David Frost’s recent article argues that the Civil Service is becoming an increasingly independent power within the British state. His concern is that unelected officials may acquire greater authority, making governments less able to carry out the policies for which they were elected.
Whether or not one agrees with every aspect of that argument, it highlights a much deeper problem. Britain has become so centralised that almost every important decision depends upon a vast national bureaucracy. As government grows larger, so too does the Civil Service required to administer it. The result is an inevitable struggle between ministers and officials over who really exercises power.
Localism approaches the problem from a completely different direction.
Instead of asking whether ministers or civil servants should control more of the machinery of the state, localism asks why so much power has been concentrated in Whitehall in the first place.
Most decisions affecting everyday life do not need to be made in London. Housing, local transport, small business support, woodland management, energy, local food production, planning, care services and much of education can all be organised within localities by people who understand local circumstances.
As responsibility moves back to local communities, the need for enormous central departments naturally declines. The question of whether permanent officials or ministers dominate those departments also becomes less important because fewer matters require national control.
Every transfer of responsibility to a locality removes work from Whitehall. It reduces paperwork, regulations, consultations and layers of administration. It also shortens the distance between those making decisions and those affected by them.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of highly centralised government is that responsibility becomes blurred. Ministers blame officials. Officials point to legislation. Agencies refer to guidance. Local authorities say they are following national policy. Eventually no one appears genuinely accountable.
Localism restores accountability because decision-makers live alongside the people affected by their decisions. Their successes and failures cannot be hidden behind complicated administrative structures.
There is another important consequence. Large bureaucracies naturally develop their own culture, priorities and institutional interests. Over time they seek stability, continuity and self-preservation. This is not necessarily because individuals have bad intentions, but because every large organisation acquires a life of its own.
Smaller local institutions are less able to become detached from the communities they serve. They remain visible, accessible and easier to influence.
The debate about Civil Service reform therefore risks treating the symptom rather than the cause. The real issue is not whether Britain should have a stronger Civil Service or a weaker one. It is whether so much authority should reside in Whitehall at all.
A genuinely localist Britain would still require a national government and a Civil Service, but both would be considerably smaller because they would perform fewer functions. Their purpose would be to deal with matters that genuinely require national coordination, leaving everything else to local decision-making.
The best way to prevent unelected institutions accumulating excessive influence is not endless constitutional reform. It is to reduce the amount of power that is concentrated at the centre.
The future of British democracy may depend less upon changing the Civil Service than upon rebuilding the capacity of local communities to govern themselves.