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393. National Shrinkage and the Uneven Growth of Localities

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The shrinking economy will not affect every part of the United Kingdom in the same way or at the same speed. National statistics will record falling prosperity, weakening tax revenues, declining discretionary employment and increasing pressure on public services. But these national figures will conceal a much more varied process taking place within individual localities.

Some localities will continue to grow, at least in terms of population, food production, practical employment and social cohesion. Others will shrink rapidly. Some may become extremely poor, while a smaller number retain considerable wealth. Between these extremes will be many places undergoing repeated adjustment as people, skills and resources move in response to changing conditions.

This will not be a planned redistribution directed from the centre. It will be an evolutionary process.

National shrinkage will not be evenly distributed

Economic shrinkage is usually discussed as though it will descend uniformly upon the country. National output falls, real wages decline and public expenditure becomes less affordable. It is then assumed that every household and every place will become proportionately poorer.

That is unlikely.

The national economy is an aggregation of very different local economies. Some depend heavily upon discretionary spending, long supply chains, commuting, tourism, financial services or government expenditure. Others possess productive land, water, woodland, workshops, useful buildings and people with practical knowledge. Some have strong social connections. Others consist largely of isolated households whose relationships are mediated through employers, public agencies and commercial services.

As the formal economy contracts, these differences will become increasingly important.

A locality that loses a large office employer may experience an abrupt fall in money incomes. Shops may close, house prices may fall and tax receipts may decline. Yet if the locality has access to land, practical skills and a willingness to reorganise, it may gradually replace some of the lost formal activity with food production, repair, care and small-scale manufacturing.

Another locality may initially appear prosperous because its residents have accumulated pensions, investments and valuable property. But it may lack food-producing land, water, affordable housing and people capable of maintaining its physical systems. Its monetary wealth may disguise a deeper dependence upon distant supplies and outside labour.

The real strength of a locality will therefore not be measured simply by the amount of money circulating within it. It will be measured increasingly by what it can provide for itself.

Growth within shrinkage

The United Kingdom can shrink while particular localities grow. This is not a contradiction. It depends upon what is meant by growth.

A locality may experience falling financial turnover while increasing its production of food, firewood, clothing, tools and essential services. It may have fewer supermarkets but more market gardens. It may have fewer professional care companies but more people providing care within families and neighbourhoods. It may have fewer new products but much more repair and reuse.

Such a locality would be shrinking according to conventional economic measurements. Yet its ability to support its inhabitants could be increasing.

Local growth in a shrinking national economy will not resemble the growth of the industrial age. It will not necessarily involve rising consumption, expanding credit or increasing house prices. It will mean the growth of useful activity.

There may be growth in:

  • local food production;
  • the number of people engaged in practical work;
  • repair and maintenance;
  • shared equipment;
  • small workshops;
  • household and locality energy production;
  • woodland management;
  • care provided close to home;
  • informal exchange;
  • apprenticeships and the transfer of skills;
  • relationships of trust and mutual obligation.

This activity may not be fully captured by Gross Domestic Product. Some of it may not involve money at all. But it will determine whether a locality is merely becoming poorer or is becoming more self-reliant.

National shrinkage may therefore be surprisingly difficult to see in the more successful localities. People will know that imported goods are less available, that travel is more expensive and that national services are deteriorating. Yet everyday life may remain tolerable, and in some respects improve, because essential needs are being met more directly.

People may have less money but more useful work. They may buy fewer prepared foods but have better access to locally grown produce. They may travel less but know more of the people around them. The economy will have shrunk, but life will not necessarily feel like continuous decline.

De-layering the local economy

This process can be understood as de-layering.

The formal economy has inserted numerous layers between the person who does useful work and the person who benefits from it. Social care provides a good example. The person receiving care pays, directly or through taxation, for much more than the time of the carer. The cost may also include management, regulation, property, transport, finance, debt servicing and profit.

The same is true of food. The price paid by the consumer includes processing, packaging, advertising, distribution, refrigeration, supermarket property, finance, management and profit. Some of these functions are necessary within the present system. But many do not produce food.

As energy and financial resources become less affordable, these layers will contract. The process may be disorderly, but it will encourage a shorter relationship between production and use.

Food grown close to where it is eaten requires fewer layers. A person caring for someone nearby does not require a national company to organise every hour of assistance. A local craftsperson repairing an implement avoids the energy, materials and finance required to manufacture and distribute a replacement.

The successful locality will not preserve every feature of the formal economy. It will retain the useful core while shedding unaffordable complexity.

Migration as a judgement upon localities

Population movement may become one of the clearest signs of how individual localities are coping.

People have always moved towards places offering food, work, shelter and security. During the era of industrial expansion, this generally meant movement towards towns and cities where monetary employment was concentrated. In a shrinking economy, the direction of movement may become less predictable.

Some towns will continue to attract people because they possess housing, workshops, markets, rail connections and established institutions. Some rural localities will attract people because they offer land, water, food production and practical work. Other places will lose population because they cannot provide affordable essentials.

Emigration from a locality will be a visible judgement upon its conditions. Immigration will often indicate that people believe they can establish a tolerable life there.

This judgement will not always be correct. A place may attract newcomers because it appears wealthy, only for its dependence upon external supplies to become apparent later. Another may lose young people during a period of severe difficulty, even though its land and resources give it good long-term prospects.

Movement will also be constrained. Poor people may be unable to move. Wealthier households may retain homes in attractive places while obtaining their essentials from elsewhere. Older people may remain because of family connections or because moving is physically impossible. Population movement will therefore be an important measure, but not a perfect one.

Over time, however, the movement of people will help shape the new local pattern. Skills will move as well as numbers. A locality that attracts growers, builders, carers, mechanics and craftspeople may strengthen itself. A locality that drives such people away through high housing costs or lack of access to land may become weaker, despite retaining substantial financial wealth.

Localities of wealth and poverty

National shrinkage will not abolish inequality. It may initially increase it.

Some localities will contain large concentrations of property, savings and political influence. They may be able to secure scarce supplies for longer than poorer places. They may employ people from outside to maintain their houses, gardens and personal care. For a time, they may seem insulated from the national decline.

But wealthy localities will face a fundamental question. Are they merely places in which wealthy people live, or are they functioning communities capable of providing essential goods and services?

A locality of expensive houses but few workers cannot sustain itself. If carers, growers, cleaners, builders and repairers cannot afford to live there, its financial wealth becomes a claim upon labour imported from elsewhere. As transport and energy costs rise, that arrangement becomes increasingly fragile.

Poorer localities will face different problems. They may contain unemployed people, derelict land and empty buildings, yet lack the finance and organisation needed to bring them together productively. Their poverty may be severe even when useful resources are physically present.

The decisive issue will be access. Who may use the land? Who may occupy empty buildings? Who owns the tools? Can people obtain the small amount of capital needed to begin producing? Are local rules designed to enable useful activity, or do they protect arrangements inherited from the age of growth?

Extreme local poverty will not always result from a complete absence of resources. It may result from the inability of people to gain access to them.

Homelessness during the breakdown of the formal system

Housing may reveal one of the most painful contradictions of the shrinking economy. People may become homeless even while houses and other buildings stand empty.

The formal housing system depends upon wages, mortgages, rents, property values, credit and state support. As discretionary employment contracts, increasing numbers of people may be unable to maintain rent or mortgage payments. They may lose their homes before any alternative local system is ready to receive them.

This could create a period of severe but temporary poverty.

Someone expelled from the formal economy may have no recognised job, little money and nowhere secure to live. Yet that same person may later become essential to a local food system, care network, building group or repair workshop. The difficulty is the interval between the loss of the old livelihood and the creation of the new one.

Grass-roots food systems cannot appear overnight. Land must be made available. Soil must be improved. Tools, seeds and knowledge must be obtained. Growing has to follow the seasons. Storage and distribution must be organised. People accustomed to specialised formal employment need time to learn different skills.

During this interval, destitution could exist alongside the early stages of local renewal.

Homelessness should not therefore be interpreted as evidence that people have become unnecessary. It is evidence that the formal system has discarded them before the emerging system has found a way to use and support them.

This is where a continuing national core and functioning local institutions will be vital. Temporary shelter, basic food, healthcare and access to land can prevent a period of disruption from becoming permanent exclusion. The object should not be to preserve every feature of the failing formal system. It should be to keep people alive, sheltered and capable of taking part in the new one.

The danger of failed localities

Not every locality will evolve successfully.

Some may be trapped by poor land, water scarcity, contaminated sites, unsuitable buildings or isolation from transport. Others may possess adequate physical resources but lack cooperation. Powerful owners may prevent access to land and buildings. Existing groups may exclude newcomers. Crime, intimidation or political conflict may prevent productive activity.

A failed locality may enter a downward spiral. Useful people leave. Essential services deteriorate. Property is abandoned. Those who remain become older, poorer and less able to restore the physical fabric. Food and energy must still be brought in, but the locality has less to offer in exchange.

The national government will not have the resources to rescue every place by recreating former patterns of employment. Nor can it design a uniform local economy from the centre. It can, however, maintain the framework within which local recovery remains possible.

This includes basic law, defence, a workable currency, intercity rail, telecommunications, specialist healthcare and a minimum system of income or essential provision. It may also require measures preventing usable land and buildings from remaining idle while people lack food and shelter.

The purpose of national government in a shrinking economy will increasingly be to preserve the conditions for local evolution.

Local success will have different forms

There will be no single model of a successful locality.

A rural locality may depend upon mixed farming, woodland, village workshops and small food-processing businesses. A market town may serve as a centre for exchange, repair, healthcare and education. A former industrial town may reuse its terraces, railway connections, warehouses and workshops. Parts of cities may reorganise into closely connected urban localities, using allotments, markets, repair centres and shared services.

Each will develop according to its geography, buildings, history, people and natural resources.

This is why localism cannot be delivered as a standard national programme. Government may enable it, but it cannot prescribe its detailed form. The process will involve experiment. Some arrangements will work and be copied. Others will fail and be abandoned.

Successful localities will also exchange with one another. Localism does not mean complete self-sufficiency. Few places can provide everything they need. The aim is to shorten essential supply chains and reduce dependence upon complex systems, not to eliminate trade.

A food-producing locality may exchange with a town possessing workshops and medical facilities. Woodland localities may supply timber and charcoal. Coastal localities may provide fish. Railways and waterways may connect these different economies using less energy than the present road-based distribution system.

The national economy will become less uniform and more like a network of distinct but connected localities.

A new measure of prosperity

The success of this evolution cannot be judged primarily by house prices, retail sales or financial turnover.

A prosperous locality in the shrinking economy will be one in which ordinary people can obtain food, shelter, warmth, care and useful work without depending upon long and fragile chains. It will retain skills, support children and older people, maintain its buildings and land, and produce enough of value to exchange for what it cannot provide itself.

Its inhabitants may own fewer consumer goods. They may travel less and have lower monetary incomes. Yet they may be more secure than people living in apparently wealthier but highly dependent places.

The most important division may no longer be between nationally rich and nationally poor. It may be between localities that can evolve and those that cannot.

Evolution rather than a master plan

National shrinkage is already beginning to weaken the systems built during the age of cheap energy and expanding credit. The consequences will not follow a neat timetable. Neither will they be identical throughout the country.

Localism will emerge unevenly. It will advance where necessity, resources and human cooperation come together. It will falter where access is denied, practical knowledge has been lost or social relationships have broken down.

There will be periods of hardship. People may lose formal employment and housing before new local systems are sufficiently developed. Some localities will become much poorer, while others retain wealth or discover new forms of material security. Migration will increasingly reveal which places offer a viable future.

But national shrinkage does not require every locality to experience unrelieved decline. Within the contraction of the formal economy, there can be growth in food, care, repair, skills, cooperation and genuine usefulness.

This is the central possibility offered by localism. A country may become financially poorer while many of its localities become more capable of meeting human needs. What appears from the centre as national economic decline may be experienced locally as adaptation, simplification and renewal.

The future will not be distributed evenly. It will be made, locality by locality, through the evolutionary response of people to the condition

360. The Housing Market Cannot Escape a Shrinking Economy

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The difficulties now facing major housebuilder Vistry are unlikely to be an isolated business problem. They are another indication that the housing market is beginning to collide with a shrinking economy.

For decades, housebuilding has depended upon one simple assumption – that tomorrow’s buyers will have more spending power than today’s. That assumption no longer holds.

In a shrinking economy, incomes come under pressure, secure employment becomes less common, banks become more cautious and households become less willing to take on large debts. Every one of these trends reduces demand for new housing.

The result is straightforward. Developers still face rising costs for land, materials, labour and finance, but fewer buyers can afford prices high enough to cover those costs. The response is familiar. Prices are discounted, profits disappear, building slows and companies cut investment. Eventually some fail altogether.

This is not simply a housing problem. It is the inevitable consequence of trying to operate a growth-based housing market in a non-growth economy.

The effects spread much further. Estate agents, solicitors, surveyors, mortgage lenders, furniture retailers, DIY stores, removal firms and countless other businesses all depend upon a steady flow of house sales. As transactions fall, demand falls throughout the entire housing economy.

At the same time, people begin adapting.

Instead of buying larger homes, families share existing ones. Older relatives remain with younger generations. Empty rooms are occupied. Large houses are divided into smaller units. Buildings that once stood empty are brought back into use. Existing homes are repaired and altered rather than replaced by new ones.

This is not a new idea. It is how housing operated for much of the nineteenth century, before the era of mass mortgages and speculative housebuilding.

The modern mortgage market itself may gradually contract. For most of history, people did not borrow thirty or forty years of future income from banks in order to obtain a home. Housing was often financed through family savings, local investment, building societies rooted in their communities, private agreements and gradual self-building as resources became available.

A shrinking economy may well push Britain back towards these more local and less debt-dependent arrangements. The house becomes a place to live rather than a financial asset whose value is expected to rise indefinitely.

This is where localism becomes important.

A locality that is increasingly self-reliant needs homes that support stable communities, not speculative investment. Local builders can concentrate on adapting existing buildings. Local skills become more valuable than large national developers. Empty properties become community assets rather than opportunities for speculation.

As the national housing market contracts, the importance of local housing solutions will grow. The transition may not be easy, but it is likely to be unavoidable.

The housing market was built for an expanding economy. The economy is now shrinking and housing will have to change with it.

The age of debt-fuelled expansion is now giving way to something much older – locally financed, locally adapted and locally owned housing, rooted in the needs of the community rather than the demands of the financial markets.

342. Sinking Ground and the Case for Localism

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Recent reports from the British Geological Survey have drawn attention to a growing problem affecting large parts of London and the South East of England. The issue is often described in the press as “houses sinking”, though this is misleading. The buildings are not falling into holes. What is happening is more gradual and more revealing. The ground itself is moving.

Much of the area is built on clay soils, particularly London Clay. These soils behave in a predictable but increasingly disruptive way. In wet periods they expand, and in dry periods they contract. As climate patterns become more erratic, with longer dry spells and more intense rainfall events, the movement becomes more pronounced. The result is subsidence, slow distortion of buildings, cracking, and increasing repair costs.

The scale is not small. Large numbers of properties are now considered at risk over coming decades, and insurers are already paying out substantial sums in dry years when ground shrinkage is at its worst. This is not a future possibility but an ongoing adjustment in the relationship between climate, soil, and the built environment.

From a localist perspective, this is not simply an engineering or insurance issue. It is a sign of structural imbalance in how settlement has developed.

A central feature of modern development in the United Kingdom has been concentration. Population, investment, infrastructure, and housing demand have been drawn disproportionately towards London and its surrounding areas. Over time this has produced extreme density and pressure on land systems that were never intended to carry such sustained load at such scale.

Localism begins from a different assumption. It treats land, soil, water, and climate as active parts of a locality rather than neutral surfaces waiting for development. Each place has limits that are not just legal or economic but physical and ecological. Clay soils that swell and shrink are one such limit. They are not defects to be engineered away indefinitely, but conditions to be respected in how and where building takes place.

The subsidence issue shows what happens when that principle is ignored over time. The more activity is concentrated, the more intensively land is used, and the more heavily infrastructure is layered onto a single geological setting, the more stress is placed on the underlying system. Climate change then acts as a multiplier, increasing the variability of moisture and exposing weaknesses that were previously managed by more stable conditions.

Seen in this light, the “sinking houses” narrative is not about collapse but about feedback. The land is responding to patterns of settlement that have become too concentrated and too uniform. It is a physical reminder that growth is not abstract and that location always matters.

A localist response would not treat this as a problem to be solved only through deeper foundations, stronger materials, or more insurance adjustment. Those have a place, but they are secondary. The primary question is where and how we build in the first place. If development were more evenly distributed across smaller localities, with greater sensitivity to ground conditions and environmental limits, the pressure on any one system would be reduced.

There is also a financial dimension. Concentration creates hidden long-term costs. Subsidence damage, drainage failure, and repeated repair work are not incidental. They are the accumulated cost of ignoring local conditions at the planning stage. These costs eventually return to households, insurers, and public systems, often at far greater expense than a more distributed pattern of settlement would have required.

In this sense, the issue is not only about housing stability but about the wider model of development. A system that continually draws activity into a few high-pressure areas will eventually encounter physical limits, even if those limits appear slowly.

Localism offers a different direction. It suggests that resilience comes not from forcing uniform solutions onto diverse ground conditions, but from allowing development to reflect the character of each locality. In doing so, it reduces strain on land, reduces long-term cost, and builds a more stable relationship between people and place.

The movement of clay beneath London is therefore more than a geological curiosity. It is a quiet signal that the balance between settlement and land has been disturbed. The question it raises is whether that balance is restored by further concentration and engineering, or by a more distributed and locally grounded pattern of living.

302. The End of Housing Wealth? What Happens if the Economy Continues to Shrink

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For more than forty years Britain has relied upon rising house prices as a substitute for genuine economic growth. As manufacturing declined and debt expanded, housing became not merely somewhere to live but the principal store of household wealth. Millions of people came to believe that their future security depended upon the continual rise in the value of their homes.

The recent concern that Britain’s housing wealth may be in danger of collapsing raises a much deeper question. What happens if the economy itself continues to shrink?

In a shrinking economy, the fundamental assumption behind ever-rising house prices begins to weaken. Housing values ultimately depend upon what future buyers can afford to pay. If incomes stagnate, secure employment becomes scarcer, borrowing becomes more difficult and younger generations possess less disposable income, the pool of buyers capable of sustaining high prices gradually contracts.

This does not necessarily mean a sudden crash. More likely is a long period of stagnation in which house prices fail to keep pace with inflation. In nominal terms prices may appear stable, but in real terms housing wealth steadily declines year after year. Britain may already be moving in this direction.

A shrinking economy would also change the role of housing itself. During the growth era, property functioned as an investment asset. People expected capital gains. Buy-to-let investors expected rising values. Governments quietly welcomed rising house prices because they created a feeling of prosperity.

However, if economic growth disappears, housing increasingly reverts to its original purpose – shelter.

That change could have profound consequences.

The first consequence would be psychological. Much of Britain’s middle-class security is tied to property values. Pension planning, inheritance expectations and retirement assumptions all depend upon housing wealth remaining high. If prices stagnate or fall, many households may discover that what appeared to be wealth was largely a paper valuation dependent upon continuous market optimism.

The second consequence would be political. Governments have repeatedly intervened to support house prices through low interest rates, mortgage schemes and planning restrictions. Yet in a shrinking economy governments themselves become poorer and more indebted. Their ability to support asset prices weakens. Eventually economic reality may become stronger than political intervention.

The third consequence concerns localism.

If housing ceases to be viewed primarily as an investment, local communities may begin to think differently about land and property. The emphasis shifts from maximising exchange value to maximising usefulness. Empty buildings become potential workshops, local enterprises, food production facilities or housing for younger families. Land ceases to be merely a financial asset and becomes part of the productive life of the locality.

This would represent a major cultural shift. For decades Britain has measured success through rising property values. Yet from the perspective of a shrinking economy, permanently rising house prices are actually a sign of increasing unaffordability and growing dependence upon debt.

The irony is that falling or stagnant house prices may be painful for those who expected continual gains, but beneficial for future generations seeking somewhere to live. Many younger people already regard high housing costs as one of the greatest barriers to family formation, financial security and independence.

If the shrinking economy continues, Britain may eventually be forced to choose between preserving housing as a speculative investment or restoring it as an affordable necessity.

The housing market was built during an age of growth, expanding credit and rising consumption. If that age is ending, then housing wealth may no longer behave as it did before.

In that case, the future may not be a dramatic collapse, but something perhaps more significant – the slow transformation of housing from a financial asset back into a home.

233. Is Centralisation to Blame for Britain’s High Construction Costs?

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Sam Dumitriu Feb 3

Fact 1: Britain is an extremely expensive place to build just about any kind of infrastructure.

Britain is currently building both the world’s most expensive nuclear power station and the world’s most expensive high speed railway line. British tram projects cost on average twice more than the average European tramway and three and a half times more than the average German tramway. The planning application for the Lower Thames Crossing (a road tunnel between Kent and Essex) cost more to produce than it cost Norway to build the world’s longest road tunnel and the world’s deepest subsea tunnel combined.

Fact 2: Britain is an extremely centralised country. Local leaders in Britain lack the power to independently approve or fund (via local taxes) new transport infrastructure.

To obtain permission to build new transport infrastructure, English local authorities must submit a planning application (Transport Works Act Order/TWAO) to the Department for Transport. In the case of a recent one mile tram extension, it took four years from submission to approval for the West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) to obtain the TWAO.

To fund projects, cities and regions submit bids to the Department for Transport, who in close collaboration with the Treasury, decide whether or not to fund projects from general taxation. By contrast, Dijon (France) was able to plan, approve, fund, and build a 12 mile tram network in just 4 years. The project was funded via a local payroll tax on large employers (the Versement Transport). On a per-mile basis, the West Midlands project cost six times more than the Dijon project.

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Is the latter (centralisation) to blame for the former (high infrastructure costs)? Alon Levy of the Transit Costs Project (TCP) doesn’t think so. In a recent blog, they argue that while there may be good reasons to devolve power, Britain’s centralisation isn’t the driver for Britain’s high infrastructure costs.

For those unaware, Alon Levy and the TCP have been extremely influential in highlighting the massive disparity in infrastructure construction costs between the Anglosphere and the rest of the world. The TCP has produced a number of country-specific deep dives into infrastructure construction. Readers can skim the Sweden, Italy and Istanbul studies to find out what works, or read the Boston and New York studies to find out what doesn’t. For those looking for even more lessons on what not to do, there will soon also be a UK study, covering Crossrail, the Northern Line Extension, and the DLR.

Levy’s key takeaway from this, as yet unpublished, UK study is that Britain’s infrastructure cost problems are not the result of excessive centralisation, but rather down to the gradual adoption of what Levy dubs the ‘globalised approach’. In essence, Britain, like other Anglosphere countries, outsources almost everything. Low-cost countries like Sweden and Italy maintain a core of engineering expertise within the state and complex projects are designed in-house then put out to tender. Britain, by contrast, is heavily reliant on private-sector consultants to design projects and public tenders bundle up design and construction. When projects finish in Britain, teams disband. Lessons learnt are lost. By contrast, the Swedish engineers who designed the Citybanan (a crossrail-style tunnel through Stockholm connecting up commuter rail lines) moved on to designing Nya Tunnelbanan (a massive expansion of the city’s metro system).

Levy points out that Italy can build cheaply (far cheaper than Britain) despite high levels of centralisation. What sets Italy apart is the deep banks of engineering knowledge within the state – knowledge that the British state can only access when it hires consultants at high cost (and at a severe informational disadvantage). It should be noted Levy concedes that Italian centralisation does differ in one key way: Britain relies on ministerial approvals while Italy lets civil servants with expertise in engineering get on with it.

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My view is slightly different. I am persuaded that Levy is right that success is less about whether power is held centrally or locally and more about whether there is a clear programme of construction with in-house engineering expertise retained across projects, limited use of consultants and flexibility for builders to make changes . There is good evidence, for instance, that when the best engineers retire subsequent infrastructure projects are more expensive. However, I still think centralisation is an important part of the story. Let me explain.

I have argued before that while the direct costs of regulation, such as the requirement to build a £120m bat tunnel (a tenth of a percent of HS2’s total budget), are insufficient to explain why British infrastructure is so expensive to build, regulation is still a major cost-driver via an indirect route.

What matters for cost reduction is ultimately the ability to retain expertise between projects, to build supply-chains that spread fixed-costs over multiple projects, and to innovate in construction and design. The problem is regulation undermines all of these proven cost-reducers. In the case of nuclear, safety regulations force frequent design changes between projects undermining learning-by-doing. While a long drawn-out and uncertain planning process (plus the threat of judicial review) mean that investments in supply chains become incredibly risky – workers and equipment may sit idle for years between projects.

So why might centralisation be an issue? Because it exacerbates the planning and regulatory problems that drive costs increases.

In Britain, local authorities have every incentive to block new development and little incentive to say yes. New homes put pressure on public services and infrastructure. In some parts of the world, new development also brings a new cash flow. A $500,000 (£400,000) home in Houston generates around $9,000 (£7,200) in annual property tax revenue. Council tax in England is far lower, a home of equivalent value might bring in just £2,200 a year, roughly a third as much. And in Britain, councils have fewer freedoms to spend that revenue on their priorities – most of that £2,200 will go on statutory services like social care.

Britain’s most significant tax on housing is Stamp Duty, which flows directly to HM Treasury (and not to the local authority). Business Rates, which apply to commercial development, are only partially retained. Outside of special areas, local authorities only receive half of the revenue raised from business property taxes on new development. And funding formulas for local government often change for redistributive ends. Put simply, the fiscal incentives to approve development in Britain are extremely weak.

Some argue that the way to overcome local opposition to development is shifting decision making up a level. Labour’s re-imposition of housing targets and California’s Builders’ Remedy (where places that fail to build are forced to approve new homes) are two examples of this approach. The Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project system, where planning approval for major transport and energy projects is decided on by independent central experts (and not the areas affected) is another.

The problem is that nationalising planning policy doesn’t eliminate anti-development energy. It redirects it. The most effective way to stop unwanted development locally may not be to oppose it directly, but to lobby for national rules that make all types of development harder.

Want to stop new homes being built on farmland near the edge of your town? Lobby for a stronger green belt that blocks homes being built on farmland on the edge of every town. Want to stop a new motorway that might shift traffic to your area? Campaign for tougher nature protections that apply equally to motorways in Kent, trams in West Yorkshire, and nuclear power stations in Somerset. Anti-pylon activists in East Anglia are some of the strongest defenders of the National Landscapes duty, which blocked a station car park expansion in Essex, created problems for airport expansion in Bedfordshire, and delayed housebuilding in Kent.

And if you are a Government minister who wants to repeal a law that makes it easy to sue developers or a law that mandates extensive consultation, be prepared to fight a coalition of people opposed to motorways in Kent, homes in Hampshire, and nuclear power stations in Somerset who would have little in common other than opposing development near them.

Not every development is unpopular, but even popular developments have to comply with regulations and requirements designed to stop unpopular developments. There are few environmental wins more clear-cut than taking cars off the road and replacing them with trams. Trams are good for air quality, cut carbon emissions, and reduce noise. They are also popular. Poll after poll shows high levels of support for a tram in Leeds. Yet the same environmental bureaucracy built-up to delay and block more controversial types of development is also holding up popular new green infrastructure. Over 5,000 environmental surveys have been carried out for the now-delayed Leeds tram.

In other words, the incentive mismatch caused by Britain’s excessive centralisation has not only prompted the creation of tools to stop controversial development, but also created the crud that makes it hard to build almost anything.

This incentive mismatch is not the only driver of the growth of planning and environmental red-tape. People support environmental regulation in part because they sincerely want to protect the environment. Post-Grenfell fire safety rules make it much harder to build new residential towers, but they were adopted out of a genuine concern for safety. Planners genuinely believe that the planning restrictions they advocate around light, outdoor space, height, and so on, do create more ‘liveable’ places. Yet centralisation matters here too. If local authorities depend on new development for revenue, they would have a strong incentive to push back on excessive restrictions on building. There would be a political cost to regulatory growth. The problem is for many opponents and veto-players, the trade-off for greater environmental protection/fire safety (less development) is a feature not a bug.

France’s rapid nuclear buildout is sometimes understood as a triumph of the state overriding local objections. Tony Benn was famously told by a French official that ‘when you drain a swamp, you don’t consult the frogs’. Sizewell C by contrast had 7 separate consultations in 8 years. Yet there’s another side to the story. France’s tax system, which levied taxes on business structures (a bit like business rates), meant that areas which hosted nuclear power stations benefitted massively financially. Alex Chalmers notes that “French councils paid an average of €35 in subsidies … per local resident. In the 19 areas that hosted nuclear power, the average was €450.” This may be why support for France’s nuclear programme remained strong even in the wake of disasters like Chernobyl.

It is a world away from the incentives in Britain. Hinkley Point C’s community benefit package of £128m over 40 years works out to roughly £6 per Somerset resident per year. Britain’s tax on business structures provides much weaker incentives to approve development: councils retain only 50% of the rates they raise locally, face levies of up to 50% on ‘disproportionate’ growth, and see gains redistributed nationally based on ‘needs’ at regular intervals. Unlike in France, Hinkley Point C’s rates windfall will not lead to local tax cuts visible on every household bill.

There are other ways centralisation creates problems in Britain. Transport projects are typically funded out of national pots. There is a separation between who pays, who benefits and who approves. If a project is over-budget or gold-plated in various ways, locals don’t bear the burden. Londoners are not paying £4bn more in tax because Crossrail was £4bn over-budget. Instead, the costs are spread across the whole country. This can happen, as it did with HS2, but when a project has sufficient momentum behind it, it becomes a prime opportunity to get pet projects funded.

Britain’s planning system contains multiple veto points where public bodies who have, at best, weak incentives for projects to be delivered cost-effectively can cause significant delay (and in some cases, kill projects all together).

When Crossrail was being planned, Tower Hamlets Council submitted a list of 96 objections. After extensive negotiation Crossrail were able to resolve the dispute – by accepting 94 of them – though the Council came back with even more. Due to the length of Crossrail, this process was repeated for 15 other councils. In some cases, redesigns in response to objections (the Fire Brigade requested eight large emergency evacuation shafts across Central London) were themselves redesigned (read: cancelled) in response to objections from boroughs.

165. How Different House Purchases used to be, are Now and Will be in the Future

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In Victorian times, society was shaped by values, technologies, and ways of life that are almost unrecognisable today.

Steam powered industry, rigid social hierarchies, horse-drawn transport, and limited communication defined an age that, from our perspective, feels distant and unfamiliar. Yet the Victorians, confident in their progress, believed they understood the direction of the future. They could not have imagined the transformations that followed: electricity, aviation, digital technology, and global interconnection.

If the world has changed so profoundly in little more than a century, it suggests that our own assumptions about what lies ahead may be just as fragile. The future is not a simple extension of the present – it is unpredictable, and often unimaginable.

In Victorian times (roughly 1837–1901), house purchase and mortgage finance were very different from today. Mortgages certainly existed, but they were far less common, the lending market was tightly regulated by social class, and large deposits were generally required. Most ordinary working families rented, while home ownership was largely restricted to the middle and upper classes until the late 19th century. Here’s a breakdown:

1. Early Victorian Period (1837–1870s)

  • Mortgages were rare for the working class.

  • Property was generally purchased outright by the wealthy or financed through private arrangements, often within families.

  • Where mortgages were available, they were provided by:

    • Solicitors (private lawyers acting as moneylenders)

    • Wealthy individuals

  • Occasionally landed estates for long-term tenants buying freeholds.

  • Loan-to-value ratios were low: lenders were conservative, typically offering up to 50% of the property’s value, sometimes less.

  • Deposits of 50% or more were common for those who borrowed.

  • Repayments were usually interest-only, with the capital repaid at the end of the term.

This meant most artisans, labourers, and low-income families had no access to mortgage finance at all and remained lifelong tenants.

2. The rise of Building Societies (1850s onwards)

By the mid-Victorian period, building societies began to transform the mortgage market, particularly for the emerging middle class and better-paid skilled workers.

  • Early building societies were terminating societies:

    • A group of members pooled savings until there was enough to build or buy each member a house, after which the society dissolved.

  • By the 1870s, permanent building societies became widespread, offering ongoing mortgage finance.

  • Building societies offered smaller loans, but on slightly better terms than solicitors.

  • Typical deposit requirement: around 20%–30% of the property value, sometimes more for riskier borrowers.

  • Repayments were usually repayment mortgages rather than interest-only, which made home ownership possible for clerks, teachers, shopkeepers, and better-off artisans.

3. Late Victorian Period (1880s–1901)

By the late Victorian era, mortgages became more widely available as the middle class expanded and suburbs grew.

  • Building societies dominated the lending market, and competition slightly improved terms.

  • Deposits of 10%–25% were possible for reliable borrowers, but 25%–33% was more typical.

  • Loan terms were short by modern standards, often 10–20 years.

  • The interest rate tended to be 4–6%, relatively stable because prices were generally stable.

  • Nevertheless, most working-class families still rented, especially in cities. Home ownership remained aspirational until well into the 20th century.

4. Key Differences from Today

Aspect Victorian Mortgages Modern Mortgages
Availability Limited to middle & upper classes Widely available
Deposit 20%–50% (sometimes more) Often 5%–20%
Term 10–20 years 25–40 years
Repayment Style Mix of interest-only & repayment Mostly repayment
Lenders Solicitors, wealthy individuals, building societies Banks, building societies
Access for Working Class Very limited Widely available

The Victorian model of funding house purchases were that different from today because consumerism and the related expectaton of growth in prices, which has prevailed since the late 1960s, did not exist in the 19th century. 

In the future, when a shrinking economy becomes established as the new normal, the post-growth model of house purchases will be as different again.  If house prices decline as a result of declining prosperity, long term loans will not be commercially viable.

Any kind of borrowing will be unsustainable.  Property owned free of of debts will be valuable as somewhere to live and run a business, which will retain its intrinsic value.  The long-term usefulness of the house for living., will be maintained regardless of market price fluctuations.

114. The Hidden Costs of Poor Ventilation in Modern Homes

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As I wrote in January 2023. Lastingly high energy prices have created the perfect conditions for the rise of a particular blight across the country. 

Surveyors have reported a tenfold increase in calls from worried landlords and homeowners. These landlords and homeowners have discovered damp and mould hiding in their properties. This issue threatens to cause chaos.

New-build homes in the UK must last 60 years, but without mechanical ventilation, they may not last that long.

This standard, rooted in old mortgage provider requirements based on two typical mortgage terms, is becoming outdated. Concerns are growing as building materials and methods evolve to meet net-zero targets. This minimal lifespan is no longer good enough. It does not protect homeowners from future costs and failures.

Experts are increasingly critical of the situation. Freya Chapman from the ground engineering firm Mainmark has described it as an outrage that modern construction, with all the advantages of advanced engineering, still produces homes that may not last. She argues that stronger guarantees are essential and that legislation is urgently needed to ensure the durability and sustainability of new homes. Without such protections, repair costs will inevitably climb as these buildings fail in the coming decades.

Alongside structural concerns, the conditions inside many new homes are also deteriorating. Soaring energy prices have intensified problems that were already widespread. Surveyors report dramatic increases in damp and mould. Properties of all ages are affected, from Victorian terraces to homes built as recently as the mid-20th century.

The problem has taken on a modern twist in new builds. High levels of insulation and airtight construction, paired with inadequate ventilation, allow moisture to build up inside. The result is condensation, damp patches, and mold growth. These issues pose serious risks to both buildings and the health of those living in them.

Many occupants of new-build homes now report persistent mold problems. The cause lies in the very design features that are marketed as sustainable.

Homes are built to be airtight to conserve heat and reduce energy use. However, without continuous and adequate ventilation, moisture from daily life has nowhere to go.

In older houses, natural draughts and breathable materials provided some relief. Water vapour lingers in today’s sealed environments, settling on cold surfaces and allowing mold to thrive.

Air-source heat pumps, widely promoted as the future of home heating, add another layer to the problem. While these systems work efficiently in airtight, well-insulated buildings, they do nothing to remove stale air or reduce humidity. Heat pumps move heat but don’t manage air quality.

Moisture accumulates without a dedicated ventilation system like Mechanical Ventilation with Heat Recovery (MVHR). This is often overlooked as developers focus on energy ratings and insulation while treating ventilation as an afterthought. Basic extractor fans or window trickle vents are commonly installed. However, they are rarely sufficient in winter. Windows remain shut, reducing their effectiveness.

Homeowners deal with black mold on walls and ceilings. They suffer from respiratory problems. They often rely on stopgap solutions like bleach and dehumidifiers. The promise of sustainable living in a high-performance home quickly fades when the environment becomes unhealthy. True sustainability means designing homes that work in practice and theory. These homes should balance energy efficiency with the need for fresh air. They must also guarantee healthy living conditions.

The government’s energy advice encourages draft-proofing as a key way to reduce heat loss and cut bills. Yet this overlooks airflow’s crucial role in preventing damp and mold. Without providing alternative ventilation, sealing a house from draughts can backfire. Blocking chimneys and sealing gaps can hold moisture, accelerating the very problems these measures were meant to solve.

These risks are already becoming clear. In early 2025, the UK government banned nearly 40 construction firms from installing insulation. Widespread reports of shoddy workmanship, including exposed insulation and insufficient ventilation, prompted this action. Homeowners caught in these failings have been unable to sell their homes. They can’t remortgage them. As a result, they stay stuck with properties suffering from damp and decay.

Despite these warning signs, many developers continue to build large estates with air-source heat pumps but no proper ventilation systems. MVHR remains rare outside of high-spec, bespoke eco-homes. Instead, most estates rely on basic fans in bathrooms and kitchens. They use minimal window vents. Sometimes, they have little more than the bare minimum to meet building regulations.

Developers avoid MVHR to keep costs down. Still, the industry lacks the knowledge to design genuinely low-energy, breathable homes. Building regulations reinforce this problem by focusing on insulation standards rather than making comprehensive ventilation mandatory.

Until this changes, new-build homes will continue to be plagued by damp, mold, and poor indoor air quality. The cycle will repeat as buyers move into brand-new properties. They will only discover the uncomfortable reality of living in a sealed box without adequate airflow.

Stronger regulations and a commitment to whole-house ventilation are essential. Without these, the promise of sustainable housing will remain an illusion. The homes being built today will not last a lifetime. They will fail to offer a healthy place to live from the very start.

102, New City may be Built on a Flood Plain

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Tempsford, a village in Bedfordshire, is being considered for a significant housing development that could transform it into a major city accommodating 350,000 residents. This proposal aligns with Labour’s initiative to establish a new generation of towns, with Angela Rayner, the housing secretary, launching a taskforce to identify suitable locations. However, the Government maintains that no specific sites have been finalized yet.

Despite its potential for development, Tempsford faces notable challenges, particularly its susceptibility to flooding. The village frequently experiences flooding when the River Great Ouse overflows, leading to surrounding fields being submerged. Additionally, there are ongoing sewage issues that exacerbate the area’s vulnerability.

The UK Day One think tank has identified Tempsford as “probably the best-connected greenfield site in Britain,” suggesting its suitability for large-scale development. However, the existing environmental concerns, especially the flood risks, raise questions about the feasibility and sustainability of such an extensive project in this location.

The proposal has elicited mixed reactions from the local community. While some residents may see potential benefits in terms of economic growth and infrastructure development, others are apprehensive about the environmental implications and the adequacy of current flood defences to support a significantly larger population.

In summary, while Tempsford is under consideration for a transformative housing development as part of Labour’s new town initiatives, its propensity for flooding and existing sewage problems present substantial challenges that need to be addressed to ensure the project’s viability and the safety of future residents.

 
 

101. Opt-Out Permits: A Tool for Decentralised Governance

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This is impossible in the UK now.  Eventually, it may become necessary.

In a rapidly evolving society, where the need for local adaptation increasingly challenges traditional regulation systems, opt-out permits offer a compelling solution. These permits allow individuals, communities, or organisations to opt out of certain formal regulations under specific conditions, fostering innovation and resilience within a controlled framework.

The Concept of Opt-Out Permits

Opt-out permits operate as exceptions to formal rules. Rather than blanket deregulation, they provide a structured mechanism for communities or individuals to bypass regulations that hinder progress or adaptation. The underlying premise is that centralised rules cannot always accommodate the diversity of local circumstances.

For instance, in planning development, national regulations often impose rigid standards for housing. While these standards are vital for safety and quality, they can hinder informal housing solutions for homeless people. Opt-out permits could allow communities to establish temporary housing that meets basic health and safety criteria, even if it does not fully comply with formal codes.

Benefits of Opt-Out Permits

  1. Empowering Localism
    Opt-out permits the shift of decision-making power to localities. This decentralisation aligns with localism’s principles, ensuring that solutions are tailored to specific needs.
  2. Fostering Innovation
    By removing regulatory obstacles, opt-out permits encourage experimentation. They create a safe space to test new ideas without the burden of full compliance, provided there is oversight to prevent harm.
  3. Addressing Urgent Needs
    Opt-out permits can fast-track solutions in times of crisis, such as housing shortages or environmental disasters. They reduce bureaucratic delays, enabling rapid responses to pressing issues.
  4. Building Trust and Collaboration
    Opt-out permits require transparent agreements between regulators and permit holders. This fosters a cooperative relationship and encourages shared responsibility for outcomes.

Examples of Application

  1. Urban Agriculture
    Strict zoning laws can prevent urban farming initiatives in cities. Opt-out permits could enable the use of vacant lots for community gardens or small-scale commercial farming, promoting food security and local resilience.
  2. Alternative Energy Projects
    Communities exploring renewable energy projects, such as small wind turbines or local solar farms, may face regulatory hurdles. Opt-out permits can allow pilot projects to test feasibility and community impact.
  3. Housing Innovation
    As homelessness rises, opt-out permits could support initiatives like tiny home villages or modular housing on underutilized land, bypassing conventional planning requirements temporarily.

Challenges and Safeguards

While the potential benefits of opt-out permits are significant, they also come with challenges:

  • Risk of Abuse: Clear guidelines must prevent the exploitation of permits for personal or corporate gain.
  • Equity Concerns: Permits should not disproportionately benefit wealthy or well-connected groups at the expense of marginalized communities.
  • Oversight: Regular reviews and community involvement are essential to ensure that opt-out permits achieve their intended goals without unintended consequences.

Conclusion

Opt-out permits represent a pragmatic approach to balancing regulation with flexibility. They acknowledge the limitations of one-size-fits-all governance and provide a pathway for tailored community-driven solutions. As society faces growing complexity, these permits could become a cornerstone of a more decentralised and responsive governance model.

92. Homelessness in the UK: An Aspect of the Transition to Localism

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Homelessness has increasingly become a pressing issue in the UK, with visible impacts in urban centers and smaller communities alike. In cities, where thousands pass through train stations, shopping centers, and landmarks each day, the homeless population is more visible. But behind the scenes, there’s a hidden and worsening crisis.

The YouTube video link offers a poignant example of this reality. It captures the daily struggles, the humanity, and the challenges of people experiencing homelessness. Viewers see the deeply personal stories that statistics often overlook, and this visibility is crucial for understanding the depth of the problem.

Living in Another World: The Social Exclusion of Homelessness

For those without a fixed address, the essential tools of participation in society are out of reach. Without an address, they cannot open a bank account, often a prerequisite for claiming welfare benefits or securing employment. Homeless people exist, in many ways, outside of normal society, living a parallel life without access to the financial and social systems most of us rely on. Living without money means they are forced to survive without conventional spending or support. In the UK any temporary shelter they manage to create or occupy—a tent, a shed, or even a homemade structure—is bound to be unlawful, underscoring the precariousness of their situation.

Rising Numbers and Complex Causes

According to recent figures, the number of people facing homelessness has risen over the last decade. This increase is attributed to various factors: rising rents, job instability, mental health issues, and lack of affordable housing. The shortage of social housing and ongoing economic pressures are exacerbating the crisis, pushing even those with stable jobs to the brink.

UK Planning Development Control: Standards and Challenges

UK planning development control plays a significant role in shaping living conditions across the country. These regulations ensure that all new constructions and renovations meet specific standards before planning permission is granted. The aim is to maintain minimum safety, environmental, and aesthetic standards, ultimately preventing situations where people are forced to live in makeshift shelters, sheds, or substandard “homemade hovels.”

While development control helps maintain the quality and safety of housing, it also presents a challenge in the context of homelessness. People with limited financial means who might consider creating unconventional, low-cost living arrangements often find themselves constrained by these regulations. This can lead to further housing scarcity and highlight the need for innovative, affordable solutions within the bounds of planning policy.

Systemic Gaps and Solutions

Although designed to support vulnerable individuals, the UK’s welfare and housing systems often fall short due to bureaucratic hurdles and limited resources. Many who seek help are met with waiting lists or complex application processes. While charities and local organizations are essential in providing immediate relief, systemic changes are necessary to offer sustainable solutions.

A Path Forward

Addressing homelessness in the UK will require both short- and long-term strategies, from increasing social housing stock to reforming welfare policies that better accommodate those in need. Additionally, societal attitudes toward homelessness must shift from viewing it solely as an individual problem to recognizing it as a societal responsibility.

The video linked above reminds us of the human faces behind homelessness—individuals with hopes, struggles, and potential.

Addressing this crisis requires policy changes and a shift in how we manage planning development control. Moving from the formal, centralised system to a more localised, informal model could allow homeless individuals to access free-to-inhabit land where they can safely park caravans, build shanties, or create campsites.

Localism would empower communities to determine how the land can best serve their vulnerable members, fostering creative solutions that traditional standards often overlook. By rethinking planning control, we could pave the way for a more compassionate, inclusive society where everyone has a place to call home—even if that home is modest, temporary, or unconventional.

85. The UK’s Housing Crisis: Declining Prosperity, Climate Change, Immigration, and the Need for Sustainable Housing Design

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The UK is grappling with a deepening housing crisis driven by declining prosperity, increasing immigration, the effects of climate change, and an ageing population. The convergence of these factors puts immense pressure on housing supply and demand, making it harder to afford homes while existing properties fall into disrepair.

To tackle this challenge, future housing policies must incorporate climate-conscious design—such as integrating trees for shade and homes with gardens to support food security. Immigration adds another layer of urgency to the issue, further straining the availability of affordable housing.

Immigration and Rising Housing Demand

The UK’s population has been significantly influenced by immigration, particularly in recent years. According to the Office for National Statistics, net migration to the UK reached record highs in 2022, with around 606,000 more people arriving than leaving. This surge is driven by global conflict, economic instability in other countries, and international students entering the UK. While immigration brings economic and social benefits, it also increases demand for housing at a time when supply is already insufficient.

The rise in immigration exacerbates existing pressures on the housing market, making it harder for migrants and native populations to access affordable homes. With more people competing for limited housing, prices continue to rise, pushing ownership out of reach for many and increasing competition for rental properties. As the population grows, the need for affordable and sustainable housing becomes ever more urgent.

Declining Prosperity and the Essential Role of Gardens to Avert Food Poverty

Amid the challenges of a growing population, the UK is experiencing long-term economic stagnation, with declining prosperity affecting wages, inflation, and the cost of living. This is particularly tough for older people, many of whom face shrinking incomes in retirement. However, housing must now go beyond simply providing shelter—it must also play a role in food security as the cost of living rises.

New homes must include gardens to help combat food poverty. In the face of rising food costs, having space to grow vegetables and fruit can make a significant difference for households, particularly those with lower incomes. Access to shared allotments or community gardens should be considered a vital aspect of housing development for residents in urban areas or flats. This would help address food poverty and build community resilience by promoting self-sufficiency.

This idea refers to the post-World War II period when domestic food production became essential. In today’s economic climate, gardens and allotments are no longer luxuries; they are necessities to help address rising food insecurity.

The Climate Crisis and the Importance of Trees in New Housing Design

The climate crisis is reshaping how housing must be designed. Rising temperatures, more frequent extreme weather events, and increased flooding are all pressing issues impacting where and how homes can be built. Floodplain areas once deemed suitable for housing are now uninhabitable or uninsurable, while flooding risks continue to rise across the country due to the changing climate.

New housing developments must prioritise climate resilience. A critical aspect of this is incorporating trees and green spaces in urban planning. Trees provide natural shade, crucial for mitigating the heat island effect in cities, where rising temperatures can make living conditions unbearable during heatwaves. They also offer a natural way to cool homes, reducing the need for energy-intensive air conditioning.

Furthermore, integrating trees and green spaces into housing developments enhances biodiversity and improves the quality of life for residents. Trees can absorb rainwater, reduce flooding risks, and contribute to cleaner air—essential benefits as the UK continues to face the impacts of global warming.

Ageing Homes: Mould, Uninhabitable Conditions, and Future Energy Challenges

The ageing housing stock in the UK is a growing concern. Many older homes are becoming uninhabitable due to problems such as mould, often caused by poor ventilation and moisture trapped in homes retrofitted for energy efficiency. Damp and mould pose serious health risks, especially for vulnerable groups such as children and older people.

Moreover, many households are transitioning to renewable energy systems, such as heat pumps and photovoltaic (solar) panels, as part of the UK’s push to reduce carbon emissions. While these systems are essential for energy efficiency, they have limited lifespans. Heat pumps, for example, need replacing after about 15 to 20 years, and the costs—often between £7,000 and £13,000—will be unaffordable for many households, particularly in an environment of declining prosperity.

The same is valid for photovoltaic systems, which will need replacement in the long term. As these energy systems reach the end of their life cycles, the financial burden of replacing them could make homes cold and energy-inefficient, exacerbating housing inequality. Due to failing energy systems, many homes may become uninhabitable without affordable maintenance solutions or government support.

Environmental Constraints: Flooding, Brownfield Sites, and Limited Land Availability

As the climate crisis worsens, flooding becomes a more frequent threat to housing developments, rendering previously safe land uninhabitable. Floodplain areas once prime for development are now at high risk of flooding, making them unsuitable for building without significant and costly flood mitigation efforts. This reduces the amount of available land for new housing projects.

Additionally, brownfield sites, seen as a solution to land scarcity, present new challenges. Many of these areas are either too contaminated from former industrial use or have become ecologically valuable habitats that support urban biodiversity. Preserving these brownfield sites is essential for the environment but limits the space available for housing development.

Alternative Housing: Mobile Homes, Tented Villages, and Planning Reform

With conventional housing becoming increasingly unaffordable and land scarcer, alternative living forms could become more common. Mobile homes, caravans, and tented villages might offer temporary solutions for those priced out of the housing market. Farmers, under economic pressure, may rent out land for these alternative housing communities.

This shift will require significant changes to the UK’s planning system, which is designed for permanent, traditional housing developments. Local authorities may need to adopt a more flexible approach, allowing for temporary housing solutions in rural and suburban areas as demand for affordable accommodation rises.

Long-Term Solutions: Climate-Conscious Housing Design

The UK’s housing crisis requires a long-term approach emphasising climate resilience, sustainability, and affordability. Homes must be designed to withstand the impacts of climate change while addressing the needs of a growing and ageing population. This includes incorporating natural cooling systems like trees for shade, gardens for food self-sufficiency, and affordable energy systems to maintain long-term.

Future homes must also be built with the understanding that, over time, renewable energy systems like heat pumps and solar panels will need to be replaced. Planning for this now, with government support and financial assistance, will be essential to prevent homes from becoming uninhabitable in the future.

Conclusion

The UK’s housing crisis is not just about affordability but also about the long-term sustainability of homes in the face of growing demand from immigration, climate change, and declining prosperity. New housing developments must integrate trees, gardens, and climate-conscious design features to build resilience against rising temperatures, food poverty, and energy costs.

As the population continues to grow and the climate crisis intensifies, the UK’s housing strategy must evolve to ensure homes are designed for its residents’ present and future needs. A sustainable, climate-resilient approach will be essential in addressing the complex and overlapping challenges of housing in the coming decades.

70. Mould:  The not-so-silent threat in people’s homes

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In January 2023, I wrote about the silent threat lurking in people’s homes. 

Surveyors have reported a tenfold increase in calls from worried landlords and homeowners who have discovered damp and mould hiding in their ­properties – and threatening to cause chaos.

And how today’s standards may be tomorrow’s problems.

Sooner than I expected, the BBC website has reported that Homes insulated in government scheme go mouldy.

So, the government’s policies on home insulation are proving to be bad for our health.

What is not reported is that a lack of ventilation causes the mould.  Not, as suggested, a botched installation.

Moreover, the government policy to install heat pumps is proving too expensive for ordinary families to install and run.

Not only are heat pumps unaffordable, but the mechanical ventilation systems required to keep houses damp-free and healthy are also unaffordable to install and will incur running costs, which will turn out to be discretionary.  As will the heat pumps.

An even bigger problem is that as prosperity has been inflecting from flat-lining into contraction, whole-house heating costs will become increasingly unaffordable. As a result, so-called modern houses built to be airtight will become undesirable places to live and uninhabitable by today’s standards—even worse than the houses in the post-WWI2 slums.

The time has come to abandon all policies and standards of house design and construction and allow individuals to decide what to build.  A popular culture of house design and construction will quickly emerge.

66. Why were roads, schools, hospitals, and now new houses only built to last for 20 years? 

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Why were roads, schools, hospitals, and now new houses only built to last for 20 years? 

I wonder if a characteristic of the last years of the industrial era was to avoid long-term thinking and planning.    These were not conscious decisions but a consequence of how the economy evolved in response to borrowing from the late 1960s onwards.

I can’t find any explicit decisions by the government to plan for only 20 years, but I can suggest why it was so.

In the post-World War II era, as nations embarked on massive reconstruction efforts to rebuild their infrastructure and houses, a prevailing mindset focused more on immediate needs rather than long-term sustainability.  This mentality led to constructing roads, schools, hospitals, and other critical structures with a life span of only around 20 years.  Several factors contributed to this phenomenon.

  1. The Urgency of Reconstruction: After the devastation of war, there was an urgent need to rebuild infrastructure swiftly to restore normality to people’s lives.  The primary concern was to address immediate needs such as housing, roads, education, and healthcare.  This urgency often resulted in adopting quick and cost-effective construction methods, sacrificing longevity for speed.
  2. Technological Limitations: The post-war era was not characterised by the advanced construction techniques and materials we have today.  Engineers and builders worked with what was available then, which sometimes meant using materials and methods that were not as durable as those used today or earlier.
  3. Economic Considerations: Many countries faced financial constraints after the war.  Governments had to prioritise spending on rebuilding efforts while managing other pressing issues such as unemployment and housing shortages.  As a result, there was often limited funding available for infrastructure projects, leading to compromises in quality and longevity.
  4. Changing Needs and Technologies: The post-war period was a time of rapid technological advancement and societal change.  As new technologies emerged and societal needs evolved, the infrastructure built immediately after the war quickly became outdated.  Rather than investing in long-lasting designs that might become obsolete within a few decades, decision-makers opted for more flexible solutions that could adapt to changing circumstances.
  5. Lack of Long-Term Planning: In the chaotic aftermath of war, long-term planning took a back seat to immediate needs.  Governments and planners were focused on addressing the most pressing issues of the day, often at the expense of considering the future sustainability of infrastructure projects.  As a result, many structures were built with a shorter lifespan, as long-term planning was not a priority.

While the decision to build infrastructure with a limited lifespan may have been pragmatic given the circumstances of the time, it has led to challenges in modern times.  Today, the UK faces the daunting task of upgrading, replacing and repairing infrastructure built in the post-war era to meet the needs of the growing 20th century.

The same short-term culture prevails today in building individual houses and estates with government-required heat pumps, ventilation and insulation with a lifespan of around 20 years.

In effect, most building projects since WW2 have been built to standards recommended by professional institutions, such as building regulations set by the government.

The advent of localism is an opportunity to do things differently.

Properly implemented localism must eliminate centrally regulated construction practices and allow homeowners and their builders to decide how and what to build.  Building design and construction can evolve with local standardisation as in former centuries.   Every cottage in my parish in Herefordshire was built over 100 years ago to an internal size of 20 ft by 12 ft.

It would then be up to individuals to decide whether to build for future generations or just for their lifetime.  A matter of individual needs and judgment: This solves the housing problems of those who can only afford to build sheds or others to extend their houses to accommodate elderly relatives or extended families.

Localism may take years to become a widespread culture, but there is no reason why it shouldn’t start when the disintegration of post-war construction becomes recognised.

Localist communities would then build their lanes, expecting to maintain them as often as needed.  More on hills, corners, and junctions than less hilly sections.

As they were in the past, schools and hospitals would be built for future generations.

We should not forget the rebuilding of railways built on foundations and with bridges over 150 years old.

It was almost as if the post-war roads and other constructions were built only to last until the end of industrialism when they would be no longer needed.