time embedded in digital layers.
Localism is not nostalgic. It is structurally efficient.
Short supply chains. Flat decision-making. Direct accountability. Immediate resolution.
These characteristics are not sentimental. They are productive.
The adapter episode may seem trivial. It is not.
It illustrates how much time modern systems consume. And it suggests that localist areas, with fewer hierarchies and faster decisions, may in fact be more productive in real terms than the complex structures they replace.
The future will not be shaped by growth. It will be shaped by contraction.
This is not a crisis to be solved. It is a condition to be lived with.
A shrinking economy changes the meaning of almost everything. Work. Value. Security. Progress.
In an expanding economy, success comes from scale, speed and abstraction. In a shrinking economy, success comes from continuity, judgement and care.
We have already discussed how declining discretionary income will reduce travel, consumption and centralised provision. Markets thin out. Systems simplify. People turn back towards what is near, familiar and dependable.
This naturally favours localism. Not as an ideology, but as a practical response to scarcity. Food, energy, repair, care and shelter become local questions again. Not because people want them to be, but because distance becomes expensive and fragile.
In this setting, the future does not belong to novelty alone. It belongs to memory.
Agrarian cultures evolved over centuries of constraint. They understood seasonality, limits, soil, weather and labour. They developed customs, tools and social arrangements that worked without growth.
Industrialism broke from that inheritance. It replaced judgement with throughput. Skill with scale. Time with speed.
Now the economy is shrinking, but industrial knowledge does not disappear. It lingers. Mechanisation, logistics, sanitation, medicine and materials still matter. The question is how they are held.
The future will not be a return to the past. Nor will it be an industrial system running in reverse. It will be a hybrid that we have little language for.
This brings us to mindset.
What sort of wisdom is needed when expansion is no longer the organising principle? What replaces the growth-oriented habits of optimisation, extraction and acceleration?
Agrarian cultures valued prudence, continuity and collective survival. Industrial culture valued innovation, efficiency and control. A shrinking economy demands something different again.
It demands restraint without nostalgia. Competence without hubris. Knowledge without abstraction from place.
So the real questions are not technical. They are cultural.
How do people learn to think long-term again when systems no longer promise improvement? How does judgement replace targets and metrics? How do communities rebuild shared norms when formal systems retreat?
What does “progress” mean when the aim is to endure rather than expand? What forms of authority emerge when expertise is local and experiential rather than centralised and credentialed? How is knowledge passed on when the future looks smaller than the past?
Perhaps the most difficult question is this. Can a society shaped by industrial abundance relearn the quiet intelligence of living within limits, without romanticising hardship or denying what industrialism taught us?
The future of a shrinking economy will be decided less by technology than by mindset. By whether wisdom can evolve. And by whether experience, memory and restraint can once again be treated as assets rather than obstacles.
These are not questions with quick answers. But they are the questions that now matter most.
That one simple sentence cuts through decades of hype like a knife: THEY WERE NEVER GOING TO SCALE.
It was the quiet warning from the Appropriate Technology (AT) movement—the one the mainstream green energy narrative did quadruple backflips to ignore. Vast solar farms, towering wind turbines, gigafactories churning out batteries—they promised endless clean power on an industrial scale.
But physics, geology, and economics had other plans. As we hit 2026, the verdict is in: globalist green tech was never going to replace fossil fuels at the level required to maintain an infinite-growth economy.
The Wall of Physical Reality
The math simply doesn’t track. To swap our current energy base for industrial renewables, we require a “Great Mining” of rare earths and minerals that don’t multiply on demand. As we move to lower-grade ores in politically unstable regions, the Energy Return on Investment (EROI)—the actual “profit” of energy we get back after spending energy to build the tech—is plummeting.
Add to this the 35% spikes in battery costs due to recent trade tariffs, and the “cheap energy” dream has curdled into a protectionist nightmare.
The Liberation of Limits
This isn’t defeatist. It’s liberating.
THEY WERE NEVER GOING TO SCALE frees us from the myth that salvation lies in bigger, faster, more centralized tech controlled by distant corporations. It reminds us that chasing “scale” often chains us to fragile global networks and bureaucracies that fail the moment a shipping lane is blocked or a mineral cartel raises prices.
Instead, we can turn to technology that is small, adaptable, and human-scaled. This is the philosophy of E.F. Schumacher’s Small Is Beautiful. It’s not about rejecting progress; it’s about choosing progress that serves people and place, not abstract GDP metrics.
What is “Appropriate Technology”?
Schumacher argued for “intermediate technology”—tools more effective than traditional methods but far simpler and cheaper than high-tech industrial solutions.
The AT Manifesto:
Repairable: Fixed locally with local tools.
Capital-Saving: Prioritizes human ingenuity over massive debt.
Resilient: Works when the global “Just-in-Time” supply chain breaks.
Nonviolent: Low impact on the Earth’s finite resources.
Think biogas digesters from farm waste, hand-built solar cookers, or passive solar designs that heat homes without a single circuit board. These are technologies with a human face.
We are entering an era of economic contraction. Resource peaks and debt burdens mean endless growth is off the table. But contraction isn’t collapse if we prepare.
In a world of “Efficiency,” systems are optimized to be lean, which makes them incredibly fragile. One disruption cascades into a total shutdown. Appropriate Technology embraces “Redundancy” and “Simplicity.”
The Complexity Trap
Joseph Tainter’s The Collapse of Complex Societies warns that societies eventually invest in so many layers of bureaucracy and tech that they reach “diminishing returns.” We spend more energy maintaining the system than we get out of it.
AT counters this by simplifying:
A community-owned windmill solves a need without a billion-dollar investment.
A backyard biogas setup turns waste into fuel without a global pipeline.
A hand-cranked grain mill works when the grid is down.
When the giants stumble, the small and the simple remain standing.
The Cooperative Engine
How do we deploy this tech without falling back into corporate traps? Through Cooperatives.
Worker-owned models align technology with local needs rather than shareholder returns. In contraction, co-ops buffer shocks: when markets falter, members prioritize livelihoods over dividends.
L’Atelier Paysan (France): This cooperative designs open-source farm tools with farmers, ensuring tech remains a tool for the worker, not a shackle.
The Mondragon Model: In the Basque region, large-scale cooperatives prove that we can have sophisticated industry while keeping benefits circulating locally.
Energy Collectives: Across the globe, neighborhoods are installing “micro-grids”—rooftop solar kits and micro-hydro owned collectively—to power homes without feeding the corporate beast.
The Script Has Flipped
The mainstream ignored this wisdom because it didn’t offer a way to get rich quick. But in 2026, getting “resilient” is the new getting “rich.”
THEY WERE NEVER GOING TO SCALE isn’t a counsel of despair. It’s an invitation to reclaim your agency. Free from scalability myths, we escape dependence on fragile megastructures. We build what we can maintain, and we own what we use.
How to start:
Audit your tech: What do you own that you can actually fix?
Join a “Library of Things”: Tool-sharing co-ops reduce the need for everyone to own a resource-heavy machine.
Invest in Low-Tech: Support local energy collectives or experiment with passive solar heating.
Small is still beautiful—and in a contracting world, it might be our only way forward.
There is a growing assumption that artificial intelligence can be adapted to a shrinking economy by making it smaller, slower and local. The idea is that large data centres disappear, but modest local systems continue to operate within communities. Once declining materials, declining know-how and the collapse of capital investment are taken seriously, that assumption no longer holds.
Modern AI depends on hardware that cannot be produced locally. Even the smallest systems rely on ultra-pure silicon, rare metals, chemically complex processes and precision manufacturing. These are not craft activities that can be recreated at community scale. They depend on long supply chains, high energy use and continuous industrial coordination. As those conditions weaken, hardware replacement becomes impossible. Existing machines are kept running only by scavenging parts from others, until a single failed component ends the system entirely.
Know-how declines even faster than hardware. The knowledge required to design, fabricate and maintain advanced electronics is deeply specialised and distributed across global institutions. It depends on formal education, constant practice and large teams working together. In a shrinking economy, people move into roles that meet immediate needs such as food production, care and repair. Training pipelines collapse. Tacit knowledge disappears first. What remains are machines that exist physically but cannot be meaningfully understood or repaired.
Capital investment is the third constraint, and it is decisive. Even if some hardware and some expertise remain, a contracting economy cannot justify investing scarce resources in systems that offer indirect or marginal benefit. Capital flows toward things that are essential, durable and repairable. AI hardware fails that test. It requires controlled environments, specialist components and planned redundancy. When it breaks, it is not worth replacing.
Taken together, these forces do not produce a gentle scaling down of AI. They produce a threshold effect. Once materials, knowledge and capital fall below a certain level, AI systems are no longer reproducible. From that point onward, they are not tools but legacy artefacts. They may continue to function briefly, in isolated pockets, but they have no future path.
This distinction matters. Technologies that survive deep economic contraction are those that can be remade from what is locally available. They use materials that can be sourced nearby. They rely on skills that can be passed from person to person. They require little capital and reward repair rather than replacement. Mills, hand tools, simple buildings and food systems meet these conditions. AI hardware does not.
In that sense, artificial intelligence belongs to a surplus phase of civilisation. It externalises knowledge into machines that only function while energy, materials, expertise and investment remain abundant. As surplus disappears, knowledge moves back into people, into practice, habit and shared experience.
AI therefore does not become local in a truly shrinking economy. It becomes historical. Not because it was a mistake, but because it depends on conditions that no longer exist.
Localism is not about finding smaller versions of global systems. It is about rebuilding ways of living that can be sustained, repaired and passed on using what is at hand. Once that standard is applied, the long-term fate of AI is clear.
In relation to Dominic Cummings’s analysis of political disillusion, the loss of trust in national politics is not a communications failure but a structural one. Power has grown too distant to remain legitimate.
The obvious next question is practical rather than philosophical.
What does local power actually look like?
Not in theory. In use.
Below are four areas where power can be moved to the locality in ways that are realistic, stabilising and suited to an economy that is no longer growing.
1. Control of everyday public spending
Local power begins with money that can actually be spent locally.
This does not mean new grants or competitive bidding exercises. It means allocating a fixed, visible budget to each locality, with discretion over priorities.
In a shrinking economy, the purpose is not optimisation or innovation. It is adaptation. Local people are better placed to decide whether limited funds are best used to keep a bus service running, support informal care, or maintain basic infrastructure.
For policymakers, the shift is simple but uncomfortable. Control moves from targets to trust. The centre audits outcomes, not decisions.
2. Health as a locality system
National funding and standards for health care remain essential. Delivery does not.
Health failure is experienced locally and personally. Appointments missed. Support absent. Care fragmented. These are problems of organisation, not ideology.
Local power means allowing locality-based health systems to integrate formal NHS services with informal care, volunteers, neighbours and charities. This is not a retreat from universality. It is a recognition that informal systems will carry more of the load as resources tighten.
In a contracting economy, pretending that everything can remain fully professionalised is unrealistic. Local integration is how standards are preserved when money is scarce.
3. Land use and shelter
Housing policy has largely failed because land-use decisions are taken far from their lived consequences.
Local power here means granting localities real authority over small-scale development, temporary structures, and low-cost shelter. This is not deregulation. It is re-scaling.
As the economy contracts, more people will live closer to the margin. Informal housing solutions will emerge whether policy allows them or not. The choice is between managed local adaptation or unmanaged national failure.
Policymakers should recognise that rigid national control of land use belongs to an era of growth that has ended.
4. Local economic resilience
National growth strategies assume expanding discretionary markets. Those markets are already shrinking.
Local power means enabling local food production, local energy, local repair and local exchange, not as lifestyle projects, but as resilience infrastructure.
This is where informal systems matter most. They are labour-intensive, low-capital and adaptive, exactly what a shrinking economy produces in abundance.
The role of policy is not to scale these systems up, but to stop obstructing them.
Why this matters now
Much current political analysis, including that of Cummings, recognises the collapse of trust but still assumes that recovery must be engineered from the centre.
That assumption is outdated.
In a contracting economy, legitimacy does not come from ambition. It comes from restraint. From visibility. From decisions made close enough to be understood and challenged.
Localism is not a political mood. It is a structural adjustment to a smaller, poorer and more constrained future.
The question for policymakers is no longer how to restore national control.
It is how much local control they are willing to release before reality forces it anyway.
In recent days, the Daily Telegraph reported Paul Swinney, chief economist at The Data City, expressing deep scepticism about a claimed “productivity miracle” in one of England’s regions — saying the figures simply did not pass the “sniff test”. Such honesty from an economist is rare, and it serves as a timely reminder that big, top-down statistics are not automatically trustworthy. Too often, national or regional numbers paint a picture that looks neat on paper but hides as much as it reveals.
This isn’t just about one set of productivity figures. It goes to the heart of a wider problem: the larger the dataset and the more distant from lived reality it becomes, the more likely it is to mislead rather than inform.
1. Bigger Data Isn’t Always Better
There’s a common misconception that larger datasets are inherently more reliable. But statisticians warn of the “Big Data paradox”: massive sample sizes can give us tiny margins of error around precisely wrong estimates. A well-known example from vaccine uptake surveys in the US showed huge online surveys with hundreds of thousands of responses massively overestimating actual vaccination compared with smaller, well-designed samples. The large surveys looked “precise” because their statistical error bars were tiny — but they were consistently biased because of how the samples were collected. This shows that quality matters more than quantity.
2. National Surveys and Official Statistics Often Mask Local Reality
Official statistics — whether from national accounts, labour surveys, or industry productivity measures — rely on complex methodologies, sample definitions, and classifications that can distort as much as they illuminate. Even UK construction statistics, for example, have been criticised because the official definitions fail to capture the true scope of activity in the sector — meaning employment and output can be undercounted or misrepresented.
In productivity measures, national statistical agencies like the ONS must combine multiple data sources, adjust benchmarks and make assumptions about hours worked, industry classification, and earnings — all of which can introduce substantial revisions and inconsistencies over time.
3. Misuse and Misinterpretation Are Everyday Risks
Statistics are tools, and they reflect the choices made in what to measure, how to aggregate, and how to interpret. Even simple phenomena like Simpson’s paradox show that aggregated data can lead to conclusions that completely reverse once we look at the right subgroups — a cautionary tale for anyone trusting headline statistics without understanding the underlying structure.
More broadly, the very concept of “misuse of statistics” is well-recognised: statistical arguments can be constructed in ways that appear compelling but are fundamentally misleading, whether by accident or design. This ranges from cherry-picking favourable outcomes to ignoring changes in definitions or boundaries.
4. Complex Models Hide Assumptions and Biases
Top-down statistical systems often bury critical methodological assumptions deep in technical notes. Unless users are expert statisticians, they rarely see how much professional judgement — and sometimes arbitrary decisions — shapes the results. Indeed, research into how economic statistics are communicated finds that many people experience official figures as confusing or untrustworthy, partly because they are aimed at expert audiences rather than ordinary people trying to understand their local labour market or incomes.
5. Forecasts Have a Poor Track Record
Historical evidence shows that even sophisticated forecasting models used for transport or infrastructure projects systematically fail to match reality, often overestimating demand or economic benefits by wide margins. One study covering hundreds of major projects found that traffic forecasts in rail and road schemes were wrong by more than 20% in half the cases — with no improvement over decades of modelling experience.
What This Means for Localism
All of this suggests a fundamental takeaway: centralised, aggregated statistics are useful for broad trends but deeply limited as guides to local economic reality. They smooth away the very variance that makes local communities tick — the small-firm dynamics, the informal jobs, the self-employed workers, the local wage pressures that national averages obscure.
A localist approach, by contrast, starts with community-specific data and lived experience, building up the picture from the ground rather than imposing a distant, top-down model. This doesn’t mean abandoning statistics altogether — it means valuing contextualised, transparent, and relevant numbers over impressive but often hollow aggregates.
If statistics are to serve people rather than technocrats, then scepticism isn’t just healthy — it’s essential.
Many of the pieces on this blog start from the same observation. The formal, industrial system that shaped the last two centuries is no longer expanding. It is becoming more brittle, more abstract, and less able to describe the conditions it is meant to manage. One consequence of this is rarely named, but it matters greatly. Large systems are increasingly poor at telling the truth about what is actually happening.
This is not because people have become less honest. It is because scale weakens feedback.
There is strong evidence that small, local systems generate fewer invented facts than large, top-down organisations. This strengthens the case for localism, not as a lifestyle choice, but as a structurally viable way of organising society in a period of contraction.
In local settings, most interactions are direct and repeated. People know one another and share overlapping knowledge of the same places, activities, and outcomes. Claims are made in the presence of others who can test them against lived experience. If a harvest is considered good, the fields are visible. If a scheme is said to be working, its effects are felt locally.
This produces tight feedback loops. False claims are rarely exposed through formal processes. They are exposed through everyday contradiction. A person who repeatedly invents facts does not simply lose an argument. They lose trust, cooperation, and standing. In an informal local economy, that loss has immediate practical consequences.
Large organisations operate oppositely. Information moves upwards through layers, losing detail as it goes. Reports replace observation. Targets replace judgment. Responsibility is dispersed to the point where no one wholly owns the accuracy of what is being said.
In such systems, invented facts usually arise without malicious intent. People adapt their descriptions of reality to what the organisation can tolerate. Bad news is softened. Ambiguity is resolved in favour of approved narratives. Over time, internal coherence becomes more important than correspondence with lived conditions.
This is a structural outcome of scale, not a failure of individual character.
In small communities, knowledge is redundant. Many people know the exact facts through different routes. This makes sustained fabrication difficult. In large systems, knowledge is siloed. Falsehoods can persist simply because those closest to reality lack authority, while those with authority are distant from reality.
This pattern is well supported by the work of Elinor Ostrom, who studied how local groups successfully managed shared resources such as water systems, fisheries, and grazing land. Across thousands of cases, she found that small, self-governing groups shared information openly, detected rule-breaking quickly, and maintained higher factual accuracy than centrally managed systems.
These groups did not function because people were unusually virtuous. They functioned because dishonesty was visible and costly. Everyone depended on the same resource. Everyone could see when claims diverged from reality.
This connects directly to the wider argument of this blog. As discretionary markets shrink and formal institutions struggle to adapt, systems that depend on abstract reporting and distant control become increasingly fragile. They require simplification to function, and simplification drifts into distortion. Targets replace reality. Invented facts become a way of keeping the system moving.
Local systems do not scale, and that is precisely why they remain viable. Their small size anchors them in observation, shared experience, and rapid correction. Errors surface quickly. Misjudgements are owned locally. False claims cannot be institutionalised or passed endlessly upwards.
Localism does not eliminate deception. People remain human. But in a local setting, deception is short-lived and self-limiting. It damages trust quickly and cannot be embedded into the structure of the system.
As the formal economy contracts and informal systems take on a larger role in meeting everyday needs, this matters. A society that cannot accurately describe its own condition cannot adapt to change. Localism remains viable not because it promises harmony or moral improvement, but because it preserves feedback.
And feedback, more than scale or efficiency, is what keeps a system connected to reality.
The piece that follows ranges across economic history, energy systems, governance, and administration over nearly two thousand years. No single person can hold detailed expertise across all of these fields. I certainly do not.
Rather than pretend otherwise, I have chosen to work differently.
I use artificial intelligence as a tool that allows me to interrogate multiple bodies of knowledge at once. In effect, it functions as a multidisciplinary team: economic historians, energy analysts, political theorists, and administrative historians. My role is not to accept what it produces at face value, but to question it, challenge it, redirect it, and integrate it into a coherent line of argument.
This matters. AI does not have judgement, values, or lived experience. It does not know what matters. It can assemble information, surface patterns, and test plausibility, but it cannot decide meaning or relevance. That task remains mine.
Throughout the development of this piece, I have repeatedly tested assumptions, corrected errors, pushed for greater precision, and reshaped the narrative until it aligned with a long-term view of how economies, energy, and governance interact. Where uncertainty remains, I have not attempted to hide it. History itself is incomplete and uneven, and any honest account must reflect that.
What follows should therefore be read neither as a definitive history nor as an academic treatise. It is a reasoned synthesis. Its purpose is to make visible patterns that are otherwise obscured by disciplinary boundaries and growth-era assumptions.
If the argument is persuasive, it will be because it resonates with historical experience and present conditions, not because it claims authority. If it provokes disagreement, that too is useful. The aim is not closure, but clearer thinking about where we are, and why certain forms of economic and administrative life keep returning when surplus and energy decline.
In that sense, the method mirrors the argument. Just as local systems re-emerge when large ones become strained, human judgement remains essential even when powerful tools are available.
As a podcast host, there’s one answer that I love to hear when I ask my guests a question – but I rarely ever do:
I don’t know.
To me, this answer is a signal of maturity, nuance, and honesty. It’s not trying to give an answer to all the world’s problems.
So, why is hearing “I don’t know” so rare?
We are all members of a social species embedded in a modern culture that’s been turbocharged by energy surplus and social technology. But in this modern setting we still seek status and respect as a product of our evolutionary wiring. Because of this, in most public settings, especially in the media, we overvalue confidence, bravado, and certainty. Today, saying “I don’t know” is seen as a sign of weakness, not of wisdom.
But in a world increasingly defined by ideological debates, when you hear these words today, they act as a sort of antidote to our cultural consensus trance. Admitting uncertainty makes room for discourse and the possibility of different answers.
In fact, I’m beginning to think that the reluctance to express “I don’t know” (or its equivalent) out loud is a fatal flaw in our culture as we begin to discuss our vastly complex, risky, and rapidly approaching future – which is chock full of uncertainties.
The Right Answer on Wall Street
So back in the day, over 30 years ago, I started working at Salomon Brothers, which at the time was one of the coolest places on Wall Street. Their highly respected training program kicked our asses, and one of the key things I remember is that they would ask a series of questions, starting with something simple that you learn in business school like, “What’s the duration of a 30 year note?” Next, they would ask a slightly harder question: “What’s the ticker symbol of Yahoo?” Easy!: YHOO.
Nate in training at Salomon Brothers
And then, after you answered the first two questions, they would ask you a really hard question that you weren’t supposed to be able to answer. Since we want to impress our bosses, we would inevitably make something up or guess, and then they would come down on us hard.
What we were supposed to say, as eventual salespeople who would be talking to billionaires and institutional managers, is “I don’t know, but I will find out and get back to you.” Because making up answers may sound good on the surface, but doing so would only cause more problems and make us appear incompetent when they turn out to be wrong later.
That concept was drilled into me in my early 20s. But, in the intervening 30 years, I’ve noticed that “I don’t know” is rarely spoken, at least publicly. Our culture doesn’t merely tolerate and accept overconfidence, but actually prioritizes it – and we end up paying a premium for it.
We see this as social media feeds boost a really bold claim, which then goes viral, while the more accurate and nuanced one gets minimal views. On TV and in the news, producers book guests with crisp and sharp takes, not the careful, qualifying one. Even in choosing guests for this show, I lean towards the articulate, confident, charismatic spokesperson for topics over the best scientist. In classrooms the quick hand beats the methodological thinker – and I know this because even in third grade I had the fast hand! In boardrooms and C-Suites, it’s the fast, confident answer that outshines the humble hypothesis. Our modern status economy runs on conviction and linearity, while nuance and caution only slow us down.
Why does this happen? Well, there are three – at least three – intertwining reasons why confidence and lack of humility rise to the top in our current culture.
Three Levels of the Confidence Game
Uncertainty is Stressful
First, at the physiological level within an individual, uncertainty itself actually feels bad. Most of us don’t really think about it, but uncertainty is reflected as a bodily state within us. Human brains are extremely good at predictions: we’re always guessing what’s going to come next and then checking that guess against the reality in front of us. When the world becomes more chaotic, these prediction errors spike and kick in our sympathetic nervous system, what we might call our “bodily alarm network”.
So when our stressed system releases cortisol and we start to feel things like a tight chest, a fluttery stomach, or an increased heart rate, these inform our gut that something is ‘off,’ even before we can really explain why.
And furthermore, being uncertain – by definition – occurs when we build multiple mental possibilities and hold them all at once. In a literal sense, the added complexity of doing this requires more energy for our brains in the form of glucose. Holding uncertainty is costly!
When we’re running parallel mental scenarios, inhibiting quick answers and requiring more context flip-flopping, our bodies don’t like the inefficient use of energy. As this stress increases, our bodies push us to pick some story – any story – to shut the alarms off.
Back in the day on the plains of Tanzania, this response was evolutionarily helpful. For instance, it was safer to assume the rustle in the bushes was a lion rather than the wind, because it was better to have a false alarm over a fatal pause (or maybe fatal “claws”). This translates into today, where modern society continues to reinforce this by rewarding decisive signals over caveats, resulting in “I don’t know” feeling like a professional status risk.
Put that all together, and at the level of the individual human physiology, uncertainty feels both uncomfortable and potentially costly. So it’s no wonder that fantasy and doom often become our default perspectives, rather than sitting with the unknown and being open to learning.
Motivated Reasoning
Building on the individual bodily reaction, once beliefs are formed at a higher level, they develop antibodies that make us resistant to change. This is called an ideological immune system, and we all have one. Once a worldview works for us we defend it.
Importantly, a lot of modern research shows that the ‘smartest’ among us are often better at arguing their own side, but also more likely to double-down on their beliefs on highly charged and divisive topics. This tells us that smart people aren’t necessarily right more of the time, but they are better at rationalizing their own positions. This is called motivated reasoning, and it’s very effective at preserving our personal blind spots.
Authority Bias
Moving another layer above, we have culture-wide human cognitive phenomena like authority bias (among many other biases).
Authority bias is our built-in tendency to trust and comply with people who display signals of high cultural status – titles, uniform, and expert credentials – despite contradictory evidence showing they shouldn’t be trusted. This human tendency has been demonstrated over and over again. Famously, in the Milgram experiment, ordinary people kept delivering what they thought were painful and nearly fatal electric shocks, just because the person telling them to do it was in a lab coat. Another classic field study set in a hospital showed that 95% of nurses prepared an excessive, unauthorized medical dose based solely on a stranger’s phone order because they were claiming to be a doctor – even though the rules forbade it.
Many other studies have repeatedly shown that humans are more likely to obey requests from persons with perceived authority. These examples are all from different settings, but they show the same pattern: signals of authority lower our skepticism, and they raise our compliance. This might not seem surprising, but it does help explain why a lot of us tend to go on autopilot at times when we probably most need to be thinking critically.
This pattern also partially explains why ‘misinformation’ works so well – it’s easy for companies to throw money behind a confident spokesperson to promote an unscientific campaign that’s good for business.
We Want Our Leaders to Have the Answers
From a cultural perspective, we can see why people in authority rarely say, “I don’t know,” because if they did, they’d be replaced by another person who could give an answer and seem to better know what they’re doing. Basically, confident guesses rise to the top, and culture-wide – almost as if by compulsion from what I refer to as the global economic super organism dynamic – we have learned to speak past uncertainty, round off any error bars, and, ultimately, act first confidently and check later.
These incentives shape the outcomes we see around us. Projects start with rosy baselines and then invariably end up with cost overruns. Politicians will campaign on certain guarantees and then walk those promises back when they’re elected and actually have to govern. Even in science, publication biasreduces the chance that statistically insignificant results get published, skewing the body of evidence. So overconfidence in our culture is rewarded at the front end and only punished, if at all, in hindsight – which means the person who benefits is rarely the person (or culture) who pays. The public pays in trust, money, and time. To those who follow TGS, it’s also obvious that our planet pays (and ergo we also pay) in the form of ecological stability.
Enter: Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence adds a relevant wrinkle here, because it also rewards confident responses, turbocharging what is already a human tendency – which naturally makes sense because humans created AI.
Most people who use AI have heard of the concept of hallucinations. This is when a large language model confidently generates an answer that isn’t true.
The main software of ChatGPT-5 hallucinates around 10% of the time when it has internet access. But without internet access, this increases to almost half of all answers. So why do chat bots make stuff up? It’s because their training incentivizes answering every inquiry, whether they’re right or not. It’s an issue in fundamental logic. When training a large language model to perform well in competitions, what’s important is what wins, not what’s true. If you think of a quiz show where the only way to get points is to give the correct answer. You don’t lose anything by not guessing, but you also don’t lose anything from getting the answer wrong. Since there are no downsides to guessing, it is always in your favor to attempt answering – and bonus points if you convince the host you’re right anyway.
This is the game that AI is designed to play within. Over a million iterations, such a system would learn to speak smoothly and confidently, even when it’s unsure.
In a recent paper in collaboration with Georgia Tech, OpenAI (who makes ChatGPT) stopped framing hallucinations as a surprising fluke, but rather as an inevitable outcome of “natural statistical pressures” – what might be called “statistical destiny.” So when you combine humans and AI, you get even more overconfidence and deceptively persuasive answers.
Reinforcing these findings further, there was a new Stanford paper that coined the term ‘Moloch’s Bargain’ for what happens when large language models start competing for attention, sales, or votes, and the results were striking (though perhaps if you’ve followed this story, not surprising). It showed that for every gain in the model performance came an even bigger loss in honesty. In effect, more deceptive marketing, more disinformation in political campaigns, and more fake and harmful social media posts.
As an aside – not one I enjoy thinking or talking about – I worry a lot about the merger of AI with military capacity. I’ve been informed by people who are in a position to know that we’ve actually avoided a dozen, or perhaps even more, potential nuclear wars in the last 50 years. Most of these near-misses were avoided because at the time a single human was unsure and they chose to hold off until they had more information. If LLMs are trained on worst-case possibilities and gain control of these defense systems, the rational speed bumps of uncertainty and waiting that come from the gut-feeling of a human might disappear. This is one of the few things that keeps me up at night.
If you’re reading this, you’re probably aware that this is not just an AI problem, but really a mirror into our cultural values and behaviors – because we train ourselves the same way. As I mentioned before, social media emphasizes confident clips, companies promote decisive talkers, and politicians prioritize simplicity and easy to understand things over truth and complexity. In the context of the human predicament, economists tell stories of infinite growth, and that technology will be able to solve any challenges along our way.
Ultimately, the result is human hallucination. The cultural stories we tell ourselves, which then guide our actions, wildly outpace our energy, ecosystem, and time constraints. And then we’re shocked – shocked – when reality shows up to stare us in the face and remind us that infinite growth is not possible in a finite system.
The Deeper Costs
How do the costs of overconfidence actually manifest in society? People following this platform are well aware of the modern costs of overconfidence and certainty on the ecological side – and still we seem to discover more and more impacts every year. But beyond the environment, we can think of examples like the Challenger Space Shuttle launch: managers waved off the engineers’ concerns about the O-rings and low temps, and it resulted in seven lives lost.
(By the way, I watched this live at Kronshage Hall at University of Wisconsin when I was at college. It’s strange how the amygdala hangs onto these little emotional memories during the lifespan of a human brain.
Another well known example is the housing bubble that led to the 2008 Great Recession. Ratings and models said this is safe leverage, and optimism said ‘let’s party,’ while the few voices who dissented and called for caution were ignored. Cue: global crisis.
And again with the oil rig, Deepwater Horizon, which took shortcuts that looked efficient until they weren’t, leading to one of the largest oil spills in history and eleven lost lives. Governments also do this all the time, overpromising on the timeline and budgets of big projects, which eventually morph into years of delays and overruns. Challenges are normal, but it’s the overly optimistic baseline at the beginning which is the mistake. This is a repeating pattern in our culture. Certainty beats caution, and the costs come later.
… And the costs come later.
(“And the costs come later” might actually be a good mnemonic tagline for homo sapiens. Unfortunately, ‘later’ is arriving sooner than many of us think.)
Overconfidence in the Human System
One could argue that overconfidence and lack of caution is one of the core underlying drivers of the maximum power principle, which itself is underpinning global human ecological overshoot and the impending great simplification. (In fact, I may dedicate a future piece entirely to this concept). In some ways, this story seems to dovetail with Dark Triad personality traits – especially psychopathy – which is also worth pondering more.
But our predisposition towards certainty can be overruled by a trump card, which is self-introspection, learning, and the fast pace of cultural change.
To start, in my opinion, the mere act of saying “I don’t know” shifts the dynamic back to curiosity and the possibility for change. It re-engages our prefrontal cortex and it makes cooperation with others easier because we’re no longer defending an identity whose scaffolding was certainty. If you can’t admit that you don’t know, then you can’t really hear anything else.
Admitting uncertainty lets us engage in experiments, instead of arguments, and it creates room to develop scenarios. More importantly, uncertainty extends conversations with people who we might otherwise not talk to because we think we disagree from the start.
Can We Embrace Uncertainty?
So how do we put this into practice? I’m tempted to say, “I don’t know” and end this essay here, but – out of the desire to not just highlight a problem and then say goodbye – the following are some directional ideas.
Some guidance might come from the world of AI itself. In their aforementioned Why Language Models Hallucinate paper, OpenAI proposed a fix to hallucinations, not in the form of more data or a larger computer, but merely through changing the “benchmarks of success” when training models. This would be done by penalizing confident inaccurate answers more than when an AI admits uncertainty, and even giving partial credit for “I don’t know”. This idea originally comes from changes in the way standardized tests are graded in order to disincentivize blind guessing. If this works, and confidence thresholds are added to calibrate behavior, the hope is that models will stop bluffing – aka ‘hallucinating’ – when they’re uncertain.
This idea is really encouraging, but the caveat is whether the customers of OpenAI themselves will miss the model that gives persuasive, confident answers, and move to another model that delivers the desired ‘certainty porn.’ Regardless, it’s a shift in the right direction. I wonder what would happen if our society did the same?
What about us as individuals? It might be helpful to start by looking within. Try to notice when you’re giving an answer that you don’t fully understand or know to be a little untrue, and call it out to yourself and fact check it.
(I like to imagine a little Nate on my shoulder to voice these things to – perhaps you have a little Kathleen or little Joe or little Fang Li or whoever is reading this).
By doing this more with ourselves, it might help us get in tune with our gut feeling. By listening to the little part of you that says “Something is off with this story,” it may become more and more accurate and sensitive to when others are trying to sell you something that’s only half baked.
Something I’ve discussed in a previous Frankly is thinking in probabilities. The added twist here is to consciously calibrate the probabilities of your claims and then score how accurate you are. It might be as simple as, “I think there’s a 10% chance it snows this week, 30% next week, and 60% by next month,” and then see how you do when reality arrives. Of course, this practice risks triggering a collective action problem if you’re the only one in your network doing it. But, if a lot of people do this, I think it would be helpful.
And then there’s the somewhat well-known concept of Red Teams, which make dissent and uncertainty a formal role in any scenario, as opposed to a risk.
This can look like a designated person who plays ‘devil’s advocate’ to flesh out any weak points in a plan or statement. It might be helpful to then rotate whoever is tasked with being the skeptic, and to even thank these people publicly for playing that role on your team. This could be at work, or even at your community board meeting or your family check-ins. Rewarding uncertainty feels counterintuitive, but if it works for machines, maybe it could work for us.
Conclusion
In today’s society, we’re assailed from all angles with social and environmental problems, information overload from 24/7 internet access, and endless dopamine hits from gambling, pornography, shopping, and ever-increasing AI content – our minds are constantly full.
All of this excess is moving us further and further away from the cultural ability to express “I don’t know,” because we want the ease of a straightforward, decisive answer.
If someone is on the news, testifying to Congress, or is being publicly asked for the answers to our financial or ecological problems, replying, “I don’t know, but I can find out and get back to you,” would result in quickly being replaced by someone with a pithy, witty, or confident answer. And with all three, they’ll be branded an expert and invited back. The uncertain, careful answer – in today’s world – implies weakness rather than wisdom.
So what is the answer? I don’t know. But I suspect if we’re able to change how we keep score for ourselves, at home, at work, in the media, and especially in discussions about the future so that truthfulness and humility are as important as knowing the answers, I expect our systems would naturally get smarter and kinder.
What if those three magic words aren’t the end of the sentence, but the start of learning?
This piece builds on the themes of “Beyond Growth: The Unavoidable Reality of Nature’s Limits”.
It explores how localism offers a natural path forward as the industrial economy reaches its limits of complexity, cost, and energy use. The argument here is simple: when money, time, and energy are seen together, the localist system emerges not as a retreat from modernity, but as its practical successor — leaner, slower, and more human.
We’ve grown used to measuring everything in money. Governments talk about GDP, companies talk about profit, and even charities measure their “impact” in pounds. But few of us stop to ask a simpler question: how are we actually spending our time, and how much energy does it take to keep our modern way of life going?
If we look at those two things — time and energy — the story of the industrial economy begins to look rather odd.
The time drain in your pocket Take your smartphone. It’s a wonderful tool, but also a thief of hours. The average adult in Britain now spends about four hours a day staring at one. Some of that time is useful — arranging a delivery, checking the weather, or messaging a friend. But most of it isn’t.
Scrolling through news feeds, watching short videos, chasing adverts, re-entering passwords: this is busy work, not productive work. It feels active, but it rarely produces anything of value.
If you add it up, that’s more than 1,000 hours a year — almost half a working year — spent in digital drift. Imagine what that same time could do in the real world: repairing a fence, helping a neighbour, or tending a garden.
The rise of the one-time password It’s getting worse, not better. Have you noticed how many times a day you now have to “prove” who you are?
One-time passwords, security codes, captchas, and two-step verification now clutter almost every online interaction.
Each one takes only a few seconds, but across millions of people and thousands of logins a day, it adds up to an invisible national time tax. It’s the cost of living in a complex, centralised system that no one fully trusts.
These checks don’t grow food, fix shoes, or care for the elderly. They simply maintain the machinery of complexity. The industrial economy, which once promised efficiency, now devotes an increasing share of our collective time to protecting itself from itself.
The hidden electricity bill Phones themselves don’t use much power — perhaps a few kilowatt-hours a year, costing less than a cup of coffee. The trouble lies in the system that supports them.
Every text, photo, and video passes through mobile masts, fibre networks, and giant data centres that run 24 hours a day. For every unit of electricity used to charge your phone, thirty to fifty units are burned somewhere else to keep the network alive.
When you multiply that by 50 million UK users, the total is about five terawatt-hours a year — roughly 1½ per cent of all the electricity Britain uses. That’s equivalent to a small power station running flat out just to support our smartphone habits.
And most of that energy isn’t producing anything tangible. It’s pushing adverts, holding temporary data, and waiting for the next scroll.
The industrial model: high output, low efficiency The modern industrial economy runs on this kind of hidden overhead. Every product or service depends on huge networks of energy, information, and security. The system looks efficient when you measure it in pounds per hour, but not when you measure it in human hours or kilowatt-hours.
For every hour of true production, several more are spent on administration, verification, and digital upkeep.
The localist alternative Now imagine a more grounded way of working — the localist economy.
Here, people make, grow, repair, and care directly. They use simple digital tools when needed but don’t live through them. Work is personal, trust is local, and value is measured by usefulness, not by the number of clicks.
A local baker sells to nearby families. A handyman repairs what’s already there. A neighbour shares surplus fruit rather than advertising it online. Electricity might come from rooftop panels, a village turbine, or a community battery. Transactions are trusted, so no one wastes time proving their identity three times a day.
Time is used directly, and energy travels short distances.
Why localism becomes competitive At first glance, this might seem nostalgic or even inefficient — until you remember that national electricity and digital overheads are now very expensive.
Industrial firms are locked into the national grid, long supply chains, and heavy data use. Their costs rise with every energy price increase and every new security regulation.
Local producers, by contrast, can use their own power and keep things simple. They don’t need to heat giant buildings or refrigerate goods for long journeys. They don’t run constant advertising campaigns or manage digital payment systems. They just work and trade.
So as national energy prices climb, local producers quietly become more competitive.
Time efficiency versus financial efficiency
It’s worth separating two kinds of efficiency.
The industrial world is efficient with money but wasteful of time. The localist world is modest with money but careful with time.
In human terms, the second is often more productive. A person who spends their day doing useful, tangible things — even unpaid — contributes more to life than someone trapped in administrative loops or digital distraction.
The phone, used properly This doesn’t mean we should throw our phones away. They’re marvellous for the right tasks: sharing knowledge, finding tools, checking weather patterns, or contacting customers. The problem is overuse. The aim is to put the phone back in its proper place — as a servant, not a master.
If average daily use fell from four hours to half an hour, the nation would save tens of billions of human hours each year and several terawatt-hours of electricity. That’s a lot of freed capacity — both mental and electrical — for things that actually matter.
The wider picture When energy and digital costs rise faster than wages fall, simplicity wins. Localism’s strength lies in this simplicity: short distances, direct trust, human time, and small power sources close to where people live.
The industrial economy will still exist for some large-scale or specialist tasks, but its cost base will keep rising as it feeds its own complexity. The localist economy, lighter and slower, will quietly outcompete it in many everyday activities — not through subsidies or slogans, but through basic physics and human sense.
A quiet revolution The recovery of productive time and local energy isn’t a step backwards. It’s a return to proportion.
As people spend less time proving who they are and more time being who they are, life will feel less hurried and more useful.
That may turn out to be the real measure of prosperity in the years ahead — not how much money changes hands, but how wisely we spend our limited time and energy.
The launch of new national guidance on protecting older people from technology-facilitated abuse marks an important step forward in safeguarding. Police forces across England and Wales are now better equipped to identify when smart devices – door locks, trackers, call blockers and other tools – are being misused to isolate or control vulnerable adults.
This is welcome progress. Yet policy cannot stop at issuing guidance. The challenge of tech-enabled abuse highlights a larger structural problem: the distance between national initiatives and the lived reality of older people in rural and semi-rural communities.
Older people at risk often live far from professional services. Many rely on neighbours, parish networks, and local groups for everyday support. Digital literacy is uneven, broadband coverage is patchy, and formal interventions are slow to arrive. And some of us don’t know how to do what we are asked to do.
What is needed is localism – the deliberate strengthening of informal, community-based systems alongside the formal sector. Localism brings three policy advantages:
Early detection. Local actors – such as GPs, pharmacists, community wardens, and faith groups – are far more likely to notice subtle patterns of tech misuse than a remote helpline.
Rapid response. When trust is embedded in neighbourhood networks, intervention can be swifter and more humane, reducing the need for escalation to crisis services.
Sustainable resilience. Embedding safeguarding knowledge in communities ensures that new threats – from emerging devices to changing social dynamics – can be met flexibly and adaptively.
National governments and police forces should therefore view the new guidance not as an end in itself, but as a resource to be localised. Training and materials must be filtered down to the smallest units of community life, from parish councils to volunteer groups.
The misuse of technology against older people is not simply a policing issue. It is a social issue – and one that reveals how fragile safety can be when formal systems operate in isolation. By embedding safeguarding practices in localism, we can create a protective mesh that ensures older citizens remain both safe and autonomous in the digital age.
As an 88-year-old, I frequently encounter examples of younger people and government departments assuming that I can adapt to new technology. As an example:
The government’s proposal for a nationwide NHS App, available on smartphones, to act as a single digital gateway for healthcare. It would enable people to book GP appointments, order repeat prescriptions, view their medical records, obtain health advice, and access vaccination and test results, aiming to make NHS services more efficient and accessible.
However,, Tim Watkins points out, that It is not unreasonable to conclude that the proposed UK digital ID system will require electricity which currently doesn’t exist. Not least because the UK already faces a 60GW shortage resulting from the bans on internal combustion vehicles and gas heating within the next decade.
The twentieth century was the age of great industries in the UK. . Steel, shipbuilding, textiles, cars, chemicals and electronics were produced on a vast scale, with workforces counted in the tens of thousands. Entire cities were shaped around a single factory or plant. The rhythm of life followed the whistle of the works. But that world is passing.
Globalisation, automation, and the limits of growth have hollowed out the giant industries. Many can no longer compete, either with low-cost overseas production or with new methods that require far fewer workers. Where once a steelworks employed 20,000, today the same output can be achieved with a few hundred. The vast labour armies are gone, and the communities that depended on them are left adrift.
This decline marks more than an economic change. It signals the fading of the industrial era itself, when economies were measured by the mass production of heavy goods. The future lies not in ever bigger factories, but in smaller, more flexible systems closer to where people live.
Localism offers a different path. Across the country, small manufacturers are emerging to meet needs that global supply chains once served. A workshop making timber window frames for local housing repair; a community bakery supplying fresh bread within walking distance; a small brewery producing distinctive ales for local pubs. These are modest in scale, but rooted in place. They keep money circulating in the local economy and provide jobs that cannot be outsourced to the other side of the world.
Technology supports this shift. Small-scale digital tools, such as 3D printers or computer-controlled cutters, allow local workshops to design and manufacture customised goods without the capital of a giant plant. In towns and villages, shared workshops – sometimes called makerspaces – give craftspeople and engineers access to equipment that once only large companies could afford.
We see it in Totnes, where local food processing and brewing firms supply a growing share of the town’s needs. In Sheffield, once the heart of heavy steel, small workshops now produce specialist blades and tools of a quality that mass producers cannot match. In rural areas, small sawmills and furniture makers are reviving traditional skills while adapting them to modern demand.
This is not nostalgia, but evolution. As big industry contracts under the weight of global pressures, small-scale making rises to fill the gaps. The end of the industrial era does not mean the end of production. It means production becomes embedded in communities again, on a scale that fits within the limits of resources and the needs of people.
The giant factories that defined the past will not return. The future belongs to the small workshops, the local makers, and the networks of exchange that sustain them. In their modest way, they point to a new economy – one that is lighter, more resilient, and more human.
Picture a 12-year-old in Brazil who has already survived their country’s worst climate disaster, uses AI to do their homework, and will join the largest adult generation in human history. Yet society expects them to follow the same path as their parents: college, career, family. This is Generation Alpha’s uncanny valley — where the traditional markers of becoming an adult persist, but the foundation beneath them has fundamentally shifted.
Generation Alpha is pursuing three paths: strengthening local resilience against climate disasters, setting nuanced, sophisticated boundaries with technology, and transforming personal finance into a public journey. However, a fourth path — Redefined Adulthood — may hold the most promise. This approach reimagines maturity itself, not a diminished version of traditional adulthood, but a more adaptable, community-oriented, and technologically sophisticated way of becoming an adult.
Shifting from centralized disaster response toward community-based resilience networks. This includes transforming local spaces into multi-purpose emergency centers, developing neighborhood support systems, and building climate adaptation knowledge into everyday community life.
Moving beyond binary tech relationships toward nuanced digital engagement patterns. This approach balances AI-assisted learning with intentional disconnection, while embracing new forms of digital usage that prioritize wellbeing over constant connectivity.
Transforming financial health from private concern to “loud budgeting.” This includes normalizing transparent discussions about money, gamifying responsible spending habits, and leveraging social networks for collective financial wisdom and accountability.
Evolving traditional adulthood markers toward contextual definitions of success. This means recognizing that stability might come from strong community ties rather than employment, and that mastery of selective tech engagement may matter more than constant digital presence.
As the largest cohort in human history comes of age, Gen Alpha is not just adapting to a changed world — its actively rewriting the rules of what it means to grow up. This version of adulthood may look strange to their parents, but it’s precisely what their future demands.
This forecast brief is the seventh in a multipart series exploring uncanny valleys across society, culminating in a full anthology for IFTF Vantage Partners in July 2025. Contact our team to explore how we can help your organization prepare for Generation Alpha’s emergence into adulthood.